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in Great Britain 
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Britain’s national rail system was ‘privatised’ as a result of the 1993 Railways Act, with most of 
the organisational and ownership changes implemented by 1997.  This thesis examines the 
long term impacts of the privatisation initiative on the passenger rail service. A key issue when 
examining long term changes is that of the counterfactual – what would have happened if the 
changes had not occurred?  A simple econometric model of the demand for passenger rail 
services was developed and used in conjunction with extrapolative methods for key variables 
such as fares, train kms and GDP to determine demand-side counterfactuals. Extrapolative 
methods were also used to determine counterfactual infrastructure and train operation costs.   
  Although since privatisation rail demand has grown strongly, the analysis indicates that 
transitional disruptions suppressed demand by around 4% over a prolonged period (1994/95 
to 2005/6), whilst the Hatfield accident reduced demand by about 5%, albeit over a short 
period (2000/1 to 2005/6). A welfare analysis indicates that although consumers gained as a 
result of privatisation, for most years this has been offset by increases in costs. An exception is 
provided by the two years immediately before the Hatfield accident. Overall the loss in 
welfare since the reforms were introduced far exceeds the net receipts from the sale of rail 
businesses. It is found that although the reforms have had advantages in terms of lower fares 
and better service levels than otherwise would have been the case, this has been offset by 
adverse transitional effects and high costs, which in turn may be linked with higher 
transaction costs. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Railway Research 
The railways in Great Britain have recently celebrated their second centenary and in typical 
British style this was greeted with grumbles about rising fare prices (Savage, 2009), service 
provision and reliability (Kassam, 2006) as well as political unrest over increasing costs and 
instability concerns of franchise agreements (TSC, 2009b). The railways have always attracted 
a mixture of emotions from the romantic to the ultra-critical and in some instances the 
reporting has also tended to be conveyed under these terms. Rail research covers broad 
topics such as history, engineering and technology, economics, social benefits, political 
constraints and health and safety and is never confined to one discipline – geography, social 
policy, history, economics, politics and transport. This enables the researcher the opportunity 
of a diversity of methodologies and empirical standings from which to build. 
Considered a superior mode of transport compared to road and canal in the early days it was 
expected to develop and profit accordingly but, rather than a steady rise in growth and 
popularity, the railways have experienced a rollercoaster of highs and lows and ownership and 
management structure has appeared to have changed more often than the Governments that 
have tried to control them. It is this flux that the railways have found themselves in that 
makes researching them both interesting and complex. Studies of the rail industry are 
sometimes conflicting and the wide choice of variables to consider and methodologies to 
utilise mean that a definitive agreement is rarely reached. 
The latter part of the twentieth century saw widespread governmental policy change, coming 
after years of governmental expansion and increasing state ownership, in the form of 
privatisation. Main utilities, communications and large manufacturing and services all felt the 
impact of market forces and separation of vertical and horizontal component parts. The 
railways were not spared this seemingly continuous onslaught of industry fragmentation 
although, as one of the largest and considered most unwieldy of industries, plans were 
continually shelved until the next government term.  The modern railways, post-World War 2, 
have been the subject of some of the broadest scope of research with the privatisation 
initiative seeing some of the most prolific research of any industry sector. Interest in the 
railways is often spurred on by events that occur and the Hatfield crash is one such event that 
has been seen from technological perspectives (Cannon et al., 2003, Smith, 2003), cost 
implications (Kennedy and Smith, 2004), politics (Glaister, 2004), health and safety (Jeffcott et Dawn Louise Robins         
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al., 2006, Evans, 2007) and social culture (Hiscock et al., 2002).  The privatisation initiative has 
also been approached from a political (Dobek, 1993, Shaw et al., 2003), economic (Smith and 
Wheat, 2007, Smith, 2006, Preston, 2008b), social, employment (MacKinnon, 2008) and 
efficiency (Fraja, 1991, Cowie, 2009) perspective.  
The majority of studies look at specific time scales or events and concentrate on an aspect of 
railways – freight, infrastructure, fares and costs, - as to do otherwise would render the 
methodology too complex to employ and provide a less rigorous analysis. An analysis of the 
impact of privatisation on the entire passenger network over a long term period is something 
that has not yet been achieved and it is here that this research aims to address the balance. It 
has been 15yrs since the privatisation of the network was carried out and this period has seen 
many changes to the organisational structure as the network ‘settled’ into its new ownership 
status.  
This research takes the time scale of the run-up to privatisation, the transitional period, and 
the post privatisation period as being 30yrs  from 1979 to 2009 and covers the political and 
economic platform from which the privatisation initiative was initiated and the changes that 
have taken place. How the peripheral events have impacted on the railways organisational 
process and how long these effects have remained prevalent will be looked at as part of a long 
run trend analysis and ex-post cost benefit analysis (CBA). Taking account of the broader 
issues of the social, economic and political challenges that have taken place will help to give 
this research clarity and help it evolve into more than an economic analysis. This thesis, 
primarily, is not an exercise in econometrics, but uses econometrics as a means to an end. It is 
the narrative that surrounds the CBA that adds depth of understanding and provides a 
plausible explanation for the results of the CBA.       
The aim of this research is, therefore, to look at the economic, political, social and cost 
implications that have been part of the platform to privatisation and to carry out a cost 
benefit analysis using the relevant data to try and ascertain what the main benefits and costs 
have been, and where these costs can be attributed. The research develops a model, using the 
available data variables, to predict the forecast for passenger kilometres after privatisation 
and compares this trend to what has actually happened in the industry. Using a counterfactual 
scenario – a continued nationalised industry – the model calculates the impact of the 
privatisation and the benefits and consumer surplus that have been identified. The costs of 
running the railway – from both a nationalised and privatised scenario – are calculated and 
the costs attributed to Users, Non-Users, Operators and the Government.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Defining the structure of the thesis and what can be included as evidence has been a 
constantly evolving exercise. The complexity of the industry coupled with the large amount of 
available research has provided immense resources from which this research can draw. The 
following chapters have been designed to tell a narrative of modern rail whilst providing a 
clear and balanced view of the impacts and strategies as they occurred.  
The literature is reviewed first and offers explanations for the political and economic 
processes of nationalisation and privatisation and covers a brief history of the rail industry. 
The methodological options of cost benefit and other economic analyses are discussed as part 
of the methodology chapter and the proposed methodology for this thesis discussed. To 
understand the impacts on the rail industry and to choose the variables that will be used to 
ascertain the costs and benefits of the privatisation initiative there is a discussion on the 
trends that have directly and indirectly affected the rail patronage. These include the 
identification of trends in cost, quality and patronage for passenger rail and the disaggregated 
trends in ticket type and sector. The trends in alternative transport modes – car, air and bus – 
are also analysed with the view of finding comparable trends and possible impacts on rail 
patronage along with the environmental and demographic trends. The aim of this section of 
the research is to identify the variables that will be used in modelling the impacts on rail 
patronage. It is here that the availability of data, its ability to be collated and manipulated 
over the 30 year time frame and capacity to develop a plausible answer to the rise in 
passenger rail patronage will be explored. 
The analysis of the data is separated into two chapters – developing the model for 
ascertaining the welfare gains, and an analysis of the cost impacts. The process of developing 
and defining the model, that best describes the impacts on privatisation, is given in the first 
analysis chapter where the counterfactual scenario is also developed. Costs and benefits are 
disaggregated through the dialogue and brought together to identify the specific impacts in 
monetary terms. 
The research concludes with a discussion on the findings and the methodology used, 
highlights areas of further work and alternative methods. The conclusion chapter of this thesis 
summarises the findings and processes and identifies the contribution that the research has 
made to the current literature. 
This thesis is ultimately a story of a journey through the last 30 years of the rail industry and 
attempts have been made to view this time period with an holistic approach thereby Dawn Louise Robins         
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encompassing the vast array of impacts and events that have occurred. It is fitting, therefore, 
that this thesis starts with an overview and grasp of the political and economic theories and 
ideologies around public and private ownership before relating this through a background to 
the rail industry that outlines the major events that have helped to shape its future.          Dawn Louise Robins         
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2  Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
The time scales covered in this research warrant an understanding of the backdrop to the 
topic. The history of the railways has been written about many times from different political, 
economic, and historical viewpoints but the privatisation of industries across the globe is a 
significant political and economic occurrence during the 1980s onwards. The first section of 
this literature review will examine the process of privatisation - the theory, ideologies, 
methodologies, and possible reasons for applying it to the railways - and how this process has 
evolved and developed in recent years. The second section will look at the modern history of 
the railway industry in Great Britain and relate the theories and ideologies around industry 
ownership to the timescales of the research period to determine why it was deemed 
necessary to privatise it. Finally, it is necessary to understand what aspects of rail privatisation 
have already been covered, what methodologies were chosen and the depth and breadth 
covered in this research. The review of the literature will therefore cover three main areas: 
1.  An understanding of the ideology and theory of privatisation and the merits of 
privatised firms compared to nationalised firms and how this relates to the rail 
industry in Great Britain 
2.  The modern history of the railways and the controversy over the privatisation 
initiative including the politics, economics and logistics of privatising the railways 
3.  The privatised rail industry – a discussion on the constantly evolving structure and the 
impacts that have shaped it. 
There is a vast literature on privatisation, but for the purposes of this thesis the literature 
included in this review is, apart from the initial discussions on the theory of privatisation, 
specifically related to rail privatisation and business organisation. Although privatisation is 
instigated by governments for reasons of politics and/or economics (Opper, 2004, Dobek, 
1993, Bradshaw, 1995), it is still a method of company structuring and financing. There may 
be an argument for determining that privatisation was a natural outcome of global business 
and economic processes (Foster, 1994).  
The literature on specific methodologies for accounting for changes in demand and modelling 
costs and benefits is abundant. To cover the entire spectrum of literature applicable to this 
research within one chapter would not be conducive to achieving a concise yet Dawn Louise Robins         
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comprehensive study, therefore, the research on methodology and the current findings of 
research using economic modelling have been reviewed within the methodology chapter. This 
will enable a full discussion on the methodologies that have been developed for this research.  
2.2   Privatisation versus Nationalisation – the theories and ideologies 
of ownership 
2.2.1  Introduction 
Privatisation was first used as a ‘jargon’ term developed in the 1970’s along with many other 
economic ‘buzz-words’. Unlike other economic terms it appeared enduring enough to last, 
turning into an internationally recognised slogan and having a considerable impact on the 
politics and economies of many countries around the world. Privatisation has no distinct 
definition, meaning many things to many people, but a broad general explanation involves 
introducing some form of private ownership into public enterprise (Hood, 1994, O'Loughlin, 
2005).  
Privatisation is essentially a product of an ideology that saw a political break from social 
democracy (Else, 1994). Sometimes referred to as Thatcherism, or the New Right, this change 
of political direction was not necessarily a Conservative policy – other Conservative 
Governments had been happy to support a welfare state and largely publicly owned industry 
sector – therefore it can be argued that the change in policy may have occurred in some form 
or another regardless of who had been in power at the time and the change in political stance 
is seen as a Neo-liberal turn (Shaw, 2000). Privatisation, during the 1980s, was also prolific, in 
occurrence if not method, across the western world therefore could not be construed as a 
policy specific to a political party (Hood, 1994). Privatisation also comes in many forms and is 
not seen as a ‘one size fits all’ solution but rather a set of ingredients that can be picked from 
to achieve the best recipe for success. The interesting concept here is the ‘success’ element, 
considering how many privatisation initiatives have been perceived to have a mixed and 
sometimes negative impact (Ivaldi, 2008), and how and why the methods are chosen.  
The literature on privatisation is descriptive yet fails to provide an answer to the fundamental 
question ‘why did privatisation of industries occur at roughly the same time across the 
western world?’ Initial findings also show that privatisation – by its very nature – follows 
nationalisation yet the literature focuses on the privatisation initiatives rather than aiming to 
explain why nationalisation took place in the first instance. There is also the concern that the 
literature, rather than concerning itself with what has not been discussed looks to pigeon hole Dawn Louise Robins         
 
21 
 
the theories into themes and categories in an attempt to further the knowledge and 
understanding. Some of these theories are discussed here.  
2.2.2  Privatisation methods and Impacts 
It appears that the majority of the literature on privatisation concerns itself with two main 
issues: the methods of privatising the industry (Boycko et.al. 1996), and comparisons of 
efficiencies between state owned and private firms (González-Páramo and De Cos, 2005, 
Boardman et al., 2009). The descriptions of why privatisation took place can be seen as fitting 
into three theoretical stances: efficiency, political, and budgetary (Rosa, 2010).  
Efficiency theory is backed by many studies that explain how large nationalised firms are 
inefficient when compared to profit driven private firms (Pollitt, 1995, Letza et al., 2004, 
Marques, 2008). The political explanation looks to privatisation as a political ideology that 
aims to bring sweeping changes and benefits to the economy, yet, if this was the case, then 
privatisation would surely have been the norm in the first instance? The third theory explains 
privatisation as solving budgetary needs. This theory also has concerns as privatisation is 
neither quick, nor cheap, to carry out and many far simpler revenue generating schemes could 
have been instigated instead.  
According to Feigenbaum and Henig (1994) there were two main perspectives to privatisation 
theory: administrative and economic. The administrative perspective presents itself in the 
form of a series of ‘options’ that are used to pick-and-mix from in order to achieve the 
privatisation objectives. These tools can include deregulation, liberalisation, contracting, 
franchising and asset sales. Which tools are chosen will be dependent on the degree of 
competition, social responsibility, available information and the organisational capacity of the 
government (Ivaldi, 2008). The economic perspective ‘presents privatisation as the inevitable 
consequence of neoclassical truths that dictate the retraction of a bulky, intrusive, and 
parasitic welfare state’ (Feigenbaum and Henig 1994 p118).  
The tools for privatising industries are classified as: divestiture, liberalisation and privatisation, 
which, according to Else (1994) are all variations along a similar theme (Else, 1994), although it 
is the term privatisation that has consistently been attributed to the process .Divestiture 
usually applies to the sale of parts of an organisation; both poorly performing and non-vital or 
those worth more to a potential buyer than in their present position. British Rail divested 
many of its subsidiaries during the 1980s, prior to the eventual privatisation of the core Dawn Louise Robins         
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business: Hovercraft in 1981, BR Hotels in 1982-84, Sealink in 1984, to name just a few.  
Liberalisation, (deregulation) tends to be concerned with the opening of a market to full 
competition. In the case of British Rail, liberalisation has come later in the form of open access 
rights rather than at the start of the process as with the bus industry. Privatisation is the sale 
of public goods into the private sector – with or without competitive objectives. Privatisation 
can be carried out in various ways – (i) direct sales of parts or whole industries, (ii) flotation on 
the stock market (British Telecommunications and Railtrack were an example of privatising by 
stock market floatation), (iii) or contracting out of services  i.e. catering, maintenance etc. 
(now a widely used practice by Local Authorities). Privatisation offers the advantage of 
structuring the competitive part of the industry whereas liberalisation, although it can 
precipitate changes, can also lead to the subsequent structure becoming unpredictable 
(Newbery, 2002). The rail industry in Great Britain has used all three methods of privatisation 
over the 30 year span of this research, in what has become one of the largest public 
reorganisations ever carried out.  
Although the literature on nationalisation is less prolific than that on privatisation it is 
important to look at what has been written in order to understand the differences between a 
nationalised economy and a privatised economy. Public enterprise has been seen in varying 
degrees throughout the Western world and has been set up for reasons of economics, politics 
and logistics; although reasons offered to explain the emergence of public enterprise remain 
descriptive rather than explanatory (Hood, 1994). Main utilities such as Gas, Electricity and 
Water; communications such as mail and broadcasting; and heavy industry such as coal and 
steel have been the main sectors to be publically owned. The formation of public enterprise 
has varied across countries with France having had a large public sector whereas Sweden 
maintained only a small sector. Public enterprise can also be run in a variety of ways, from 
great monopolies such as British Gas, to metaphytic competition, such as broadcasting. Public 
enterprise enjoyed a strong position within sound economic practice and was expected to 
grow throughout the 20
th century as it provided security for both the workforce and 
consumer, and generated income for government policy expenditure. Public enterprise was 
also advocated throughout the developing world being seen as a key ingredient to economic 
growth and prosperity, and in many instances was a condition of grant aid. It came as a 
surprise to everyone when public ownership practise was challenged by the concept and then 
practise of privatisation.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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In many instances privatisation is motivated by property rights theory (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1973), which suggests that in competitive environments state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are 
less productive and less profitable than their private-sector equivalents (Boardman et al., 
2009). Property rights theory concerns itself with the concept of ownership and ability to 
control. Boardman suggests that the empirical support for property rights theory is three fold; 
1.  comparisons of samples of state-owned firms with private-sector firms in similar 
circumstances, or “like-like” studies (Pollitt, 1995) 
2.  “before-after” performance studies  
3.  “before-after” CBAs of specific privatisations (Pollitt and Smith, 2002). 
There is also empirical evidence of property rights theory being tested as individual case 
studies where changing property rights are directly influenced by politics in order to achieve 
the desired political outcome (Opper, 2004). The issue here tends to surround the different 
interest group and major stakeholder disputes that run, not only against the political will but, 
against each other (Libecap, 1989). The purpose of these case studies underlines the problem 
of the underlying merits of the different property right theoretical approaches – there is not a 
one-size-fits-all approach that can be taken. The theory of property rights may be applied to 
privatisation initiatives, but the outside influences of the social, political, economic and global 
landscape will affect the ability of the model to explain progress on both small and large scale 
privatisations (Opper 2004).  
With regard to the railway industry, Boardman (2009) studies the Canadian railroad post 
privatisation and compares, through cost benefit analysis (CBA), the performance of Canadian 
National Railways (CNR) to Canadian Pacific Railways (CPR) – continually privately owned 
railroad – and finds that the privatisation of CNR has improved performance and generated 
efficiency gains in the region of approximately $4.3bn (Boardman et al., 2009).  Contrary to 
both Boardman’s research, and property rights theory in general, Caves (1980) found no 
evidence of inferior performance when he studied the railroads performance prior to 
privatisation (Harvey, 2006). Although the methodology for comparison differed: Caves used a 
‘Measurement of Total Factor Productivity’ and Boardman uses CBA: it could be said that 
although public ownership did not hinder productivity levels to the degree that property 
rights theory suggest (Caves and Christensen, 1980), once privatised, the railroad exceeded 
expectations and provided the competition necessary to improve performance (Boardman et 
al., 2009).  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Although Property Rights Theory may provide an incentive to privatise there is also a case to 
consider that the change of ownership between public and private can also give rise to 
Principal-Agent problems. The principal-agent problem develops when a principal – in this 
case the Government – creates an environment in which an agent – the franchised operators 
– has reasons to align its interests with those of the principal, typically through incentives – in 
the case of rail these are mainly in the form of subsidies. Principal-Agent Theory deals with a 
specific social relationship – delegation. By nationalising an industry the principal 
(Government) takes control of not just the industry and the direction the industry should take, 
but also the information and knowledge of how the industry is run and where necessary 
changes should take place to align it with policy (Marsh, 1991). Privatising an industry involves 
not just a change of ownership but also delegates the control of the information and 
knowledge and the decision making process on operational policy. This scenario creates the 
Principal-Agent problem and the solution for the principal can be found in regulation and 
legislation. 
Principal-Agent Theory highlights the natural human behavioural aspects of industry and the 
self-interest of ‘Actors’. Actors seek to maximise their personal welfare and to profit at little 
cost to themselves. If the theory is taken in its most basic form it would stand to reason that 
the Franchised Operators would run the railways for profit and any routes that did not turn a 
profit would be cut. Although the principal wishes the agent to flourish, they will also want to 
make sure that the service provided is in line with their objectives. To achieve this they will 
stipulate the quality and quantity of service provision and incentivise the agent by providing 
subsidies and penalties – regulation. Another configuration reducing the possibilities of agents 
reducing service for self-interest profit is the presence of multiple agents, which creates more 
of a market-like structure, adds the incentive of competition, and feeds the desire of agents to 
succeed, thereby reducing the opportunities for reneging on contractual agreements (Braun 
2003). 
Braun (2003) calls this ‘moral hazard’ ‘shirking’ (Braun 2003 p304). But he also suggests that 
this can be ‘collective’ in the sense that both agent and principal are capable of this 
behaviour. The reasons for changing ownership are usually multiple and there can be reasons 
for the principal to renege on contractual agreements if the agent out-performs, or the 
principals policy no longer aligns with the contractual agreement (Braun and Guston, 2003). 
With regard to the railways, the mis-alignment of objectives and therefore performance 
outcomes of privatisation are discussed by Heritier (2002). Heritier questions whether public-Dawn Louise Robins         
 
25 
 
service goals of accessibility, security, continuity and affordability are still in place in the 
countries that have undergone reform and finds that the Principal-Agent problem exists in 
many instances (Burton, 1987). Heritier used policy objectives as a measure of performance 
and found safety under privatisation had become worse and that poor maintenance of the 
infrastructure was often at fault. Profit over service was therefore a problem for the industry 
and a reason for increased regulation and public control (Héritier, 2002). 
Prosser (2005) found that the problems with regulation was partly due to the essentially 
political nature of regulatory relations (Prosser, 2005), which make it difficult to tie down 
regulatory discretion in ways which resemble contractual relations (Feigenbaum and Henig, 
1994). Interestingly, he also questions who the principal and agent are – shareholders, 
creditors and suppliers are all important stakeholders and essentially the Government serves 
the public and the public are served by the railways. This scenario provides a bilateral 
relationship that adds to the complexity of ownership and responsibility and, argues Prosser, 
is an area that has little empirical research to provide possible solutions for implementation 
(Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994). 
2.2.3  Government and Market Failure – reasons for policy change? 
The theories outlined above are not the only reasons for transferring public properties to the 
private sector though and it is suggested that in order to understand the concepts and 
methodology of privatisation it is necessary to understand why public enterprise occurred in 
the first instance. This may then shed some light on why privatisation was not always 
welcomed by either the public or the trade unions in regards to the railways. Unfortunately, 
there is no developed body of theory to explain why public enterprise develops, adapts, or 
behaves generally, as the majority of literature remains descriptive (Hood, 1994). Particularly 
insightful is the work of Hood (1994) which offers three broad explanations for public sector 
operations. These encompass economic, political and social situations, describing public 
enterprise as:    
1.  A functional state response to market failure 
2.  A product of international competition, nationalism and development of the modern 
sovereign state; and 
3.  A product of domestic politics. 
Resembling the ‘Whig Tale’ (Hood 1994) of regulation, public enterprise can be explained as a 
‘functional policy response to the inherent shortcomings of capital or product markets’ (Hood Dawn Louise Robins         
 
26 
 
1994 p39). This explanation assumes that private enterprise is the normal method of social 
production and that public enterprise only occurs when some sort of market failure occurs. 
Tautologous or overtly simple, for this to be a convincing argument there must also be an 
explanation as to why public enterprise is the only solution able to overcome the apparent 
market failure. One sphere where this may be explained is through reference to property 
rights. Owners can appoint or dismiss top managerial level employees; regulators can close a 
company down, but only owners can decide to keep a company running. It is here that 
governments may wish to intervene in the ownership and running of an industry if the need 
for greater control would enable social responsibility or political international advancement. 
Regulation may enforce these attributes in theory, but if a company is neither willing nor able 
to conform in practice, government ownership or intervention may be seen as the only viable 
option. There is also the issue of bankruptcy and takeover. Although the Competition 
Commission
1 can prevent any takeovers or mergers that will produce a monopoly industry 
they have less control over bankruptcy and foreign takeovers unless competition will be 
contravened.  
Although the recent trend has been to privatise nationalised companies, the recent case of 
the troubled Northern Rock Bank is a good example of how the market failure and the need to 
protect consumer, customer and public interests have led to nationalisation. Nationalisation 
in today’s market does not necessarily mean continuous public ownership, but rather a 
necessary breathing space for the market to stabilise before some sort of privatisation or 
return to original investors with regulatory rules imposed. This argument for ownership and 
property rights also highlights the need for control; or indeed the need to give control away. 
Hood’s second argument for nationalisation is nationalistic (in the true sense) since it seeks to 
promote a sense of ‘closing ranks’ and ‘flying the flag’. By warding off foreign capital 
investment and promoting nationalism the state engenders feelings of power and joint 
ownership; and therefore responsibility.  There have been many cases where nationalisation 
has come about for this reason. The Belgian railways purportedly nationalised the network in 
1834 to ward off the threat of Dutch domination and Britain nationalised the aero division of 
Rolls Royce to maintain an international competitive advantage. Austria nationalised many 
abandoned German industries to stop them being confiscated after the Second World War 
and France used nationalisation as a response to empowering the nation after German 
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occupation. This argument works well for many cases of nationalisation but in many instances, 
although this appears to be the foundational argument, it is actually a secondary outcome. 
There are many countries with large national industries where international threat is also 
minimal; such as Sweden and the USA (Kay, 1987).  
If this rationale for nationalisation is to be seen as a cohesive argument then it must also 
explain why economic sovereignty needs to be pursued through public ownership rather than 
other ‘soft’ options such as national contracts and regulation. National industries are less 
transparent than subsidised industries, and the transfer of ownership can have a faster impact 
on the economy than other policy implementations, but this still doesn’t explain all the 
instances of nationalisation that have taken place. 
These considerations suggest that the third reason for nationalising companies may well be 
closer to the mark, if not economically then definitely politically. By looking at the social and 
domestic political forces at play the more subtle reasons for ownership transferral can be 
found. Nationalised industries are seen to be ‘safe’ in terms of providing a service to all at a 
cost that is achievable to the public. Indeed, main utility services such as electricity and 
communications are expensive to provide and maintain and not seen as commercially viable 
to rural areas. This approach to nationalisation may be seen as a response to popular demand 
for the policy by the public, business lobbies and trade unions. It is a way to privatise profits 
and socialise losses according to Marxist views of capitalism (Boycko et al., 1996a). Reasons 
for nationalisation can also be for reasons that Hood calls ‘unmentionables’. Nationalised 
industries are seen as ‘waiting rooms’ for politicians whom governments want to ‘move on’ or 
bury. The public funds generated by nationalised companies are convenient for governments 
to use as a reward for supporters, key plants can be located in marginal areas, and then 
further aided by business decisions such as expansion or closure that can be timed into the 
political cycle. Nationalised industries have often been used to soak up unemployment and 
have been seen as being over staffed both at the lower and managerial levels (Boycko et al., 
1996b). Historically, working for a nationalised company can provide job security and there is 
often an abundance of low paid menial work.  
Nationalisation can therefore be seen not just as an economic solution to a market problem 
but also as a social and political tool. These reasons can also be turned around and used to 
argue the case for privatisation because if nationalisation takes place when there is evidence 
of market failure then it follows that for an industry to be privatised there must be evidence 
of government, or regulatory, failure.  This was seen in the 1990’s in the ex-communist states Dawn Louise Robins         
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with the mass disposal of ex-communist industries into the private sector, arguably a classic 
case of government failure. But not all ex-communist countries engaged in such systematic 
privatisation as Russia and the former Czechoslovakia. Privatisation also took many other 
forms as some governments privatised small areas of an industry and others the entire 
industry. Methods of privatisation also differed between country and industry and included 
management buy-outs, trade sales and also stock market floatation’s (Hood, 1994). 
Market failure could also be rectified with technological innovation and advancements which 
would mean that privatisation is an effect of a reduction in market failure, not a response to 
government (regulatory) failure, but rather showing that the theory was, ultimately, 
successful. This is particularly apparent with the communications industry and the 
development of satellites and digital media enabling relatively cheap and versatile 
communications and allowing for competition within the industry. Technology, in particular 
computers, has enabled previously large and unwieldy organisations to splinter, generating 
competition, and allowing for regulation to be effective and easily monitored. 
It is here, with the introduction of regulation that the concept of privatisation and 
nationalisation appear to blur. Although many companies are sold into the private sector, the 
‘property rights’ may not necessarily be completely transferred. Regulation of previously 
Government owned industries appears to increase over time (Majone, 1997). Although this is 
essentially the solution to ensuring consumer protection from privately owned natural 
monopolies there is also evidence that regulation can inhibit management decisions, prevent 
companies from expanding and continuing economic growth, and form a control not 
previously evident in the nationalised industry (Kay, 2000). Boycko found that for privatisation 
to work an effective stabilisation policy also needs to be in place that depoliticises firms and 
controls political discretion (Boycko et al., 1996a). The majority of the criticisms lie with the 
pricing of goods and services and the widely used formula of RPI-X to cap prices below the 
Retail Price Index (RPI). 
From the evidence put forward it could be argued that privatisation and nationalisation are 
just forms of financial, organisational and management structure that occur through cycles 
(Gwilliam, 2008). Foster (1994) argues that the failure of nationalised industries to maintain 
earlier productivity levels led to declining profitability and stagnant – if not declining – service 
quality and eventual economic failure (Foster, 1994). The reason for nationalisation to take 
place in the first instance, from an economic point of view, can be the reverse. Foster believes 
that the owners of the railways prior to the First World War could have prevented the Dawn Louise Robins         
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eventual nationalisation of the industry but made little effort to do this. Foster believes the 
regulation and control of the railways was inefficient and the owners, faced with possible 
bankruptcy or re-financing, saw nationalisation as a way of ensuring the railways continued as 
a main transport service (Foster 1994 p490).  
When Gwilliam (2008) looked at the regulatory cycle of the Bus industry he found evidence to 
suggest that there is a clear continuous cycle through private supply – unregulated private 
monopoly – regulated private monopoly and then – nationalisation before restarting the cycle 
again (Gwilliam, 2008). Preston (1999) also considered this cycle as a feature of the rail 
industry (Preston, 1999b). The drivers for this cycle, and indeed change in general, seems to 
be around the behaviour of suppliers, the unrealistic aspirations of politicians, and whose 
visions ensure stability is unachievable (Gwilliam 2008). 
Each ownership cycle will occur depending on the social, political and global situation of the 
time. For example, the post war era saw a trend towards nationalising companies for the 
reasons explained above but when the economy improved, and outside threats reduced, so 
did the governments’ need to reduce spending and, the trend reverses towards privately 
owned companies. Socially necessary utilities such as electricity and gas will require public 
ownership to install due to the scope of the infrastructure and initial outlay, yet once in place 
the actual running of the operation can be managed from the private sector and regulated to 
ensure fair competition between operators and fair prices for the consumer. Regulation is 
deemed important to ensure the balance between profitability, price and sustainability are 
maintained and almost all services are now regulated to some degree
2. 
Although the argument for privatisation being a fairly natural economic event seems fairly 
robust, the privatisation of firms during the Thatcher years was not always greeted 
particularly enthusiastically, although there is evidence that opposition was loud but lacked 
enthusiasm (Crompton and Jupe, 2003, Ivaldi, 2008). This may have been due, in part, to a 
natural resistance to change as well as the sense that the privatisation was not necessarily 
carried out for economic and social benefit but rather had a political agenda that may have 
impacted on the success of the venture (Glaister, 2004). It is therefore important to consider 
to a greater degree the political climate of the era and to see if there is a correlation between 
the economic and political policies that are directly related to the Thatcher government. 
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2.2.4  Thatcherism, the New Right, and Political Ideologies  
The privatisations undertaken throughout the 1980s’ in the UK have also become known as 
Thatcherism. That said, Thatcherism in itself is a controversial term that means different 
things to different people. Described as incoherent and inconsistent (Gamble 1989), 
Thatcherite policy was, nonetheless, a radical change that has been compared to the 
watershed of the 1940s settlement and the conception of how the public and private sector 
relationships operate (Gamble, 1989). 
Prior to the Conservative Governments led by Margaret Thatcher, the UK economy had 
operated within what had been seen as a fairly balanced public and private ownership system 
where the majority of large social welfare industries were publically owned and the majority 
of trade sectors were privately owned. This system had evolved from the 1940s settlement 
and had proven to be durable both economically and politically. Education, housing, health 
and utilities were developed and expanded helping to rebuild the country after the Second 
World War. All the time there was prosperity and growth the structure of the economy was 
left alone but as Britain started to lag behind other westernised countries the nationalised 
policies began to be questioned (Gamble, 1989). The Global recession and the Oil Crisis of the 
1970s revealed the cracks in the economic performance of Great Britain and the Government 
were left trying to find ways of repairing the economy whilst supporting the cost of the 
recession. Rising unemployment, a heavily unionised workforce and repeated economic and 
political crisis could arguably have laid the foundations for the radical and pronounced 
ideological stance of the Thatcher led Conservative Party.  
Thatcher’s rejection of a politics of consensus and her embrace of conviction politics were 
unusual for a Conservative Government (Gamble 1989) although the claims appeared to be 
more radical than the policies themselves. Not once in either the election manifesto or the 
run up to the election did the Conservative Party commit to privatisation as a tool for 
recovery. What was committed to was the adoption of more commercial practices within the 
nationalised industries. Privatisation was not a policy chosen to rebuild Britain but rather a 
policy that was developed after the successful sale of a few small publically owned assets 
(Burton, 1987). Privatisation policy was only set out during 1983-4 and as with most 
government policies it was improvised, amended, and reactive to the changing social and 
economic climate as well as the political opposition. 
Once privatisation became an accepted and embedded policy the Conservative Government 
sought out larger and more radical industries to privatise (Feigenbaum and Henig, 1994) and Dawn Louise Robins         
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innovative ways of achieving increased funds to the Treasury from the sales and a reduction in 
the costs of subsidy and social responsibility (Gamble 1989). Privatisation was quickly seen as 
a political tool to buy votes by selling low to ‘friends’ and reducing the amount of ‘blame’ that 
could be placed with the Government for failure to achieve objectives (Hood, 1994). When 
transport was considered for privatisation the problems appeared to be greater in terms of 
methodology and a fierce opposition was found from both the Opposition Government and 
the general public (Gourvish, 2002a, Wolmar, 2005).  
One of the main problems with the privatisation of transport was the size and extent of 
related services that were involved. This, coupled with the social responsibility of running a 
transport network, and the huge deficit between income and expenditure, meant that a 
selection of privatisation tools needed to be used along with incentives – in the form of 
subsidies – and control – in the form of regulation. The potential for competition in the 
market was therefore constrained through regulation at the time of the sale, but competition 
for the market became the incentive (Shaw, 2001).  
Thatcherism and transport are also worth considering outside of the privatisation policy 
framework. Transport – specifically public transport – was not something that the 
Conservative Government wanted to promote. The policy was more towards car ownership 
and road building and increasing the ‘great car economy’ (Docherty and Shaw, 2003). The 
1980s saw the largest increase in car ownership since its invention and a general move 
towards equality with women becoming the largest growth market (car use is discussed at 
length in the Industry Trends in chapter 4). Large road building projects and the continued 
motorway development were driven forward in the Thatcher years. The Conservatives 
promoted the idealism of empowering people with property rights and this extended out 
from house buying to car ownership. With this increase in car use came the concept of 
congestion and the associated ‘road-rage’ of frustrated drivers and the introduction of 
research into a new geography paradigm; Automobilities (Urry et al., 2005).  
It would be unfair to suggest that the Conservatives were the only Government to support car 
use, all Governments had supported the concept of personal travel and road building had 
been prolific since the 1950s. In many respects it is a feature of the urban sprawl and 
‘dormitory settlements’ (Headicar, 2003) that gradually became the legacy passed to 
governments, but it is the Conservative attitude of negativity towards public transport and the 
unwillingness to invest that stands out against previous governments. Political negativity also 
combines with social status and consumer behaviour to further alienate public transport – it Dawn Louise Robins         
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was not considered a vote winner and therefore not promoted – these issues are explored 
further in this thesis in both the literature review and the transport trends (Maio et al., 2006). 
The practicalities of political will are very apparent in regards to transportation. The 
Conservative idealism was showing signs of cracks by the time the Labour Government came 
to power and the historical under funding of public transport and subsequent sale or 
deregulation had not engendered the public to switch from road to rail or bus. The 
Conservatives ideal was for car ownership whereas the New Labour policy moved towards 
sustainable transport. Neither of the policies is without fault, and putting them into practice 
has, more often than not, been much more complicated that the election promises that were 
delivered. For the Labour Government, attempting to get the car owning and independent 
population to change their behaviour coupled with trying to increase the service of a public 
transport infrastructure that was organised for profit rather than providing a social service 
proved far more difficult than their manifesto had described (Docherty and Shaw, 2003). All 
this will have impacted on the demand for rail and needs to be accounted for when analysing 
the results of this research.  
It has been argued that privatisation is a concept and set of policies that are highly diverse in 
scale and scope. The term privatisation is in dispute and the ideology behind the concept 
complex. When privatisation as a political tool is considered in transport – and specifically rail 
– the external influences of consumer behaviour, political opposition, modal shift and 
changing environmental and economic demographics all play a major role in shaping the 
changing industry structure. How the Thatcherite policies (although by the time of rail 
privatisation  it was John Major in control) influenced the privatisation initiatives and how 
external influences shaped them will need to be discussed in order to understand any impacts 
that may have influenced the changing demand for rail over the time period. The following 
section looks at the actual process of privatising the railways and takes account of the events 
leading up to, and after, the initiative. 
2.3  A Potted History of the Railways 
The railways were ‘born’ on the 21
st February 1804 when Richard Trevithick’s pioneering 
engine pulled 10 tons of iron over a 30 mile track – although it was the first run of George 
Stephenson’s Locomotion that pulled the train on the Stockton to Darlington line in 1825 that 
is best remembered as the start of the railway age. By 1845 there were approximately 2,400 
miles of track across the UK and the railways quickly became the preferred method of Dawn Louise Robins         
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transport for moving first freight and then passengers as the industrial revolution was by now 
in full swing (Héritier, 2002).  Canal transportation was slow and unpredictable and routes 
were sporadic and constrained to lowlands near rivers, whilst coach travel was dangerous, 
slow and could only transport small items at a time.  The train, on the other hand could pull 
large loads, and as long as the track didn’t run out, could be used to transport goods for miles 
over differing terrain. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the transformation of the 
lives and livelihoods of Britain’s people as the rail network stretched from Plymouth to 
Aberdeen enabling fast and effective movement of first goods, then people (Wolmar 2005). 
Built by the wealthy industrialists of the time, the rail network was not strategically planned as 
a passenger network but rather to link factories and ports and large urban market centres.  
With the realisation that passengers could be moved from one location to another at a profit, 
tracks began to be laid side by side in direct competition with each other, and whilst each new 
line needed parliamentary approval, the government of the time had a limited interest in the 
emerging network that was being created and very few applications were turned down 
(Glaister et al., 2006). The oligopolistic competition of the early years gave way to a more 
consolidated industry as the more profitable rail companies took over the weaker ones, 
thereby reducing the number of privately owned rail companies and creating a monopoly 
situation for passengers and freight users in many areas. Many of the newly forming rail 
companies also maintained a monopoly within the industry sector as they owned both the 
infrastructure and locomotives they used.  
In terms of transport share, the rail industries ‘Golden Age’ was short lived, if it ever existed, 
as the railways had an ever falling percentage of overall transport share and went from an 
almost total monopolisation of all passenger and freight movement in the 1850’s to no more 
than 6% of the total share at the point of privatisation. Government intervention as early as 
the 1840 Railway Regulation Act entailed regulating the monopolies in each area and insisting 
on specific health and safety issues to be addressed. These early interventions by the 
Government also heralded a concern for the consumer, specifically the less economically 
advantaged consumer, by enabling rail travel to be accessed by all. These ‘parliamentary 
trains’ (Harris and Godward 1997) became a provision of service and provided at least one 
return trip per line each day at around 1d a mile, although many of these carriages had no 
seats or windows and led to the outcry that animals were treated better than people. The 
1844 Railway Act also gave the government the option to revise prices and the right to Dawn Louise Robins         
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compulsory purchase after 21 years; although these provisions were never taken up they 
show an early indication towards nationalisation options. 
Modern rail, from the early twentieth century onwards, was dominated by several significant 
events before culminating in the privatisation of the industry in 1995/6. The amalgamation of 
the rail companies into the ‘big four’ in 1921 set the standard of government intervention 
following the brief period of nationalisation during the First World War. Nationalised again 
during the Second World War the railways were over worked and under maintained to the 
point where significant investment was needed to bring the network up to operational 
standards (Shaoul, 2004). In the wake of the war the government was not in a financial 
position to inject large sums of money into private enterprises, and the owners of the industry 
were unable to finance such large investment. Thus to prevent the railways from falling into 
disrepair the 1947 Railway Act created the British Transport Commission (BTC), and the 
railways were brought under the umbrella of nationalised industries.  
The aim of the government in regard to nationalisation was always to ‘produce an entity that 
could combine public service operations with commercial viability’, although this appeared as 
time went on to be an impossible task (Gourvish, 2002a). The BTC was abolished in 1962 and 
the British Railways Board (BRB) set up in 1963 to deal specifically with the railways with a 
view to improving operational service. The Beeching Report, in 1962, had a dramatic effect on 
the rail network as it suggested mass closure of many branch lines in order to cut the deficit 
and bring the industry into the twentieth century. The Government carried out many of the 
recommendations it suggested, reducing the infrastructure by almost a third (Figure 2-1). The 
impact was not as successful as originally hoped; neither service quality or value for money 
improved; and many of the lines that were lost would, today, be strategic links (Wolmar, 
2005).  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 2-1 Before and After the Beeching Recommendations were Instigated 
 
Source: (Price, 1999) 
In 1968 the Transport Act provided a public service obligation to distinguish between 
commercial and social railways and ensured grants were made payable for those lines that 
remained necessary for social reasons but un-commercial in economic terms. By 1974, after 
the restructuring and reshaping of the industry, the passengers were being better valued 
(Harris and Godward, 1997). The railways were now characterised by five main groups (not 
including Users):  
1.  the passenger and freight companies now served by lobby groups in response to the 
powerful road lobbyists;  
2.  the essentially hard working and dedicated rail managers and engineers;  
3.  the heavily unionised but low paid general railway workers;  
4.  the Department for Transport;  
5.  and the investor, namely the Treasury (Gourvish, 2002a)  Dawn Louise Robins         
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These were difficult times for the railway industry, and even though the railways have always 
endeared a sense of nostalgic affection this has rarely been coupled with respect. British Rail 
has historically been held in low esteem, been the keen butt of many jokes, and dismissed as 
an inferior method of transport to road, whether deserved or not. As road building and car 
ownership increased, rail patronage decreased with even the former transport minister, Dr 
John Gilbert, admitting to preferring the car to the train. Yet unlike many other industries, the 
railways have always generated passionate debate from every sector and as Richard Marsh 
commented in his communications lecture in 1974:  
‘Together with labour relations and singing in the bath, knowledge of how the railways should 
be run is provided by the Almighty at the moment of birth. It is a well-known fact that the 
nation is divided between 27 million railway experts and 190,000 of us who earn our living on 
the railways’ (Marsh 1974 cited in Gourvish 2002a p8). 
Britain’s railways were always mooted as a potential candidate for privatisation in the early 
Thatcher Government, and it is argued that privatisation was inevitable, it was just the when 
and how that needed to be decided (Godward, 1998). The complexity of the industry meant 
that although privatisation was considered on what appears to be a regular basis, it was 
always shelved as something to consider during the next term of office. As early as 1981 the 
British Railway Board looked enthusiastically into how to integrate private partnership into 
the railways. This was a particularly bleak time in rail finances and also the start of industrial 
unrest. Most of the proposals were aimed at specific projects; such as electrification in 
conjunction with private companies such as Balfour Beatty; but floundered when the 
Government insisted that any projects should be ‘self-standing’ and not ‘overtly controlled’ 
(Gourvish, 2002a).  
In 1982 the Secretary of State for Transport David Howell, appointed a four-man committee, 
headed by Sir David Serpell, to analyse the financial situation of the railways and their 
associated companies with the aim of producing a 20 year plan with the objective of securing 
efficiency and financial growth in the rail industry. The report engendered a hostile reaction 
due to the suggestion that the railways should be further reduced in track length and 
disagreements amongst the committee members themselves meant that practical discussion 
on the actual contents of the report were overshadowed by public interest in the conduct of 
the committee (Committee, 1983). One of the findings of the Serpell Committee regarding 
private investment was taken on board though, and as it concluded that private investment 
was currently unmanageable, the proposals by the BRB were shelved. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Although the railway objectives set in 1983 by Ridley and 1986 by John Moore made no 
account for private investment, the option was not ruled out completely and opened the way 
for procurement, contracting, and other sales elements. The 1985 Omega report from the 
Adam Smith Institute challenged the concept that the railways needed political control and 
government subsidy, and with Kenneth Irvine’s The Right Lines in 1987 and Track to the Future 
in 1988 (Irvine, 1987, Irvine, 1988) further underpinning the arguments for segregation in the 
operating and infrastructure areas, the privatisation debate could hardly be considered 
buried. In September 1988 the Board debated the future organisational development of the 
industry and in the uncertain climate for the long term future of the railways it was decided to 
radically decentralise the industry regardless of who ended up running it. After careful 
consideration, in June 1989 the options were taken even further and focused on profit centres 
and inter sector trading. The decision was made, and government support sought, for what 
was to become the radical initiative that became known as ‘Organising for Quality’ (OfQ) 
(Gourvish, 2002a).  
With privatisation supposedly shelved in 1990 it seemed that the OfQ programme of changes 
could be embraced with enthusiasm, but less than a year later the privatisation debate was 
rekindled. The idea of franchising and competition was once again looked at by a variety of 
consultants and although the OfQ initiative was by now well under way, the Government 
were looking seriously at various proposals for the ultimate privatisation of the Railways. In 
the meantime, OfQ was instigated and, British Rail began to look like a streamlined 
commercial enterprise. Figure 2-2 shows the organisational structure that was operational 
post OfQ in 1992. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 2-2 British Rail’s post OfQ organisation, April 1992 
 
Source (Gourvish 2002a p 381) 
OfQ was the end of the matrix management structure and embraced Bob Reid I’s vision of a 
business-led railway (Harris and Godward, 1997). As the organisational chart shows, sectors 
guided railway policy but had contracts with different operating and contracting units who 
operated and maintained the railway. All employees were now under one director who had a 
separate budget and made his own business decisions. The emphasis of OfQ was on customer 
service and each business unit contained a group of profit centres working closer to the work 
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face and customer. Passenger functions were split into five units and freight and parcels 
became separate units. OfQ was not without opposition and this came from both internal and 
external sources. One of the main complaints internally seemed to be that rather than 
abolishing the matrix system, OfQ just lowered it to the customer level. Engineering also had 
doubts about the new management structure and this became one of the last sectors to 
integrate into the new system (Gourvish, 2002a). Rail safety was paramount to the new 
structure and responsibility was given to two sections within the main headquarters: Group 
Technical Standards and Group Operational Standards. 
By 1992 the regions had been abolished and replaced with the OfQ management structure. 
Staffing levels remained fairly static in the beginning but British Rail Headquarters had shrunk 
in size. The overall cost of implementation was estimated at around £50 - £70 million 
(Gourvish, 2002a) compared to estimates of the privatisation process at £5 billion (Harris and 
Godward, 1997). However, the new organisation was unable to prove itself to its fullest extent 
as the privatisation debate moved from planning to instigation.  
Throughout the last two centuries the railways have struggled to turn a profit, and more often 
than not, have continually been running at a loss and, since 1968, heavily subsidised. Financial 
responsibility for the railways has very often lain heavily at the door of the government and 
even though each change to the industry has been received with great expectations these 
have ultimately resulted in disappointment. Private ownership of the railways was hardly a 
new idea considering they were privately owned for so much of their existence but the 
method and speed taken to return them to private ownership was considered radical. In order 
to begin to understand the complexities of the privatisation process it is important to 
understand the concepts of privatisation and nationalisation and the social, economic and 
political reasons why industries are run under such conditions. The following section looks at 
the two concepts and discusses the variables that seem to need to be in place for either 
model to be of any success. 
2.4  Privatisation of British Rail 
Privatisation of the rail industry had been considered previously, but due to the size and 
complexity of the industry the process was always deemed logistically and economically 
unviable. The OfQ reforms may have enabled privatisation to take place, even though it was 
designed to alleviate the need. Private sector involvement was seen by the government as a 
necessary move in order to inject sufficient investment into the network to continue with the Dawn Louise Robins         
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improvements that had already been made (Harris and Godward, 1997).  The three main 
arguments put forward for privatisation were as follows:  
1.  Privatised companies were said to be more productively efficient, and even though BR 
was considered as ‘one of the most productive and efficient state-owned railways in 
the world’, the potential for further improvement remained (Harris and Godward 
1997 p63).  
2.  State ownership limited the amount of private investment as a result of being reliant 
on the funding source, namely the Treasury. Investing in long-term projects which 
were not necessarily in the interest of the economy in general was problematic, as 
was the fact that the Treasury was also not in a position to commit to long-term 
projects; hence the need for private investment from commercial investors.   
3.  The need for better pricing of goods and services. The government considered private 
companies to be more effective at pricing due to more accurate evaluation and 
awareness of costs (Harris and Godward, 1997).  However, this also meant that, in 
order for the railways to be competitively priced, regulation and subsidy would 
remain a long-term commitment.  
The removal of the monopoly held by BR was seen as essential by some, including the 
Secretary of State for Transport, Malcolm Rifkind, and was one reason that the railways would 
not be sold outright (Hibbs et al., 2006).  Therefore, reform was motivated primarily by the 
desire to eliminate subsidy, but also by the objectives of using private borrowing to finance 
investment and of improving the efficiency of the industry. In the year to March 31st 1987, 
almost one-quarter of BR’s turnover (£786m out of £3,830m) came from the government 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1989). In its foreword, the 1992 White Paper stated that: 
“the time has come to extend [the benefits of privatisation] to the railways. This calls for a new 
approach. British Rail makes large losses. It cannot therefore be sold as a complete concern in 
the same way as other industries we have privatised and there will not be substantial proceeds 
to the exchequer” (DfT, 1992).  
This suggests that, in the Great British rail sector, the unbundling of the vertically integrated 
monopoly was driven by the need to make the privatisation process viable.  
Privatisation of the railways is not a solely British phenomenon. The British may have carried 
out the most extensive programme of privatisation in a short space of time, but many other Dawn Louise Robins         
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rail industries across the world have seen some sort of privatisation to varying degrees. It is 
therefore fair to say that there has been a global trend over the last 30 years of privatising 
formerly state owned enterprises of which the railways form one sector (Koppenjan and 
Leijten, 2007). It can also be said that the long term impacts of privatising other rail industries 
across the world has also seen little research. Short term impacts and concentration on 
particular operating or economic areas has tended to be the norm and some papers compare 
these developments to the British privatisation initiative (Boardman et al., 2009). This in itself 
is a difficult achievement due to the scope of the British scheme having little comparison to 
any other initiative; something frequently complained about when performance reviews have 
little to benchmark against (Smith et al., 2009, Preston, 1996, ORR, 2003).  
Many of the rail privatisation initiatives across the world have tended to concentrate on small 
areas of the industry such as commuter lines (Japan) or freight (Canada and the US). Although 
the US does have many privately owned passenger lines the concentration on long haul 
freight and the sparse network coverage makes it very difficult to compare with Britain (Nash 
and Preston, 1994). 
2.4.1  Franchising Framework 
The process of privatisation was complex due to the size and nature of the industry, but also 
because of the political ramifications. Various methods were debated through ‘think-tank’ 
papers and conferences prior to the event, including the following: 
1.  British Rail PLC – favoured by Bob Reid I. 
2.  Sector segmentation, which would maintain the benefits of OfQ but limit the 
possibilities of competition between services.  
3.  A route-based solution that would promote competition and rely on a pre-1921 
structure where BR was vertically separated into a dozen companies and regulation 
would be reduced, thus enhancing entrepreneurship (Gritten, 1988).   
4.  A regionally based system such as previously implemented in Japan.  
5.  An infrastructure authority concept propounded by the Adam Smith Institute, 
whereby the competition would lie in the operators competing to run services on the 
network (Irving, 1987).   
Although a solution that faced significant challenges, the idea of an infrastructure authority 
was further developed using the auction of ‘slots or train paths’ (Starkie, 1984). Although the Dawn Louise Robins         
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method preferred by BR was a complete sell-off in one whole piece, it appeared that this was 
not viable due to its size and the need for competition within the industry.   
Franchising on an infrastructure authority-based model (based on the fifth option above) 
became the preferred method (Butler, 1985). The idea of franchising is a simple one: property 
rights that convey an element of market power; market power necessitates regulation; and 
franchising allows competition for monopoly. With franchising as a method of privatisation, 
the franchising authority can fix the prices charged and the nature of the services offered. The 
competitive bidding process then allocates the franchises to firms that can provide the 
greatest value for money while meeting the objectives laid down by the franchising authority. 
However, it is equally plausible to sell franchises at unconstrained prices, thereby realising the 
monopoly rents to government, or to give the franchises away to companies that offer the 
greatest level of service at the lowest prices to customers (Helm, 2000). The wide-ranging 
reform plans set out in the 1992 White Paper were largely implemented by the Railways Act 
of 1993. It set out the provision for the following.  
1.  The establishment of a track authority that would own, and be responsible for, the 
maintenance of the infrastructure (including signalling, stations and depots). 
2.  The sale of freight and parcels to the private sector. 
3.  The franchising of passenger services with the private sector bidding to operate them. 
4.  The establishment of a franchising authority that would negotiate award and monitor 
the franchises. 
5.  A regulatory body to oversee the track access, promote competition, prevent 
monopolies, and promote consumer benefits (Harris and Godward, 1997).   
The options considered all looked at the industry from an operational and organisational 
perspective. It is important to recognise a key feature of the rail sector—replicated perhaps 
only to the same extent in the airports sector among regulated utilities—that makes 
competition difficult, which is that rail cannot run more than one train along a track at any 
given time. The time at which a service is run is as important as the service itself. 
The passenger rail industry was split up into 25 train operating companies (TOCs) 3 rolling 
stock companies (ROSCOs) and an infrastructure company: Railtrack (Preston et al., 2000). 
Apart from the ‘Island Line’ on the Isle of Wight which was vertically separated and had 
responsibility for the infrastructure as well as the operations (White, 1998), all other train 
operating companies were horizontally separated and paid access charges to Railtrack whilst Dawn Louise Robins         
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leasing the rolling stock from the ROSCOs. The franchises were awarded by the Office of 
Passenger Franchising (OPRAF) who invited bids for subsidy required to run the services. The 
franchise length was initially set at 7 years with an option to extend dependent on specific 
investments being implemented. Bids tended to be successful if the subsidy amount was kept 
low and this has been seen as one of the main reasons that over half the original franchise 
awards failed within the first few years (Preston, 2000). 
In addition to the 25 former BR service franchises the Channel Tunnel operations and 
infrastructure was divested and the Dockland Light Railway (DLR) was also placed under a 
form of franchise operation in 1997 (White, 1998). Most of the franchised services covered a 
mixture of regional and long distance services with the exception of the east and west coast 
long distance rail services. The roles are briefly highlighted in Table 2-1 whilst Appendix 1 
gives the franchise ownership and dates of transfer to the operators. 
Table 2-1 Roles and Responsibilities of the newly formed companies 
Railtrack  Infrastructure Owner 
Train Operators (franchised)  25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) 
Unregulated Passenger Services  Eurostar 
Open Access Operators  Heathrow express 
Non Passenger Operations  Freight – 7 Freight Operating Companies 
Rolling Stock Leasing Companies  3 Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCOs) 
Maintenance Contractors  7 Infrastructure Maintenance Units (IMUs), 6 
Track Renewal Units (TRUs) 
Franchising Director  Office of Passenger Rail Franchising OPRAF 
Regulator  Office of the Rail Regulator ORR 
Safety Regulator  HM Railway Inspectorate 
Local Authorities  Passenger Transport Executives PTEs 
Other Suppliers  Rolling Stock, Signalling, Design, Cleaning 
Services etc. 
Source: DfT 1996 
The basis of the plan was to provide competitive bidding, which would lessen the Treasury 
burden; an un-geared Railtrack balance sheet that would provide the finance mechanism; and Dawn Louise Robins         
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the introduction of competitive services over time to focus on costs and customer service, 
thus improving efficiency. However, due to the Labour threats of re-nationalisation if they 
won the next election, the risk to franchise bidders increased, and private investors into 
Railtrack were deterred (Gourvish, 2002a). As a result of this increased risk, the regulator, the 
Office of the Rail Regulator, after persuasion from the government, moderated competition to 
ease the burden. Privatisation now became the objective rather than a vehicle for achieving 
the original objectives. This, coupled with the new Labour Government’s attempts to integrate 
rail into one Transport Policy along with all other modes after 1997, rather than maintaining 
the ‘business model’ developed by the Conservatives, led to problems with both the industry 
structure and operations. 
One of the key elements of this new privatised structure was the vertical separation of 
infrastructure-related tasks from operating tasks (Harris and Godward, 1997). Engineering, 
such as civil, power and signalling, was transferred to Railtrack. Although responsible for these 
areas, Railtrack subcontracted them to private companies, thereby potentially saving money. 
However, concerns emerged about the degree of monitoring of its contractors (Wheat and 
Smith, 2006), and its successor, Network Rail, has both taken some activities back in-house 
(maintenance) and comprehensively redesigned contractor performance monitoring (Gibson, 
2005). Asset knowledge has also increased manifestly since Network Rail took over the 
infrastructure business, in part due to the obligation to provide and adhere to and asset 
management policy. 
The remainder of the network was split into franchised passenger operators, of which there 
were originally 25 train operating companies (TOCs); unregulated operators such as the 
Eurostar; open access operators such as Heathrow Express; and non-passenger operators (ie, 
freight). The former BR was therefore restructured into one track authority (Railtrack), 25 
passenger TOCs, seven freight train operating units and some 70 ancillary businesses 
beginning to trade as free-standing units on April 1st 1994 (Preston et al., 1999).  Three 
rolling-stock leasing companies (ROSCOs) were also formed to buy and lease out passenger 
and freight trains.  
The franchised companies operated the specific services but did not have ownership of the 
tracks, the stations, or the trains themselves. The three ROSCOs supplied the trains on a lease 
basis, but these trains were built and (in some cases) maintained by yet different companies. 
The track renewal units and maintenance units of the former BR became companies prior to 
privatisation and were sold as such. The administration side of the industry was set up as the Dawn Louise Robins         
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Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), responsible for the franchising of the passenger 
services. The Office of Rail Regulator (ORR) was responsible for issuing the licences to run the 
services, approving the franchise agreements, and enforcing domestic competition law, and 
the railway inspectorate (HMRI) continued as before as an independent safety regulator 
affiliated to the Health and Safety Executive (Preston and Whelan, 1995). This now meant that 
financial responsibility for the different elements of the industry were split up, and rather 
than a straightforward budget being allocated, money came from a variety of sources 
including local authorities in the guise of Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) (Harris and 
Godward, 1997).  
The horizontal separation of BR’s passenger rail business into 25 train operating units 
corresponded broadly to the existing profit centres devised by OfQ. The competitive bidding 
for franchises was based on an auction for the subsidy required (Dnes, 1992).  It was intended 
that this would bear down on the burden placed on HM Treasury by lessening the amount of 
subsidy needed to increase the service provision thereby ensuring value for money and 
increasing quality for a lower percentage of public funds. Most of Railtrack’s 2,500 stations 
were leased to the TOCs, but it retained the management of 14 major stations. TOCs obtained 
the right to use stations or depots either by leasing facilities from Railtrack, or by means of 
regulated access agreements with other TOCs which operate them, or, in the case of the 14 
major stations, with Railtrack. Meanwhile, TOCs obtained the use of tracks by means of 
regulated track access agreements, involving submitting Railtrack to the UK’s traditional RPI-X 
regulation, whereby future track access agreements for the next five years are set at five-
yearly periodic reviews. Rights of access were made available to private freight operators 
without a franchise.  
The BR freight companies were privatised as follows. Trainload Freight, a specialist carrier of 
bulk raw materials, was sold to English, Welsh & Scottish Railways (EWS), a subsidiary of 
Wisconsin Central, in 1995. The domestic container business of Railfreight Distribution 
(Freightliner) was sold to MCB Ltd as a management buyout in 1996, while its European 
intermodal and automotive freight business was also sold to EWS. The express parcels service, 
Red Star, was sold in 1995 as a management buyout. Finally, EWS bought Rail Express Systems 
Ltd, the carrier of mail for Royal Mail, in 1995. 
The intention was that rights of access for new passenger service operators would be 
established immediately, in order to fulfil the third policy objective of improving the efficiency 
of the industry (Glaister, 2002).  However, because of concerns surrounding the opposition Dawn Louise Robins         
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Labour Party’s plans for a re-nationalisation of BR, the government decided that competition 
should be ‘moderated’, thus reducing the risk to investing in TOCs. Hence, open access was 
postponed until 2002
3.  Nonetheless, there has been some significant competition between 
franchised operators conveying passengers along similar routes, most notably between Virgin 
West Coast and Chiltern between London and Birmingham; Gatwick Express, Southern, and 
Thameslink services between London and Gatwick; and GNER and WAGN between London 
and Peterborough. This competition has generated product differentiation, service frequency 
increases and selective fares cuts (Preston, 1999a).  Figure 2-3 outlines the structure of the 
industry immediately after privatisation. 
Figure 2-3 The Structure of the British Railway Industry after Privatisation 
 
Source: (Thompson, 2004) 
Although there were significant savings on operating costs in the first few years of 
privatisation ((Smith and Wheat, 2007, Pollitt and Smith, 2002)) these abruptly came to an 
end with the Hatfield crash in October 2000. Hatfield became synonymous with the downfall 
of Railtrack due to the nature of the accident and the resulting infrastructure and 
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maintenance inefficiencies that it uncovered. Maintenance and renewal were reappraised 
after the event and significant and sustained increases in funding were instigated. An 
important question arises from this increase: are post-Hatfield cost and productivity levels 
reasonable and should they be sustained? An important reason for the privatisation of the rail 
industry was the reduction in Treasury spending and the encouragement of competition in 
order to incite cost efficiency and high productivity. The increased costs of the railways have 
burdened the Treasury to levels unseen in the nationalised era. It has been argued that the 
need for increased funding is defensible as previous funding was inadequate, but in order to 
justify this increase it must first be found that a/ the inadequate funding requirements for 
infrastructure were directly responsible for the Hatfield Crash and b/ that the current levels of 
funding are comparable to other network infrastructure costs. Both these scenarios are 
difficult to prove and open to assumption. The main problem with the latter scenario is that 
until recently there are no other directly comparable infrastructure networks to compare with 
and therefore no methodology with which to employ. Smith (2008) addresses these issues in 
his research on costs and benchmarking Network Rail efficiency savings (Smith and Wheat, 
2008) and recent benchmarks have been stipulated in the Control Period 4 operational plans 
for Network Rail.  
2.4.2  Rail Under labour 
In 1997 there was a change of emphasis with regards to rail objectives when the first Labour 
Government for nearly two decades came to power. Labour had pledged to bring Railtrack 
back under public control. The White Paper of 1998: ‘A New Deal for Transport: Better for 
Everyone’, was an integrated transport policy that would also tackle pollution and congestion 
by encouraging users to switch from cars to buses and trains. The Conservatives had planned 
an efficient stand-alone network but had not built into the equation any plans to enlarge the 
network. The Labour ideology would need extra financing to ensure that instead of a decline 
in services, they were increased to accommodate extra routes and increased capacity.  
The Labour idea was to use the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), supported by the Integrated 
Transport Commission (ITC) and the Rail Regulator, to steer this forward. The Rail Regulator 
would, in fact, become subordinate to the SRA, as reflected in the Transport Bill 2000. Unlike 
much of New Labour’s inheritance of the privatised industries from its Conservative 
predecessors, the railway industry was made subject to radical reforms by the newly elected 
government. This change of policy, from the Conservatives’ drive for efficiency, to a White Dawn Louise Robins         
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Paper that called for an expansion of the railways, required substantial reforms to the 
structure of the industry.  
According to the 1998 White Paper, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) would take the 
objectives of policy and translate them into a ‘clear, coherent and strategic programme for the 
development of our railways’ (DfT, 1998). Crucially, the White Paper did not specify the 
sources of funding for the SRA’s activities. Therefore, when the shadow SRA
4 attempted to 
implement the slogan of its first chairman, Sir Alastair Morton, ‘investment, investment, 
investment’, it had to consider its options carefully. It quickly became clear that Railtrack’s 
balance sheet did not provide the solution, and with the Hatfield Crash highlighting the many 
inefficiencies of the infrastructure, Railtrack saw no option other than embarking on a far 
reaching and costly maintenance programme that left the SRA severely constrained in its 
spending review (Gourvish 2008).  
The resulting lack of confidence in Railtrack, and resulting fall in share price, led to the failure 
of Railtrack and the beginning of the end for the SRA (Gourvish 2008). The new structure for 
the railways was developed with efficiency in mind. The structure became simpler and the 
Government – through the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) – increased their control. The 
organisational structure of the new railway is shown in Figure 2-4. 
                                                             
 
4 The Shadow SRA was set up to ‘shadow’ for a year before becoming the railway authority – this is 
fairly common practice when regime change is implemented and can be seen as a practice run to iron 
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Figure 2-4 Post Hatfield Organisational Chart 
  
Source: (Preston, 2002) 
Network Rail became the infrastructure authority and was a company limited by guarantee. 
Although the SRA worked on the development of Network Rail it was rapidly seen by the DfT 
as an unnecessary complication in the management process and by 2005 the SRA was 
dispensed with (Gourvish 2008). Under the new arrangements, the Government would set the 
level of public expenditure, and take the strategic decisions on what this should buy. New 
regulatory and contractual arrangements would be put in place between Network Rail and the 
Government, to run alongside, and provide the context for, the franchise contracts with train 
companies. Network Rail has been given clear responsibility for operating the network and for 
its performance and accountability and control is more clearly given to the different sectors 
with a move towards integrated working and shared interests planned. This arguably gives 
back control of the purse strings firmly to the Government and in economic terms questions 
the ability of the franchisees and Network Rail to provide a commercial and competitive 
industry. In the meantime; environmental concerns, congestion, and a deepening fuel crisis 
have switched priorities towards favouring rail, and yet very little investment on increasing 
the infrastructure had been made.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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The structure set up first by the Conservative and then Labour Governments was fraught with 
problems. The fragmented structure of two regulators and the separation of infrastructure 
owner, train operating companies, rolling stock providers, and infrastructure maintenance 
and renewal companies forced many new entrants into the industry into steep learning curves 
(Gourvish 2008). The bidding process and franchise agreements were expensive to carry out 
and rigid in their design (Alexandersson et al., 2008). Over optimism regarding cost savings 
and streamlining meant profits in the interim were negligible and service suffered as TOC’s cut 
staffing to meet targets; over half the original franchises failed (Gourvish 2008). In many 
respects, mistakes were made that had far reaching consequences that were not considered 
at the time.   
One of these mistakes was possibly the management of the failure of the MTL franchise in 
Liverpool. The MTL was the first franchise to fail and also occurred at the start of the new 
Labour Government in 1997 when policies were still being defined and knowledge of what to 
do in the event of a franchise failure had not been tried or tested. OPRAF approved a 
management agreement and bailout before refranchising which opened up the way for other 
franchises to see that failure was not the major financial risk that was first thought. Soon after 
this franchise failure other franchises appealed for either renegotiation or management 
buyouts costing the Government a considerable sum. Eventually the Operator of Last Resort 
was used even though this ability had always been in place and failing franchises could have 
been left to ‘go to the wall’ possibly securing both a reduction in taxpayer costs and a better 
commitment to the franchise contracts from the operators and even a reduction in the failure 
rate of the initial franchises (Whelan, 2008). 
Regulation needs to be stringent but should not encourage adverse actions. Instances during 
the last few years have seen a variety of negative impacts from regulation designed to 
improve the service. Regulation regarding punctuality saw operators cancelling trains rather 
than be penalised for lateness. Regulation encouraging operators to claw back money from 
other operators (or Network Rail) if their service was delayed through the fault of another saw 
some operators collecting more from fines than from passenger receipts ((Preston, 2008b).  
Since the more recent – post-Hatfield – restructuring of the industry there have been 
significant improvements, although there are still areas where regulation and competition are 
not compatible.  
Preston (2008) argues for five main areas that should be followed for successful franchising: Dawn Louise Robins         
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1.  Service requirements should be easy to define and reasonably stable.  
2.  the technology should be well understood.  
3.  sunk costs should not be too high.  
4.  the initial costs of defining and letting the contract should be low.  
5.  monitoring of service delivery and quality should be feasible.  
Arguably these features only partially apply to the passenger railway industry and as a result 
franchising has had mixed results. Risks and uncertainties have distorted the process, and 
coupled with so few incumbents’ winning repeat bids for their franchises, investment into the 
industry is understandably cautious. Ensuring that investment follows increases in franchise 
length, to encourage investment, has proven to be a difficult problem to solve.  
2.4.2.1  Where Are We Now? 
Vertical separation has had some advantages in promoting specialisation, a better 
understanding of infrastructure costs and encouraging competition.  However, there are also 
significant challenges in providing the appropriate incentives for investment, given the 
naturally monopolistic characteristic of the rail network, and the scale of investment that has 
been and continues to be required.  
Preston (2008) finds that rail franchising in Britain has been competitive and has permitted 
reductions in revenue support to something approaching the pre-privatisation levels. There 
have been risks and uncertainties, though, and that has been found to have distorted the 
process, resulting in relatively little transfer of risk from Government to the private sector and 
therefore limited innovation. Rail reform has been a costly and on-going exercise that has yet 
to be completed. Transparency of objectives is paramount to the success of any privatisation 
programme and this was lacking from the original scheme. The current structure has 
improved the situation, but competition has not developed to the extent that was envisaged 
in the original infrastructure and franchising model.  
Competition within the industry does raise questions for the quality and value of service to 
the consumer. Individual franchises are now competing for customers and deriving their own 
unique brands with differing weight put on particular service requirements. This begs the 
question of the effectiveness of horizontal competition; should franchises compete so 
ruthlessly with each other or should the emphasis be on competing with other transport 
modes through a pooling of resources and collaborative support? One of the examples of this 
is through the fare distribution software process – Operational Research Computerised Dawn Louise Robins         
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Allocation of Tickets to Services (ORCATS). The revenue received through the ticket sales are 
distributed to each franchise along the route the ticket covers and weight is given to the 
presiding franchise. Many operators are now producing specific tickets to named stations to 
avoid part of the allocated revenue being taken by other operators. These tickets tend to be 
cheaper but stipulate the train service that can be used and the time the journey can be 
taken. The Operator then gets the full amount of the revenue received and builds loyalty with 
the customer through reduced ticket prices. Allocation is also given on the nature of the 
service provided; therefore a fast train will get a higher percentage of revenue than a 
competing slower train. Concentration is then given to the receipt of increased revenue 
allocation rather than on the suitability of service to passengers. 
One of the key aims of the separation of the rail sector was to facilitate investment in the 
infrastructure and the rolling stock. Under public ownership, the financial constraints led to 
under-funding of long-term investment. The model initially adopted, with a single privatised 
operator managing the network while sub-contracting a significant proportion of the 
maintenance work, enabled significant investment to be channelled into the system, but at 
the expense of quality controls over the work undertaken. The transfer of the responsibilities 
of Railtrack to Network Rail, and the change in working practices that that involved, appears 
to have addressed these concerns.  
2.5  Conclusion 
Both property rights theory and principal agent problems are clearly apparent in the shaping 
of the privatised rail industry. Increases in regulatory control and a shift from an initial totally 
privately owned and managed rail network to an industry that has the firm control by the 
Department of Transport highlights the continual balancing process of ownership, 
responsibility and control whilst achieving quality and value of service. It appears that there 
may have been a desire to absolve the rights and responsibility of Government in return for 
competition and efficiency but when the service and value seem threatened the Government 
is keen to gain control back – if not ownership.  
Privatisation has appeared to have brought stability to the industry that nationalisation could 
not. The Treasury has less control and finances are fixed into longer contractual agreements. 
There are also other streams of funding and infrastructure investment available that was 
lacking under the old regime. It could arguably be said, although the statistics appear to back 
this up, that the transition period of the railways did not really end until after 2005 when the Dawn Louise Robins         
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passenger kilometres and revenue started to increase. Post privatisation and prior to 2005 
there was still much restructuring and crisis management borne from the instigation of such a 
large restructuring event where no previous similar events could be used to learn from. Many 
mistakes were made, and many outside influences interfered with the process.  
The advantage of hindsight will always allow a clearer view of what should or could have 
happened and both the Conservative and Labour Governments made many decisions that had 
adverse impacts that were previously unforeseen. Short franchises, increasing operator 
support and many bail outs of franchisees were possibly some of the issues that hindered the 
transition period. The railways do appear to have settled down in recent years and the 
leadership and control of the different factions is stringent through the regulation and 
transparency that has now evolved.  
The literature that has been reviewed and the historical accounts of the rail industry in Great 
Britain that have been described in this chapter help us to understand the complexity of the 
political and economic events that have helped shape the railways into what they are today. 
The structure of the railways over the 30 year period can be seen as continually evolving and 
complex. Achieving the balance between operational standards and costs has been a difficult 
journey that has, arguably, yet to end. Tightening of regulation, increased government 
control, and stringent franchise agreements have highlighted a potential principal agent 
problem. This is further highlighted through the increased costs and subsidies that have also 
occurred. It is interesting to note that contrary to their continual promise of renationalisation 
whilst in opposition, once in power, the Labour Government quickly dropped the policy in 
favour of an integrated and regulated industry. This may underpin the theory of property 
rights and also allows the Labour Government a certain amount of distance from the blame if, 
as happened in October 2000 and the Hatfield Crash, grave errors in organisational structure 
are laid bare. 
Understanding how much the change within the industry has cost the various stakeholders 
and whether the privatisation initiative was of any benefit to them is the subject of this 
research. How this will be achieved is described in the next chapter. There have been many 
approaches to analysing costs and benefits and in order to fully understand the cost regime 
and reasons for the increases it is necessary to look at the research that has taken place over 
the last 10 years into the various aspects of the railways. The following chapter will look at the 
research that has taken place and the methods employed before outlining the methodology 
chosen for this research. Dawn Louise Robins         
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   3  Methodological Approach to Costs and Benefits 
3.1  Introduction 
When deciding on a suitable methodology for a research topic it is important to account for a 
number of determining factors such as: what has been used before, what has previously been 
effective, what data is available to be used and what methods can be utilised to accommodate 
the data. It is worth noting here that the actual process of design and development of the 
model and method used in this research was a work in progress rather than a methodology 
developed prior to the event. Due to the limitations of availability of research on such a broad 
subject area, as this research proposed, a variety of methodologies were considered taking in 
political, industry and academic recommendations.  
The first section of this chapter will consider the journey that was taken in determining the 
methodology. A discussion on the barriers to certain methodologies, the limitations of the 
research and the background to the project itself will be considered and an outline of the 
reasons for choosing the methodology implemented – Cost Benefit Analysis. Although this 
research is concerned with ex-post Cost Benefit Analysis it is worth considering the research 
that has been carried out on CBAs as a whole and the strengths and weaknesses that have 
been found in the methodology and this will be covered in the second section. Assessing the 
costs and benefits of the rail industry is fraught with difficulties such as problems with cost 
modelling, changes in accounting procedure, fluctuating cost of resources, and inaccuracies in 
demand forecasting. Many attempts have been made to assess costs of various features of 
the industry including infrastructure, safety, and subsidies, as well as an assessment of the 
actual cost benefit process itself.  
This chapter will, therefore, look at the research that has been carried out in order to support 
the methodologies chosen in this thesis. The first section considers the research journey, the 
second section looks at cost benefit methodology and then application in relation to large 
infrastructure projects and the railways is considered. The final section will look at the CBA 
methodologies in relation to this research and explain the general methodology that will be 
employed.  
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3.2  Developing a Methodology  
The aim of this research is to understand the impacts of the privatisation policy on the 
railways and to determine how much of the growth that has occurred in Passenger Kilometres 
is due to that policy initiative and where the costs and benefits of the policy have been felt. In 
order to carry out such a task there are a number of activities that need to take place. This 
section highlights the journey through determining the methodology for carrying out the 
research and links the previous and future chapters into a comprehensive story of 30 years in 
British Rail policy history.  
When attempting to ascertain the impacts of policy on a particular industry it is useful to have 
something to compare to. This could either be a like – for – like process such as that carried 
out by Boardman in 2009 when he compared the newly privatised rail sector against a 
continually nationalised one in Canada (Boardman et al., 2009), or a separate space in time 
such as the work by Smith in 2006 on the costs prior to privatisation compared to those post 
privatisation (Smith, 2006). It may also be practicable to compare against an industry in 
another country or a different industry sector that has worked through a similar process, but, 
to carry out such a study requires that there is something – be it an industry, country or 
methodology  – that is comparable, and as found by both Preston and Smith this has proven 
difficult (Smith and Wheat, 2008, Preston, 2008b). 
One of the main issues with studying such a large industry sector over such a long period of 
time is the reduction of available comparisons. It will be found throughout the rest of this 
chapter that although a great deal of searching took place the ability to compare the whole of 
the study was impossible – and to compare small aspects illogical. It became apparent that 
the methodology for this research could be informed by prior studies, could take account for 
the different methodological processes, and could both draw from and develop the work of 
others, but would need to test and develop the main body of work from scratch. Another 
issue to contend with was the fact that during the data collection and review of literature and 
methodological choices there was a lot of work occurring around the concept of rail demand. 
The Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook – the parameters by which demand is 
calculated for the purposes of testing the viability of infrastructure and service changes – was 
in the process of being reworked due to issues with both under and over estimation in many 
tests
5. This, and other projects such as Whelan et al. (2010), have only come to publication 
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since the majority of this thesis was designed and written therefore the work cannot be 
included as work that has been further developed but, where able, it has been referred to for 
comparison and to provide a clearer insight.  
To achieve the research aims the research journey had to start from the very beginning of the 
time period and develop the data, history and methodology over time. It has been shown in 
the literature review how diverse the subject matter is and the complexity of the various 
impacts from politics and economics and how the history of the rail industry impacted on the 
future development. Encapsulating these impacts into a workable methodology required a 
greater understanding of the data available, the history and behaviour of the industry, and the 
complexities of the political will and economic framework that was apparent. The literature 
review has provided much of this evidence and in generating the background to the research 
specific variables of interest were noted for inclusion into the model of impacts on demand. 
The data collection of these variables proved difficult and therefore required a reworking of 
the initial framework which meant the research quickly fell into a pattern of adjustment and 
reconsideration as different elements were removed, replaced or reformulated.   
The following chapter will highlight the journey through the data collection and will highlight 
the difficulties involved in collecting specific time dependant data from a variety of sources. 
Problems that were encountered included - data that suddenly stopped being collected, 
methodology of the collection process changed, and organisational changes altered the 
allocation of data, and the detail and aggregation of data changed. There is a slew of data 
available for rail but not all of it could be utilised and not only rail data has impacted on 
demand therefore the data trends chapter also looks at other factors external to the rail 
industry that may be of relevance.  
Although there was a desire to include external factors such as fuel costs, modal change and 
environmental impacts the data for these variables was difficult to align to the rail data. The 
environmental impacts are especially difficult to interpret and this is explained in greater 
depth in chapter 4, section 4. The literature review has highlighted several events within the 
research time frame that had adversely affected demand – Hatfield, strikes, recession and fuel 
costs. Although some of these events may have increased demand others would have reduced 
demand and during the 30 year period studied there has been an increased awareness of 
‘being green’ that may have resulted in a switch to the more environmentally friendly mode of 
transport - rail. That said, the added environmental impacts of renewal and maintenance has 
been significant and these ‘costs’ are long term and attributed to the life span of the Dawn Louise Robins         
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infrastructure. Accounting for all these factors across such a large network proved unwieldy 
and initial tentative calculations gave minimal credit to any costs or benefits. Due to the 
difficulties in determining the many factors that had impacted on rail demand let alone those 
with a minimal impact it was decided to leave the environmental factors out of the model and 
use the discussion around the topic as evidence of accountability. 
Other external variables – such as car and bus – are discussed in chapter 4 and their impact on 
rail demand is explored. National Transport Trends has shown some interesting developments 
within the area of car use over the last 30 years and although there is strong evidence to 
suggest that there has been a significant modal switch between car and train it became 
problematic to suggest that the increase in rail demand was from modal switch rather than 
new journeys. It was again decided not to include this factor in the demand model as 
accounting for adjustments over such a large network and a long time period would be too 
difficult to justify. That said, the different external factors that are described in chapter 4 are 
important indicators of the change in behaviour of consumers and also underpin the 
argument for the impacts of political and economic events and policies on transport use over 
the 30 year time period. 
Once a comparable set of data had been collected a methodology for ascertaining the impacts 
on demand was considered. Pawson (2002) suggested that one of the reasons that testing a 
policy impact had yet to be carried out could be because the effects of a policy change are 
distorted by exogenous variables such as changes in population and income and are overtaken 
by other policy initiatives (Pawson, 2002). Undeterred, a methodology was developed that 
would account for the different data types, help to ascertain the start of the policy impacts 
and to disaggregate the costs and benefits to the different stakeholders. The following 
sections in this chapter consider the accepted methodologies for addressing the problem and 
explain the reasons why a cost benefit analysis was chosen. 
Before a cost benefit analysis can be carried out there needs to be comparable sets of data to 
compare. This consists of the development of a simple econometric model of rail demand and 
extrapolative models of key variables such as fares, train kilometres and costs. The demand 
forecasting model was developed and informed by the work of others such as Wardman 
(2006) and influenced by the research on transport trends and social and economic impacts as 
shown in chapter 4. As it has been said before, this research is not a study of econometrics 
but uses econometrics as a means to understand the impacts of a policy change whilst 
accounting for the external factors such as politics, economics and social behaviour. For this Dawn Louise Robins         
 
59 
 
reason it was not a feature of this research to develop new ways of testing impacts or to 
design new econometric methodologies. The model designed was simple yet unique, but the 
methodology behind the design was common place. The chosen methodology was a simple 
semi-logarithmic regression model chosen for its simplicity and transparency and because it is 
the most widely used methodology in transport economics (Picard et al., 2010, Wardman, 
2006, Wheat and Smith, 2008). The aim was to generate a test statistic; Coefficient B for PKm; 
that could then be used to predict the impact of privatisation.  
The modelling itself may not have set out to be a significant aspect but it became a central 
feature of the research as it quickly became apparent that the initial data availability and its 
ability to interpret and account for the external events – such as Hatfield, recessions, strikes, 
and fuel crisis and policy evolvement – would not easily be accommodated.  One of the main 
features that required consideration was that of the actual start date of the impact of 
privatisation. 1992 was the publication date of the White Paper and therefore knowledge of 
the process to be carried out. 1993 saw the Railway Act granted and confirmation of definite 
timescales to privatisation published. Privatisation impacts could have started to occur around 
this time in both positive and negative ways from an organisation, political and consumer 
perspective and this has been explored in the literature review. 1995 was the actual start of 
the process (although some sectors and affiliated companies had been sold off prior to this), 
but 1996/97 was the time that the process had finished and the beginning of a fully privatised 
industry. Various authors have given differing dates for the start of the privatisation impact 
and these have been discussed and compared to the choices made in this research. 
Over 100 different model specifications were tested, in particular with respect to functional 
form (linear and log linear models were also tested), the specification of the dependent 
variables (e.g. the reciprocal of TKM was tested), the use of lagged variables, alternative 
explanatory variables (e.g. car ownership, petrol prices) and alternative specifications of the 
Dummy Variables. The final choice of model was determined by its ability to predict changes 
in demand (98%) and its simplicity and ease of use for the research over the time period 
studied. 
The aim of the model was to account for a counterfactual scenario; a ‘do nothing’ comparison 
when compared with an alternative action. The counterfactual can be calculated using moving 
averages up to the point of privatisation but this will only allow for a comparison of what has 
happened with what would have happened. What it does not account for is how much of 
what has happened is due to privatisation rather than any other reason – a ‘would have Dawn Louise Robins         
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occurred anyway’ scenario. This is one aspect of the research that differs from other attempts 
at long time series modelling such as Whelan et al. (2010) and Camilleri (2004). Research of 
modelling may look at the different impacts of the economy, cost structures and social and 
political changes but this research aims to attribute the change to a specific element. Whelan 
et al. study the economic impacts on the railways and include the same dummy variables that 
were independently developed here, but the research does not set out to isolate the 
privatisation impact and therefore does not include this within the model. The model was 
devised so it could interpret the actual data as well as the counterfactual data. This meant 
that three data sets were effectively generated – what happened, what could have happened, 
and what should have happened. The impact of privatisation is then clearly represented 
outside of the actual changes that have taken place. 
During the development of the counterfactual it became important to relate the actual events 
over the time period to what the data was actually saying. The literature review has provided 
a comprehensive account of Thatcherism and the privatisation policy, and the rail history 
accounts for many of the events but applying them to what may have occurred in a 
counterfactual scenario is considered at the point of the counterfactual development. This 
enabled the counterfactual to become robust and relevant to actual scenarios that have 
occurred – and would have occurred – had the privatisation policy not been initiated. Once 
the model had defined the counterfactual scenario the first steps towards understanding the 
policy impacts through cost benefit could be carried out. This came in the form of consumer 
surplus – an economic measure of consumer satisfaction, which is calculated by analyzing the 
difference between what consumers are willing to pay for a good or service relative to its 
market price – and the change in revenue – the cost or benefit felt by the operators for 
providing the service. It is assumed that there will be a substantial consumer surplus due to 
the large increase in demand but the regulation of the industry suggests profits will be limited.  
The model was only used for the demand side of the data and not the costs, there is no 
comparable scenario for costs other than a counterfactual. The costs presented their own set 
of difficulties regarding availability, disaggregation and consistency. Each set of accounts for 
the period of British Railways (1979-1995) emphasised specific elements of data rather than 
presenting the individual data as a whole throughout the time period. In some years data was 
broken down into specific operating costs and in others the data was kept aggregated. This 
provided a significant problem with comparison to post privatisation data where the costs are 
available for the train operating and rail maintenance separately. A considerable amount of Dawn Louise Robins         
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time was initially spent on trying to decide which costs could be attributed to which 
stakeholder and where the data was not disaggregated by which percentage the attribution 
should be. Whilst this was taking place the events and policy implications of the era were also 
being considered alongside each accounting year. Various research papers were consulted, 
where costs were a main feature and data had been identified and manipulated, but the 
understanding of how the disaggregation had been achieved and why certain calculations had 
been made proved difficult to compare to the objectives of this thesis. The main research 
undertaken for costs of the rail both pre and post privatisation is that of Smith (2006). It was 
decided to incorporate this work into the research and develop Smith’s model further. The 
cost calculations found in Chapter 6 are based on the work of Smith (1996/7 to 2006/7) 
(Smith, 2006, Smith and Wheat, 2007), with the series extended using company accounts and 
the TAS Rail Industry Monitor. 
Operating and capital costs are only one aspect of the cost implications and thought needed 
to be given to any income from sales or costs incurred due to implementation of the policy 
change. Transition costs are those costs incurred as a direct result of a policy change and 
would not have occurred under a counterfactual scenario. Transition costs include 
consultancy, legal and financial information gathering and activities as well as direct 
contractual and processing costs. Transitional costs can be offset by the actual sale of 
companies and this may have been an intention of the privatisation process (Dnes, 1993). 
Transition costs differ from transaction costs in the sense that transaction costs are ongoing 
rather than a one-off cost. When it came to looking at transaction costs there appeared to be 
little work carried out on the impact over time and a great differing opinion on how these 
costs are appropriated and disaggregated. Until recently the majority of studies had looked at 
transaction costs as applicable to specific events and policy changes i.e. Hatfield and the most 
comprehensive data available concerned itself with initial transition costs. It was decided to 
allow the ongoing transaction costs to remain within total costs and to use the start-up costs 
as a one-off cost disaggregated between stakeholders as informed by previous work (Nash 
and Smith, 2007, Preston, 2002).  
Once this journey had been completed there would be three specific sums of money that 
could be attributed to the stakeholders of the rail industry. These figures would be either 
costs, a reduction in income or benefit to the stakeholder from the privatisation initiative, or a 
benefit, and increase in the income or benefit to the stakeholder from the privatisation 
initiative. The next step in determining the costs and benefits that have occurred is to Dawn Louise Robins         
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calculate the welfare benefit – this is the change in the revenue received due to the policy 
change minus the amount of cost of the policy change added to the change in the consumer 
surplus. This methodology allows the research to compare the costs and benefits of the policy 
change to the different stakeholders – Government, Operators, Users and Non-users and to 
determine whether the privatisation policy initiative has produced an overall cost or benefit. 
The research journey finally ends once the analysis of where the costs and benefits have been 
felt is attributed to the changing political and economic era of the research time frame. This 
analysis will endeavour to produce tentative recommendations for policy in the future and 
will, no doubt, recommend additional research to underpin the findings. To continue on the 
research journey the following sections will take into account cost benefit methodologies and 
the difficulties in forecasting over a long time series.   
3.3  Cost Benefit Methodology 
Cost benefit analysis is used to help forecast the impacts of specific investment and to identify 
the value of carrying out one proposal compared to another. CBA is also used to monitor the 
impact of regulation on an initiative i.e. privatisation. According to McVea (McVea, 2005) CBA: 
“is a practical and rigorous means of identifying, targeting and checking the impacts of 
regulatory measures on the underlying causes of the ills with which regulators need to deal, 
those causes being the market failures that in turn may justify regulatory intervention” 
(McVea 2005 cited in Vleugel & Bos 2008).  
Cost benefit can, therefore, decide whether regulation of an industry needs to be 
strengthened or, if the regulation is hindering or preventing competitive activities, it may 
need to be re-evaluated. CBA is carried out either ex-ante or ex-post, depending on whether 
the project or industry is being evaluated on previous performance or value is being forecast, 
and in some cases a CBA is carried out on completion of a project to gauge whether the 
original assumptions have been met. 
One of the problems with CBA that were identified by Vleugel was the difference between the 
CBA outcomes when an ex-ante CBA is compared to an ex-post CBA once the project is 
evaluated (Vleugel and Bos, 2008). They restrict their research to purely infrastructure 
projects of which railways are a main feature. The problems with the divergence of results 
means CBAs are increasingly questioned for validity and robustness. One of the main issues 
that seem to reoccur in the analysis is the difficulties in assessing environmental impacts. This Dawn Louise Robins         
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is not an uncommon complaint, many of the papers that have been reviewed look towards 
environmental impacts as being a cause, if not the main cause, of inaccurate CBA forecasts 
(Schade and Rothengatter, 2003).  
One approach by Feng and Wang that tries to deal with this issue is by combining cost 
evaluation methods in order to derive a more substantial methodology (Feng and Wang, 
2005). By combining the contingent valuation method (CVM), that estimates economic values 
for environmental services, with a fully economic evaluation approach they are able to 
construct a new transport evaluation model that highlights the importance of including 
environmental costs in order to ascertain the benefits and identify specific stakeholder 
conflict. This is always assuming that the environmental costs are an important aspect of the 
transport infrastructure to be negotiated.  Feng believes that using the integrated model 
allows interest groups to pursue bargaining tactics with other stakeholders by providing the 
evidence – or disputing the beliefs – of environmental cost allocation. As it appears that the 
environmental factors are one of the main weaknesses in CBAs this methodology devised by 
Feng & Wang (2005) may help to strengthen the relevance of the results and reduce the 
amount of over-spend on many projects, but it does not necessarily answer the problems 
identified by Vleugel. 
Kidokoro (2004) looked at practical methods of estimating benefits to infrastructure projects 
on congestion-prone transport networks and compared the results of three methods 
(Kidokoro, 2004). Using a benefit estimation methodology for first-best case and comparing to 
a second-best case scenario - where costs and benefits vary on routes – it is found that the 
differences between the final calculations of benefit differ to a considerable degree. One of 
the problems here is the inclusion or exclusion of certain costs. If costs can be clearly 
identified the results appear to improve but if costs such as environmental costs have to be 
assumed then the models tend to adjust accordingly and the results are less robust. This is 
particularly pertinent to this research where the benefits of the whole network are calculated 
rather than a specific route. If estimations of benefit on a small route can differ depending on 
the model and method chosen then the calculations for a large scale project will be even more 
pronounced. The impact of the problem of CBAs giving possibly unfavourable projections 
causing projects to be delayed, or even cancelled, has been analysed using the Dutch 
experience (Annema et al., 2007). 
Another issue for CBA methodology lies in standardised methodologies across sectors and 
ensuring variables are weighted in the same way. Preston and Mackie (1998) found that: Dawn Louise Robins         
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“roads  are  not  appraised  solely  on  the  basis  of their  traffic,  economic  and  
environmental  performance  as expressed  in  the  Framework,  but  also  on  Government  
Office judgement  and  their  importance  to  the  overall  network” (Preston 1998 p1).  
The paper looks at 21 errors and bias in transport appraisal (Mackie and Preston, 1998) and 
found that there were errors and inconsistencies’ across objectives, methods and sectors and 
that double counting, inappropriate values, and failure to balance quantified and non-
quantified items can all affect the evaluation (Mizutani, 2011). CBA of roads, specifically trunk 
roads, has been found to lack the information required by the different stakeholders for a 
robust evaluation to take place (Rosa, 2010). The lack of information coupled with 
inefficiencies in dissemination could mean that the methodology used to conduct the CBA is 
ineffective. Increasing robustness of both method and awareness would come at a cost, but, 
Oxera found the extra cost – approximately £600,000 a year – could be reduced through 
tailoring CBAs to the needs of the individual project being evaluated (Rosa, 2010).   
The quality of ex-ante CBA evaluations can, and do, mean the difference between projects 
ever coming to fruition. Annema evaluated 13 CBAs that had been carried out in preparation 
for project appraisal. The Dutch Government stipulated in 2000 that all major infrastructure 
projects would be appraised using CBA and Annema questions the validity of these appraisals 
and asks why CBA should be preferred to Marginal Cost Analyses (MCAs). The simple answer 
to this lies in the political implications of MCAs and the controversy that may arise from the 
appraisal yet, as Annema points out, on evaluation of the CBAs carried out since 2000, half are 
questionable and as politically controversial as an MCA. It is the belief of the authors that CBA 
methodology in the Netherlands has yet to achieve its full potential and the lack of 
transparency surrounding the CBA methodology means projects are often shelved on the 
grounds of cost value. If the inputs had been less generalised, and transparency achieved, 
they could potentially have been carried out in a more stringent and less politically inclined 
manner giving a set of robust costs and benefits to contribute to the decision making process. 
It could therefore be argued that relying on cost benefit models as the deciding factor in new 
infrastructure projects may prevent major socially and economically favourable projects being 
carried out.  
Annema (2007) does not rule CBAs out as a robust methodology for cost calculation but rather 
points to the weaknesses of the methodology when care is not taken with deciding which 
costs are included and how they are assessed. It was found, though, that CBAs had made a 
significant contribution to cost evaluation by ensuring inputs were appraised using the same Dawn Louise Robins         
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scenario and if transparency was achieved the results ensured the decision making process 
was better informed. Leleur (2001) tried to tackle the problem of differences between CBAs 
and MCAs by using them as ‘anchors’ for a composite modelling assessment (COSIMA) to 
examine the costs and benefits of transport projects specifically (Leleur, 2001). The research 
was again carried out in The Netherlands as a response to Government intervention and 
aimed to assist decision makers in exploring appraisal in a more systematic way. The main 
difference here is that a COSIMA model is tailored to the appraisal case in question rather 
than using a more generic set of parameters. COSIMA adds to the CBA parameters and can 
influence the end result and turn a project deemed not-worthwhile through CBA into a valued 
proposal (Riley, 2011). 
So far the majority of cost benefit literature has looked at the methodology and outputs in 
relation to reliability and robustness. Many CBA evaluations have taken place on small scale 
transport projects with clearly defined aims and objectives but, calculating the cost of large 
infrastructure projects needs to be considered in similar ways but, for the compensation of 
generalising certain costs. Vickerman (Vickerman, 2007) addresses these challenges and finds 
the main difficulties tend to be those of forecasting over long time periods, dealing with 
imperfect competition in transport-using sectors to obtain estimations of wider transport 
benefits, introducing private finance, and appraising network effects. Although CBAs are not 
discounted as a method of identifying costs and benefits they should not be considered in 
isolation from other complementary approaches, such as computable general equilibrium 
modelling
6, which may have a useful role to play for very large or network projects. The main 
concern is with the inputs into the model for a CBA. Differentials within the inputs due to 
assumptions and estimations may, over a large project, over or under calculate the true costs 
or dilute the impacts over the infrastructure project to the point that careful consideration 
needs to be given to the validity of the final results.  
The Netherlands have been a central point for cost benefit research and rail infrastructure 
projects, just as it has been for road. Van Wee (2007) looked to tighten up the variables that 
were included in the analysis and found that many CBAs, when determining the benefits, 
often missed opportunities that may have changed the final conclusions. He recognised that 
cost over-runs were common in rail infrastructure but coupled with only half of benefits being 
included in the analysis led to a bleak picture for future rail infrastructure growth (Van Wee, 
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2007). Van Wee challenges the practice of comparing through cost benefit analyses of using a 
‘do nothing’ scenario and suggests that comparisons should instead focus on an alternative 
project that delivers the same, or similar, outputs. 
When CBA is used for large infrastructure projects it is useful to have the availability of 
international benchmarking, especially if the proposed project is something that has no 
comparison in either the specific sector, or industry in general, as in the UK. Due to the speed 
and sheer size of the privatisation initiative of the rail industry in Great Britain there have 
been little opportunities to compare work with other countries.  Network Rail (NR) and the 
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) have been conflicted over efficiency savings deemed necessary 
to bring the infrastructure owner into line with European contemporaries. The ORR has 
carried out various international comparisons with regard to asset management (Opper, 2004) 
and the Institute for Transport Studies carried out international benchmarking of maintenance 
and renewal costs (Engles, 2009). The reports culminated in the publication of PR08 and led to 
ORR insisting on efficiency savings to be made during CP4. Network Rail continue to remain 
doubtful that comparisons with European and International counterparts can provide 
benchmarks from which efficiency targets can be set but further work is continuing in this 
area. 
Smith (2009) looked at how International benchmarking of costs could be addressed in terms 
of comparing cost efficiency in the work of Network Rail. Using the Periodic Review 2008 
(PR08) of Network Rail (NR) Smith et al. used top-down econometric techniques coupled with 
bottom-up engineering analysis to compare NR with other international infrastructure 
companies. One of the main issues that this research found was the need for good quality and 
continuous data. It was found that the actual timescales needed to complete the data 
collection and analysis were long and consideration was needed when extrapolating data – 
data must be compared to a variety of other evidence sources and estimates must be 
conservative (Smith et al., 2009). A final point for consideration must also be the natural 
anomalies in data that will impact significantly on the data set from one country but not on 
another – Hatfield is a good example of this. 
Most of the actual research that has concentrated on ascertaining the costs and benefits on 
the railways has been aimed at a specific part of the railways, the impact of an event, or a 
small time frame. One project that has looked at an ex-post cost benefit of a railway 
privatisation initiative is that of the Canadian railways by Boardman (Boardman et al., 2009). 
The Canadian railways are mainly freight, rather than passenger as in Britain, and only one Dawn Louise Robins         
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aspect of the railways was privatised – Canadian National Railways (CNR) – not the Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR). This gave Boardman an advantage over other ex-post CBAs in that he 
had a readymade counterfactual to compare to, although, with competition coming in the 
form of the newly privatised CNR, there would be a case to argue that the CPR would have 
increased cost efficiency and quality of service to be able to compete in a commercial setting 
and may not be taken as a true counterfactual of non-privatisation. 
Boardman uses the methodology of Jones (Jones et al., 1990) - where Social Welfare is equal 
to the total value of privatised industry minus the total value of the nationalised industry plus 
the sale of the industry – to identify the welfare benefits and uses changes in capital 
expenditures as well as changes in operating costs to determine the costs to the stakeholders. 
It is important to remember that where many CBAs will use data extrapolated from actual 
data prior to the initiative, Boardman uses data extrapolated from the differences between 
the two railway companies and estimates the forecast in line with the actual data from the 
‘other’ railway company. This has the advantage of following anomalies in the data caused by 
the national economy and actual events but also assumes that the companies would have 
continued to have performed in the same manner had privatisation not gone ahead. There is a 
strong argument for this to be preferable as long as the pre-privatised industry performed in 
the same way for a period of time and did not deviate when faced with outside influences and 
political and economic challenges, but it does assume CPR is an appropriate control. 
Boardman’s final analysis of the Canadian privatisation initiative arrived at similar results to 
Pollitt and Smith’s (2002) analysis of the British railway privatisation apart from the 
restructuring costs which were much higher in the UK. Where Boardman’s research differs the 
most from the CBA in this thesis is with the actual purpose of the CBA. Although Boardman’s 
research is also looking to ascertain the welfare gains from the CBA process, this research is 
also concerned with explaining the exponential rise in passenger kilometres as being a direct 
result of the privatisation process. The Canadian railways did not increase in size or service or 
price therefore any gains attributed to the privatisation process are purely efficiency gains and 
will amount to a net gain for all stakeholders. 
Few larger scale CBAs have existed on the privatisation of the rail industry in the UK and those 
that have been carried out tend to look at the immediate time frame around the privatisation 
process. The work of Pollitt and Smith (2002) on rail efficiency savings used CBA to assess 
where the savings, if any had been made, were felt. They found costs had risen by £2.9bn 
between 1999/00 and 2001/02 and noted that the preliminary results for the following year Dawn Louise Robins         
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were indicating further increases. This suggests that the Hatfield crash in 2000 had a greater 
and longer lasting effect on the rail profits than previously thought and is an opportunity for 
this research to follow through on. The paper focuses on safety as a benefit to service quality 
and finds little empirical basis for the continuance of further spending on safety as the impact 
was shown to be limited. Although the ORR have issued enforced efficiency savings on 
Network Rail to try and reduce the costs to pre-privatisation levels, Smith points out that the 
cost base for the efficiency gains - as set by the ORR – is 27% higher than the cost base at the 
point of the Hatfield crash. Any reductions in costs through achieving efficiency gains would 
have to be considerably higher than the amount enforced for the savings to bring costs down 
to anywhere close to privatisation levels.  
The CBA carried out omitted capital costs due to the problems of establishing a counterfactual 
scenario, although they did provide separate accounts for these costs both before and after 
privatisation. The approach used for the CBA is that which was originally developed by Jones, 
Tandon and Vogelsang (1990) and as we have seen so far in this literature review it is probably 
the most widely used and the one that will be adopted by this research. The first task is to 
assess the welfare change before allocating it to the different stakeholders – consumers 
(users), producers (operators) and the government. The same principals are used in the 
research by Boardman (2009) with the exception of the costs. Pollitt and Smith derive the 
industry costs as the difference between the total revenue received less the actual operating 
profits. Under normal circumstances this would not provide an accurate account of the actual 
costs for a counterfactual scenario to be developed from but as this research is concerned 
mainly with operating costs, and inherent problems with measurement and comparability 
prevent the majority of railway efficiency studies from using capital costs, they address the 
issue through discussion on capital investment levels and the changes that have taken place 
and the efficiency of the cost of capital investment (project management). Rail infrastructure 
projects are often over budget and often run over time, something that has not changed to 
any significant degree since privatisation. 
It should be noted that Smith’s methodology for ascertaining costs and benefits of the rail 
privatisation is similar to this particular research except this research is looking at a much 
longer time scale and also seeks to explain the increase in passenger kilometres. Smith 
continues with the theme of cost implications in his paper on rail industry cash costs and the 
implications of the Hatfield crash (Smith, 2006). Here, the focus is on total costs and Hatfield 
features significantly as an area of increasing costs and how reasonable these costs are. The Dawn Louise Robins         
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paper takes two significant timescales – from privatisation to Hatfield and from 2000/01 to 
2001/02. The second time period they describe as post-Hatfield but more recent research has 
questioned the time frame for post-Hatfield and argues for a longer period. They do, however, 
use benchmarked productivity levels from previous periods when similar maintenance and 
renewal programmes were in force, namely the 1970s. 
Their results include the comparisons of post-Hatfield costs with historical events but the 
main focus of interest lies in productivity and the impact of changes in track renewal (a main 
feature of Hatfield). The paper again looks at safety measures as a reason for changes in 
productivity trends but finds that incorporating them into the final analysis did not produce 
reportable results. Smith recognises that the Hatfield crash has had a significant and longer 
lasting effect on the rail industry than previously thought and suggests that benchmarking 
should be a priority feature of further research (Smith, 2006).  
Since this thesis has been developed and completed there have been developments in time 
series analysis of the rail industry in Great Britain and the recent work by Whelan and Harvey 
(Whelan et al., 2010) has explored the relationship between variables and the impact of long-
term trends in terms of the economic, demographic and competition variables as well as 
service and fares (Whelan et al., 2010). Although their inclusion of quality measures and fuel 
costs extends the parameters of the model their findings support the analysis of this thesis 
and provide a benchmark for comparison that will be explored further in the next section. 
3.4  Relating Cost Benefit Analysis to this Research 
The literature has highlighted an assortment of potential issues with carrying out CBAs and 
these issues must be addressed, even if they cannot to be solved. One of the main issues is 
that of forecasting over long time periods (Vickerman 2007). This research aims to take a 30 
year time period as the basis of the pre-privatisation, transition, and post privatisation period 
– this is a considerable time period to take, and one of the unique features of this research. 
There are various methodologies that have been tested that try to address the issues around 
developing a counterfactual argument that corresponds to a plausible scenario.  
Developing a counterfactual argument for the model requires some sort of estimation of likely 
trends. It was decided to use a simple moving average scenario based on previous data trends. 
There have been many attempts at designing models that will accurately forecast by reducing 
‘noise’ (i.e. irregular events that impact on an otherwise smooth trend). Linear methods try to Dawn Louise Robins         
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model closely underlying subsystems and require the identification and measurement of 
several features such as seasonality, cycles and irregularities. Non-linear methods exploit 
measurement data and mimic dynamic systems without the need for understanding the 
underlying processes (Camilleri, 2004). Although a linear trend is commonly assumed in time 
series forecasting, as it is here, empirical research shows this is a reasonable assumption only 
at short horizons (Gardner and McKenzie, 1985). The longer the horizon, the more likely a 
linear trend will be to overshoot the data – mainly due to unforeseen events. Overcoming this 
problem can be tackled by dampening the trend through the introduction of an extra 
parameter (González-Páramo and De Cos, 2005).  
Studies of forecasting have shown that the most common methods used by researchers, such 
as simple regression and Box-Jenkins, do not, in hindsight, necessarily give the best 
forecasting results. The main reasons given for the widespread use of these methods are that 
they are easily understood, relatively simple to use and they do not require complex software 
(Collopy, 1992). An alternative approach to trend extrapolation is Lewandowski's FORSYS 
system (Cowie, 2001), which damps the trend in every time series according to the level of 
noise. According to Gardner and McKenzie, the results derived from this approach seem to fall 
short each time (Gardener and McKenzie 1985), and especially when there appears to be a 
strong trend, Lewandowski's forecasts tend to track well below the data at long horizons. This 
method also achieves good long-range performance although at some cost in short-range 
accuracy. Alternatively, the Parzen methodology (ORR, 2011), which may be the most robust 
approach reported to date, is considered to be too complex for use in large forecasting 
systems (Gardner and McKenzie, 1985).  
It is important for the analysis that all data is treated in much the same way – costs and 
benefits will only be comparable if the data that is used is the same and the methodology 
consistent. This includes using the same dates for estimations and calculations and the same 
parameters i.e. if revenue per passenger kilometre is used for one model it should stand to 
reason that it is also used, and not replaced with another data set such as revenue, in other 
models.  
An outcome of this research is the development of a simple regression model to ascertain the 
forecast for passenger kilometres. The model is only used in the benefit section of the CBA 
and not in the cost section. Benefits are also attributed to passenger kilometres as this is the 
increase that is being explored. Costs are attributed to train kilometres as it is here that the Dawn Louise Robins         
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cost falls. That said, when estimating change in the parameters during this research care is 
taken to ensure the modelling remains comparable. 
One other methodological issue that is worth mentioning is the model that was used by BR to 
estimate the impact of projects and infrastructure enhancements (Gwilliam, 2008). Before 
privatisation, each BR business had a model to forecast traffic and revenue. For Network 
South East the model essentially relied on central London employment as this was the main 
income generator – commuters. Intercity utilised a different model in the form of: 
Change in IC revenue = A(change in GDP) – Y 
Where Y was a constant that reflected the increasing dispersal of population away from 
stations, and reduced rail competitiveness compared to road as a result of road building and 
increased car ownership. Developing a model for each sector is an issue that was considered 
during the initial thesis development but the main problems associated with this are issues of 
comparison and data availability. Changes in the sector boundaries and responsibilities and 
accounting procedures make it difficult for a disaggregated cost and benefit model to be taken 
advantage of.  
3.5  Conclusion 
The conclusions made in Vickermans (2007) paper on forecasting over long time periods are 
worth considering and may need accounting for within this research due to the size of this 
project and the network that is to be covered. Rail network routes will have different impacts 
and levels of use therefore the final costs will need to be aggregated over the whole network 
and cannot be isolated to specific routes.  
One of the most widely used approaches for CBAs is that which was originally developed by 
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990). It assesses the welfare costs and attributes them to the 
stakeholders. In this research these are the consumers (Users), Operators, and the 
Government (also non-users). This enables the specific benefits to be assessed against the 
stakeholders and will aid the narrative surrounding the final analysis. 
We have looked at the process of privatisation, the reasons that privatisation was carried out, 
and have garnered an understanding of the methodologies that have been utilised in order to 
understand these impacts on the rail industry. Now it is important to understand the long 
term trends of the rail industry and the impact that other transport modes may have had on Dawn Louise Robins         
 
72 
 
the increase in passenger kilometres. The next chapter looks at these trends and draws out 
those variables that will be important to understanding the changes in demand that have 
occurred. 
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4  Rail Industry Trends 
4.1   Introduction 
The last 30years of the rail industry has seen considerable changes in the way they are run 
and the service they provide. This has coincided with changes in political policy, 
environmental awareness and economic growth. However, analysing links between changes in 
the rail industry and these broader contextual factors raises considerable challenges for 
analysis. Not the least problematic is the fact that data for the industry comes with inherent 
problems regarding its character, collection methods, and timescale of availability. In order to 
be able to justify the assumptions made in the cost benefit analysis it is important to clarify 
these data anomalies and find the specific trends that relate to the growth in the industry. The 
purpose of this chapter is to look at the trends that have appeared in the different areas of 
the industry - such as region, sector and ticket type - and to try and attribute them to the 
various events that have occurred. This will set the scene for the next two chapters that will 
look at how much of the unexplainable changes can be attributed to the privatisation 
initiative. External influences will also be explored to find which factors impact on growth in 
the rail industry, where they impact and to what degree. Explaining growth and applying 
predictions can only be carried out with any degree of success if a general understanding of 
where the growth has occurred, and what may have contributed to it, has first been 
ascertained.  
The first section will look at the data that has been collected and where it originated. The rail 
industry trends will follow and subsequent sections will highlight the external influences 
including the impacts of other transport modes on the industry. The majority of the trends 
look at a span of 30yrs from 1979 to 2009 (where data allows) but some of the modal 
comparisons can be seen from 1952 thereby spanning more than 50yrs. 
4.2   Data Used in the Analysis 
Data for the rail industry is collected and distributed by different agencies for differing 
purposes. The method of data collection has changed over the years as the industry has 
evolved and the responsibility for data collection has also changed. This in itself is problematic 
in the sense that consistency of data collection is difficult to achieve over long time periods. 
The main body for transport data is the Department for Transport (DfT). They issue guidance 
on data collection methodology and provide a policy framework for the collection process and 
reporting structure. The railways are heavily regulated and cost containment has always Dawn Louise Robins         
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played a large part in the formulation of what is essentially a loss making industry (Jupe, 2005, 
Pollitt and Smith, 2002). To this end, the Department of Transport provide various guides and 
strategies to help rail companies strategically plan future rail improvements in a cohesive and 
standardised way
7.  
All data for rail is collected from the industry central ticketing system LENNON. Quarterly 
dates start from the beginning of the financial year rather than the beginning of the calendar 
year therefore quarter one is for thirteen weeks beginning in April. All data is rounded to the 
nearest two decimal places and revisions are made at the end of the financial year to take 
account of Train Operating Company (TOC) specific tickets and Passenger Transport Executive 
(PTE) multi-modal tickets. The LENNON system collects two types of data: Pre-allocation 
(Sales) and Post-allocation (Earnings). The National Rail Trends
8, a main user of the LENNON 
data set, uses the post-allocation data set. Allocations are created from an ‘opportunity to 
travel’ mathematical model using origin and destination timetabled information.  
Rail statistics consist of data on a broad range of topics including rail usage, performance, fare 
increases and safety. The National Rail Trends (NRT) is a main source of information for rail 
trends, and has, since 2008, been produced on a rolling basis rather than an annual 
publication (ORR, 2009c). Other publications from the Association of Train Operating 
Companies (ATOC) and Network Rail (NR) complement and contribute to the resources 
available, as does the Transport Statistics Great Britain, published by the Department for 
Transport (DfT), which includes data for all modes of transport (DfT, 2009c). Prior to the ORR 
reportage of statistics the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) collected and published the data. Data 
collected before 2000 was published by the DfT. All graphs use the NRT data unless otherwise 
stated. 
4.3   Rail Trends 
This section looks at the trends in the rail industry and those external factors that contribute 
to changes in rail patronage. Initially, the data specific to the rail industry is studied, followed 
by the incorporation of other social, economic and political factors.  
                                                             
 
7 Webtag, in particular, is a primary source of research methodology for rail provided by the DfT.  
8 Published by the ORR as an annual publication with regular updates throughout the year, including 
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4.3.1  Passenger Kilometres (PKm) 
The most common gauge of growth in the rail industry is Passenger Kilometres (PKm) (Nash, 
2002, Shaw et al., 2003). It is the growth in PKm that this research seeks to explain. The data 
for PKm is expressed as the total amount each year, and each quarter, for all Operators and is 
also disaggregated into Sectors: Long Distance, London & SE, and Regional, and Ticket Type: 
Ordinary Fares and Season Tickets (ORR, 2008a). Since privatisation in 1995/96 there has been 
considerable growth of almost 70% in the amount of PKm (ORR, 2009b). Levels of PKm are 
now the highest they have been since the 1950s on a network that is 40% smaller (ATOC, 
2005). Figure 4-1 shows the trend in PKm over the 30yr period from 1979 and highlights the 
upward trend that has been apparent since privatisation. 
Figure 4-1 Passenger Km by Ticket Type 
 
The most significant rise has been seen in the sale of ordinary tickets. The slight dip in trend in 
2000 is assumed to be due to the Hatfield Crash in October 2000. This major accident was 
caused by faulty infrastructure and led to a consistent and protracted speed restriction on the 
whole network. Figure 4-2 highlights the considerable effect that the Hatfield Crash had on 
passengers purchasing ordinary tickets. This would be due to the spontaneity of ordinary 
ticket sales compared to the long term commitment of season tickets. Season tickets, 
therefore, are likely to be slower in reacting to a change in the economy but once recognised, 
they take longer to recover. Season ticket holders had less choice in choosing their mode of 
travel since season tickets are bought in advance and the majority of journeys involve travel 
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into London. This is one possible reason that the Hatfield Crash shows little impact on this 
type of ticket. 
Figure 4-2  Passenger Km by Ticket Type Using Quarterly Data 
 
Figure 4-3 shows the trends in PKm disaggregated by sector. The main increase appears to be 
in the London & SE sector, although all sectors have shown an increase since privatisation. 
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Figure 4-3  Passenger Km by Sector 
 
Between 1982-1984 there was a dip in PKm which represents the strike action by British Rail 
workers and the economic recession of the era. The recession of the early 1990s seems to 
have been swallowed up in a general decline in the industry from 1988. The reverse in trend 
towards growth occurred prior to the actual privatisation of the industry and is an area that 
requires further investigation. The upward trend in PKm could be due to the privatisation 
effect occurring once the decision to privatise was made (1992)
9 but could also be due to the 
early impacts of the ‘Organising for Quality’ initiative which began in 1990 and was the first 
major attempt by BR to commercialise and streamline the rail industry by focussing on 
customers and profit (Gourvish, 2002b). 
There is little evidence in the graph of the impact of the Hatfield Crash on the sectors. Figure 
4-4 show the quarterly effect on the PKm and shows that the impact of Hatfield appeared to 
be concentrated on the Long Distance sector, further highlighting that the majority of Season 
Ticket holders commute into London thereby causing minimal fall in PKm in the London & SE 
sector. 
                                                             
 
9 The 1992 White Paper ‘A New Deal for Transport – Better for Everyone’ set out the intention and 
methodology for a privatised rail industry. 
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Figure 4-4 Passenger Km by Sector Using Quarterly Data 
 
The decrease in the regional PKm after Hatfield underlines the significant impact that the 
accident had on the network as a whole, rather than just in the localised area. For how long, 
and to what depth, this event impacted is an area that will be questioned in the analysis 
chapter of this thesis. 
Growth prior to privatisation was negligible, showing a peak in 1988/89 of 11.73% falling off 
to – 6.51% in 1994/95. There has been a 69% increase in PKm since privatisation but an 
overall increase of 65% over the 30yr time period that is being studied. Table 4-1 shows the 
total percentage increases in the PKm over the time period studied and both pre- and post-
privatisation. 
Table 4-1 % Increase in Passenger Km  
  Over 30yrs  Pre Privatisation 
(1979/80 – 1994/95) 
Post Privatisation 
(1995/96 - 2008/09) 
Ordinary Fares  57.14%  -7.59%  58.56% 
Season Tickets  89.02%  -2.44%  96.02% 
Long Distance  34.72%  -19.84%  61.66% 
London & SE  87.76%  0%  82.12% 
Regional  79.28%  7.55%  53.26% 
Total  65.15%  -6.51%  69% 
Source: NRT 2009 
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It is clear from the table that the vast majority of growth in the PKm has occurred since the 
privatisation initiative. Only the regional sector saw any consistent growth over the whole 
period. All sectors have shown significant increase in Pkm since privatisation and the sale of 
season tickets has almost doubled. The data set PKm shows how many Km are travelled each 
year - or quarter - by passengers but not how many passengers travelled or the distance the 
journey taken. It could therefore be that the same passengers are travelling further, or more 
passengers are travelling far more frequently.  
4.3.2  Passenger Journeys (PJ) 
In order to clarify that there has been growth across the industry the previous trends need to 
be compared with the data set ‘Passenger Journeys’ (PJ). There are problems with the 
accuracy of the PJ data due to the definition of a journey. If a journey requires a change of 
trains then it is counted as two journeys and return trips are also counted as two journeys. 
Therefore a return journey requiring three changes each way will result in a total of eight 
journeys being accounted for. The ORR recommends this will cause an inflation of 5% in the 
total number of journeys calculated (ORR, 2009c). Even when this anomaly is accounted for it 
is still clear that there has been significant growth in the amount of passenger journeys since 
privatisation although the increase in Ordinary Ticket Journeys started prior to the 
privatisation in line with the PKm growth. Figure 4-5 shows the trend in Passenger Journeys 
over the period studied. 
Figure 4-5 Passenger Journeys by Ticket Type 
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Figure 4-6 shows the trends in PJs since privatisation disaggregated by sector and quarter 
years. The London & SE sector is more susceptible to changes and shows a clear seasonality 
effect.   
Figure 4-6 Passenger Journeys by Sector 
 
The graph appears to show that the London & SE sector experienced the highest growth since 
privatisation, yet Table 4-2 shows that on a percentage increase basis the Long Distance 
sector has seen growth of more than 100%. When compared to the PKm % increases it is 
apparent that, although more journeys were taken, they were not necessarily longer journeys. 
This could be due to the definition of a journey or, as mentioned earlier, more passengers 
travelling shorter distances.  
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Table 4-2 Passenger Journey growth and % increase since Privatisation 
 
Long 
Distance 
operators 
London 
and SE 
operato
rs 
Regional 
operators 
Total 
pass 
journeys 
% 
Increase 
in Long 
Distance 
operators 
% 
Increase 
in London 
and SE 
operators 
% 
Increase 
in 
Regional 
operator 
% 
Increase 
in Total 
pass 
journeys 
1994-95  54  502  179  735  0  0  0  0 
1995-96  56  516  189  761  3.33%  2.85%  5.80%  3.56% 
1996-97  59  542  200  801  9.78%  8.01%  11.79%  9.02% 
1997-98  64  576  206  846  17.65%  14.69%  15.45%  15.05% 
1998-99  67  616  208  892  24.98%  22.78%  16.38%  21.34% 
1999-00  72  639  220  931  33.46%  27.25%  23.11%  26.65% 
2000-01  70  664  223  957  29.15%  32.29%  24.57%  30.14% 
2001-02  74  663  222  960  37.16%  32.14%  24.27%  30.54% 
2002-03  77  679  219  976  43.02%  35.28%  22.60%  32.71% 
2003-04  81  690  240  1,012  50.88%  37.47%  34.34%  37.64% 
2004-05  84  704  256  1,045  55.04%  40.34%  43.39%  42.11% 
2005-06  89  720  273  1,082  65.70%  43.37%  52.69%  47.22% 
2006-07  98  773  292  1,164  81.59%  54.01%  63.53%  58.30% 
2007-08   104  833  294  1,232  93.47%  66.00%  64.68%  67.64% 
2008-09   109  854  310  1,274  102.60%  70.19%  73.55%  73.33% 
Source: Original data from NRT (DfT 2000/2009) 
In general, there have been significant increases in both PKm and PJ since privatisation and it 
is this increase that does not appear to be easily explained.  
4.3.3  Passenger Revenue 
How much a passenger has to pay for their ticket will impact on the amount of passengers 
that are able to travel (willingness to pay). The Revenue data is collected and adjusted 
according to Train Operating Company (TOC) special offers and Passenger Transport Authority 
(PTE) joint modal ticket prices. The price reflects the total cost of the journey and therefore 
includes the cost of car parking, seat reservations, and other generalised costs paid by the 
Passenger. Ticket prices are never far from the news headlines and there is a general feeling 
that prices since privatisation have increased above and beyond what is considered 
acceptable (Savage, 2009). In January 2009 during one of the worst recessions in recent 
memory the Operators increased regulated fare prices by more than 6% and in many 
instances increases of up to 11% were seen on some routes. This perfectly legal price increase 
was brought about because of the manner in which the regulatory system for fares is 
managed. The current system allows operators to increase regulated prices by the RPI+1% 
and, as long as the average percentage across the fare basket is maintained, some fares can Dawn Louise Robins         
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increase more than others. The RPI index is set at the previous July level which in this case was 
5%. The fact that the RPI had fallen considerably since July 2008, and by January 2009 was 
hovering at approximately 1%, was irrelevant to the price setting. Operators, faced with falling 
revenues due to the deepening recession and the prospect of rising premiums to the 
Government, felt they could not afford to be lenient with the fare increases. This only 
accounts for regulated fares though, and in many areas the majority of fares are unregulated 
and therefore open to increases at the rate decided by the operator.  
Changes to the types of fares available were made during 2009 that simplified the ticketing 
system enabling customers to choose between Standard Tickets, Advance tickets or First Class 
tickets. Although the aim was to simplify the fare system, when the multitude of railcards, 
Operator offers and group save tickets are added in there are still a vast array of ticket prices 
and types for customers to choose from. Concern has also been raised that the majority of 
cheaper tickets are only available to those with access to the Internet (TSC, 2009b).  
For the purpose of collection and reportage the data for ticket type is split between Season 
tickets and Ordinary tickets (all other tickets). Figure 4-7 shows the increases that have 
occurred in passenger revenue since 1979 and suggests the concerns about price increases 
could have a sound foundation. 
Figure 4-7  Passenger Revenue by Ticket Type in Current (2008) Prices. 
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amount of journeys and Km that have been taken. It would therefore be wrong to take pure 
revenue in isolation and the rise in PKm should be included to see if the revenue increase is a 
consequence of a rise in the ticket price, a rise in the amount per Km travelled, or the amount 
of passengers that are paying. Figure 4-8 highlights the revenue according to the ticket type 
on a £ per Km basis. 
In reality, the fare increases do not appear to be as significant when compared to the amount 
of PKm. The increases are in Ordinary Tickets and these are generally unregulated. In real 
terms, the price of season tickets has fallen since privatisation.  
Figure 4-8 Revenue per Passenger Kilometre by Ticket Type (2008 prices) 
 
When the revenue is disaggregated across the sectors (Figure 4-9) the main increases can be 
seen in the Long Distance sector. This is interesting when taking into account the low air fares 
and increase in uplift that has been seen in domestic flights. If prices for rail have gone up, yet 
more people are travelling, then there must be something else attracting passengers to rail. 
The section on other transport modes will explore this further. 
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Figure 4-9 Revenue per Kilometre by Sector (2008 prices) 
 
Although there was a decline in the revenue for the London & SE sector from the beginning of 
privatisation, this trend has since reversed and prices are almost level with pre-privatisation 
incomes. The data set RevPKm is a useful predictor for willingness to pay, and therefore 
demand for travel, and will be included in the following chapter where the growth in PKm is 
explored in more depth. 
Revenue increases since privatisation should also take into account the technological 
advances in ticketing and competitive incentive to prevent ‘fare dodging’. Fines for fare 
dodgers have increased tremendously since the privately owned franchises are critically 
dependent on the revenue collected through ticketing. Although there has been a significant 
decrease in some areas of full-time manned stations there has been considerable rolling out 
of ticket barriers, preventing access without a valid ticket, at all major stations. In a three 
week period in 2007, 192 fare dodgers had to pay a total of £43,186 in fines in the East and 
West Midlands after a campaign by Operators to ‘Name and Shame’ those customers who 
attempted to fare dodge (ATOC, 2007). ATOC estimate that a reduction from 5% to just 2% of 
passengers who now manage to ride without payment has been achieved in these areas. 
4.3.4  Train Kilometres 
Train Kilometres (TKm) is another data set that impacts on the amount of Km a passenger can 
travel. TKm gives the total amount of Km that is available to be travelled each year also 
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further disaggregated into quarter years. There is a potential problem with this variable in 
that it does not tell us how many trains are travelling, how far they are going, or how much 
capacity they will hold. Any growth in the available TKm could be due to shorter more 
frequent trains or an increase in distance that a train travels. This is the only variable that 
could be used as an indicator of supply as changes in capacity have not been collected for the 
duration of the research time span and the methodology for the collection has changed 
making it impossible to compare over time. Lack of capacity is a significant problem in many 
areas of the country and is due to a variety of problems such as the need for infrastructure 
upgrades, population density, bottlenecks and general congestion and capacity limits. The 
Transport 2000 Plan (DfT, 2000) by the DfT aimed to tackle many of these issues but as growth 
has exceeded investment the majority of improvements have so far done little more than 
maintain current capacity constraints.  
Capacity prior to privatisation was organised on a ‘matrix management’ system that evolved 
from the sector management structure of British Rail. ‘Organising for Quality’ saw the first 
step in commercialisation and the matrices were replaced by contracts, but as planning was 
still split across geographical offices there remained much complexity (Watson et al., 2004). 
Since privatisation, the responsibility for allocating train paths (slots) has resided with the Rail 
Regulator. This has been seen as a contentious issue within the franchise agreements as bids 
are planned around the ability to generate revenue in order to pay premiums to the 
Government. Lack of control over capacity by the TOCs has meant that in some instances 
adequate revenue has not been achieved. The most sensational case being the fall of GNER 
East Coast Mainline in 2006 after the ORR awarded Open Access rights to two operators 
rather than allowing the incumbent franchise the rights (Clement, 2006). 
Figure 4-10 shows the changes that have occurred since 1979 in the amount of train Km 
available in each sector. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-10 Train Km by Sector 
 
There has been a general increase in the amount of TKm since privatisation but due to a 
change in the collection methodology it is not possible to disaggregate after 2007. Due to the 
nature of the data set it is not possible to disaggregate between ticket types. TKm is now 
collected by TOC rather than Sector and, although an approximate calculation could be made 
depending on the franchise and route, it is not necessary to disaggregate for the purposes of 
the main analysis in the next chapter.   
4.3.5  Investment in the Rail Industry 
Now that we have examined a range of critical performance indicators affecting the rail 
industry, including passenger numbers, journeys and revenue, we can now move on to 
analyse the related issue of investment in rail.  Investment in the rail industry is politically 
driven and therefore difficult to quantify in terms of outcomes. One of the objectives of the 
privatisation initiative was to reduce costs by generating competition (Harris and Godward, 
1997, Gourvish, 2002a). How the industry is funded is a complex and politically challenging 
exercise. Payments are made to Franchises in the form of subsidies on non-commercial 
routes. Grants are paid to PTEs (recently changed to Integrated Transport Authorities ITAs) 
that are then used to fund local initiatives and enhancements in rail through franchisees. 
Infrastructure is maintained through the High Level Output Specification (HLOS) and funded 
through the Statement of Funding Allocation (SoFA). Transport for London has recently been 
given enhanced responsibility and power to stipulate specific service requirements extending 
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out of the Greater London boundary and has also taken on all stations within this area thereby 
granting access to franchises with the aim of maintaining consistency of quality of service 
(DfT, 2007b).  
Prior to privatisation the funding for all investment came from the treasury or through capital 
loans. Expenditure was closely monitored and capital grants reduced or increased for political 
and economic reasons rather than sound business reasons. Until 1998 the spending review 
was set on a yearly basis making long term investment difficult to plan.  
Tracking and separating the investment into rail over a 30yr period is a challenging task. The 
document National Rail Trends gives a breakdown of funding for the period but due to the 
changes in how rail has been supported there are many changes to funding categories both in 
name and substance. There has been considerable in-depth study of investment over the last 
few years (Smith, 2006, Pollitt and Smith, 2002, Gourvish, 2002a) and a wealth of data now 
exists to support and underpin further inquiries. Since privatisation Investment can be 
disaggregated into two sectors: Operating costs and Infrastructure investment. Operating 
costs include support to franchises and grants to Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs). 
Infrastructure investment is mainly covered under the Control Period Review spending 
(currently CP4), and government funded initiatives such as Crossrail and High Speed Rail. 
Support to franchises is set out during the franchise bidding process. The initial failure of over 
half the first 25 franchise awards and the later trend, by the DfT, to ward off failure by 
renegotiating, meant that changes were made to both income and expenditure estimates. 
Since the failure of GNER in 2006 the DfT has refused to renegotiate on bids. Lord Adonis, the 
previous Labour Secretary of State for Transport, told the Transport Select Committee on the 
17
th June 2009, that the DfT would not renegotiate, and  they would withdraw other 
franchises from any franchise that failed, and refuse an Operating Company the chance to bid 
on future franchises (TSC, 2009b).  
Table 4-3 gives an example of a funding stream set over a franchise period for the South 
Western franchise.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 4-3 Franchise Payments and Subsidies for South Western (new franchise: started in February 2007)
10 
YEAR  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Nominal
11 
Payment 
£16.2  £61.2  £23.2  (£36.5)  (£74.4)  (£117.4)  (£160.1)  (£193.9)  (£223.6)  (£250.4)  (£235.2) 
Payment 
at 
2006/07 
Prices 
£16.3  £63.6  £25.0  (£40.7)  (£85.8)  (£140.0)  (£197.6)  (£247.9)  (£295.7)  (£342.8)  (£331.5) 
Source: (DfT, 2009a) 
Government support to the rail industry was expected to fall after privatisation, especially as 
one of the main reasons for privatisation was to reduce the amount of Treasury spending.  
Figure 4-11 highlights the reverse in expected trend and shows an increase in Government 
expenditure in the railways in the respect of support in the form of grants and subsidies. The 
franchising process stimulated a drop in expenditure at the point of privatisation but since 
then, and in particular since the Hatfield crash, support has increased to levels far and above 
those seen prior to the privatisation process.  
                                                             
 
10 Note: year 1 represents the partial year ending 31 March 2007; Year 11 represents the partial year 
ending 4 February 2017. 
11 The amounts show franchise payments year by year expressed in £m. Amounts in brackets are 
premium payments made to DfT by the franchisee; other amounts are subsidy payments made to the 
franchisee by DfT. The "Franchise payments in 200x/200x prices" show the amounts that appear in the 
Franchise Agreements; the nominal payments are the real figures adjusted for inflation. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-11 Total Government Support to the Rail Industry in Current (2008) Prices 
 
The total costs of running the railways per train kilometre (Figure 4-12) is taken from Andrew 
Smiths work on rail costs (Smith 2006 p 18 fig 1) and then converted to 2008 prices in line 
with all costings for this research. The data highlights the inordinate increase in costs from the 
Hatfield incident onwards. The majority of these costs were attributed to infrastructure 
investment (Smith 2006). 
Figure 4-12 Costs per Train Kilometre (2008 Prices) 
 
Source: Smith (2006) 
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Finance for UK rail infrastructure investment since the privatisation of the industry has seen 
many changes. Currently (since 2005), it is sourced through Network Rail (through a mixture 
of track access charges paid by the train operating companies (TOC’s), and the Network Grant, 
paid directly by government to Network Rail (NR)), through the Passenger Transport 
Executives (PTE’s) and through the Northern Ireland Integrated Transport Operator, both of 
which are dependent on levels of funding determined in the Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR). For Network Rail, the network grant accounts for approximately 82% of revenue in 
2009/10;- this is scheduled to decrease to 72% over Control Period 4 (the regulatory period 
running from April 2009 to March 2014 (ORR, 2009a)). The Control Periods follow on from the 
original spending reviews set up by the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) and are currently set at 
five year periods. The service needs of the Industry are stipulated in the High Level Output 
Specification (HLOS), which is decided by the government, and then supported by the 
Statement of Funds Available (SoFA). 
Framing the HLOS and SoFA is the sole preserve of the Secretary of State. Determining the 
outputs that Network Rail has to deliver in contributing towards delivery of the HLOS 
(consistent with the SoFA), and the access charges that Network Rail will receive to fund the 
costs of these outputs, is the preserve of ORR. Network Rail has a right to reject ORR's final 
determination, if it believes that the outcome of the periodic review is unreasonable and the 
ORR can then either revise its determination or refer the matter to the Competition 
Commission. Overall there has been an increase of 83% (2008-09 prices) in 2009 spending 
compared to spending in 2000 (DfT, 2007a).  
Table 4-4 gives the actual spends and % change since 2000 and highlights how spending 
peaked in 2004 with the acquisition of rolling stock being the main beneficiary. Spending on 
stations has been mainly cosmetic and general maintenance and apart from an increase in 
2006 the spending on stations has always been less than that spent in 2000.  
   Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 4-4 Investment since the Transport 2000 Plan 
  Track 
and  
Signa
lling 
% 
Change 
Roll
ing  
Sto
ck 
% 
Change 
Stat
ion
s 
% 
Change 
Total 
invest
ment 
% 
Change 
Tot 
Inv 
(08/0
9 
price) 
% 
Change 
1999-
00 
1,315  0  236  0  410  0  2,248  0  2,812  0 
2000-
01 
2,126  61.67%  554  134.6%  253  -38.39%  2,958  31.58%  3,630  29.07% 
2001-
02 
2,718  106.72%  922  290.4%  345  -15.90%  4,070  81.05%  4,935  75.47% 
2002-
03 
3,275  149.05%  566  139.8%  279  -32.09%  4,322  92.26%  5,087  80.89% 
2003-
04 
4,188  218.52%  774  227.6%  299  -27.05%  5,496  144.48%  6,295  123.82% 
2004-
05 
3,051  132.06%  897  279.6%  297  -27.74%  4,440  97.51%  4,937  75.55% 
2005-
06 
2,601  97.80%  557  135.9%  243  -40.80%  3,794  68.77%  4,097  45.68% 
2006-
07 
2,629  99.90%  326  37.95%  503  22.57%  4,092  82.03%  4,233  50.50% 
2007-
08 
2,713  106.35%  401  69.63%  316  -23.02%  4,535  101.73%  4,495  59.82% 
2008-
09 
2,823  114.68%  346  46.30%  285  -30.68%  5,149  129.05%  5,169  83.78% 
 
Source DfT (2000) 
Total spend since 1980 is disaggregated into ‘station’, ‘rolling stock’ and ‘other’, and Figure 
4-13 shows the total amounts spent in each category. Investment during the privatisation 
transition period shows as negligible and is due to the sale and transfer of assets at this time 
(Gourvish, 2002a). Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-13  Investment in the Rail Industry 
 
Although there were significant savings on operating costs in the first few years of 
privatisation (Pollitt and Smith, 2002), these abruptly came to an end with the Hatfield crash 
in October 2000. Maintenance and renewal were reappraised after the event and significant 
and sustained increases in funding were instigated. An important question arises from this 
increase: are post-Hatfield cost and productivity levels reasonable and should they be 
sustained? An important reason for the privatisation of the rail industry was the reduction in 
Treasury spending and the encouragement of competition in order to incite cost efficiency 
and high productivity. The increased costs of the railways have burdened the Treasury to 
levels unseen in the nationalised era. It has been argued that the need for increased funding is 
defensible as previous funding was inadequate, but in order to justify this increase it must first 
be found that  
a)  the inadequate funding requirements for infrastructure were directly responsible for 
the Hatfield Crash and  
b)  that the current levels of funding are comparable to other network infrastructure 
costs.  
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Both these scenarios are difficult to prove and open to critique. The main problem with the 
latter scenario is that there are no other directly comparable infrastructure networks to rail in 
the UK although as shown in the literature review chapter of this research there are attempts 
being made to address this issue. Many countries have privatised sections of their railways 
but, to date, no country has rolled out such a comprehensive and systematic privatisation 
initiative.  
Figure 4-14 compares the trends in support and investment and highlights the significant 
increases in Government funding since privatisation, and more specifically, since the Hatfield 
crash in October 2000.  
Figure 4-14 Total Support and Investment since 1979 in £/m 2008 Prices 
 
A large proportion of the investment in the late 1980s is purported to have gone on the 
Channel Tunnel which opened in 1994, a year before the privatisation initiative (Gourvish 
2002 p303). According to Gourvish, spending during this period was ‘historically high’, even 
without the investment into the tunnel. The difference is the system of an ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
railway which was agreed on for funding purposes whereby increased investment came with a 
reduction in revenue support. The total spend on the ‘old’ railway was still three times that 
which was spent on the Channel Tunnel from 1989-1994 (Gourvish 2002a). Table 4-5 shows 
the total spend on each sector and also gives total group spend. 
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Table 4-5  Total Spend on the ‘Old’ & ‘New’ Railway in 2008 Prices  
  ‘Old’ (existing 
railway) 
‘New’ (CT railway)  Group Spend 
1988/89  1104.66  9.18  1113.84 
1989/90  1321.92  42.84  1364.76 
1990/91  1329.57  272.34  1601.91 
1991/92  1481.04  535.5  2016.54 
1992/93  1461.15  797.13  2258.28 
1993/94  994.5  787.95  1782.45 
Totals  7694.37  2443.41  10137.78 
Source: Gourvish 2002 Table 9.1 p304 
Investment and support was also needed to implement the privatisation initiative. These costs 
have been wildly differentiated depending on what is considered a privatisation cost. The 
overall cost of implementation of OfQ was estimated at around £50m–£70m (Gourvish 2002), 
compared with some estimates of the costs of the privatisation process that are much higher 
(Harris and Godward, 1997).  In 1993/94 (the last financial year before the reforms) the 
passenger TOCs received £0.55 billion in direct revenue subsidy, but there were also:  
1.  additional subsidies related to capital grants and grants towards the operation and 
maintenance of level crossings, which could amount to as much as £0.54 billion per 
annum; 
2.  changes in accounting conventions from current replacement cost of renewed assets 
to modern equivalent asset valuation of all assets, increasing the railway’s capital 
costs by around 25%. This too may represent around £0.54 billion per annum. If the 
receipts of the privatisation sales are amortised over a 3-year period, they represent 
around £0.3 billion per annum (BRB, 1994).  
These points explain most of the difference between the pre- and post-privatisation subsidy 
levels, although different studies draw different conclusions. Harris and Godward (1997) 
conclude that privatisation has led to a worsening of the railway’s financial situation; 
however, White (1998) concludes the opposite (White, 1998).  An unresolved issue is the size 
of the transitional costs (Preston et al., 2000). 
Operator costs and profits are also pertinent to the cost of the privatisation initiative. 
Operator costs have risen, but so has income. Table 4-6 shows the TOCs’ operating costs, pre-
tax profits and government subsidies per passenger-km. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 4-6  TOC’s operating costs, pre-tax profits and government subsidies per passenger-km. 
  2000/1  2001/2  2002/3  2003/4  2004/5 
% 
change 
2001–04 
% 
change 
2001–05 
Income 
(£m) 
4,920.0  5,163.7  5,556.3  6,086.4  6,205.9     
Average  196.8  206.5  222.2  234.1  248.2  +19  +26 
Operating 
costs (£m) 
4,792.5  4,977.3  5,271.7  5,768.0  5,868.5     
Average  191.7  199.1  210.9  221.8  234.7  +15.7  +22.4 
Pre-tax 
profits 
(£m) 
92.5  183.1  293.4  412.6  345.4     
Average  3.7  7.3  11.7  15.9  13.8  +329.7  +273 
Subsidy 
(£m) 
1,347.8  1,288.6  1,320.8  2,050  1,005.4     
Average  3.4  3.3  3.3  5  2.4  +47  –29.4 
Source: (Gourvish, 2008) 
In the majority of cases income exceeded costs, but there are a few TOCs that have 
experienced large cost increases in relation to income, and others that have seen large rises in 
income compared with costs (Gourvish, 2008).  Subsidies have now started to fall as many of 
the main operators have started to pay for their franchises. Indeed, TOCs are due to pay net 
premiums to the Department for Transport as the franchising authority in the near future 
(Reuters, 2009), and the majority of passenger train operations in Great Britain will be 
covering both infrastructure charges and operating costs by the end of the current Network 
Rail access charges control period (CP4) (DfT, 2008). 
Rolling-stock leasing has involved some controversy. Set up with three ROSCOs, Angel Trains, 
Porterbrook and HSBC Rail, the aim was to provide choice to the TOCs and hence encourage 
competitive pricing. The Competition Commission recently looked at competition in the 
sector, and found that many TOCs were unable to choose which ROSCO to lease their trains 
from (Commission, 2007). A lack of available rolling stock pushed up prices and reduced 
choice, resulting in overcharging estimates of around £177m per year. Differences in the rail 
infrastructure with regard to electrification methods meant that choice of traction was limited 
and there were no guarantees of available stock at the beginning of a franchise period. Due to 
the varying lengths of the franchises investment into rolling stock became one of the largest 
costs to the TOCs (Preston, 1999a).  However, the Competition Commission has concluded Dawn Louise Robins         
 
96 
 
that the major factor in the lack of competition in this market is the nature of franchising 
policy set by government, as opposed to the behaviour of ROSCOs per se. 
Staff costs have risen above the level of inflation and TOCs have tackled this by reducing 
staffing in many areas from 135,000 jobs in 1993 to 43,000 in 1998 (Smith, 2006). Nationalised 
industries are reputedly over staffed in the main (Hood, 1994), but cutting two thirds of staff 
could have an impact on customer service and hence affect the benefits of privatisation. This 
scenario culminated in the failure of nine of the franchises according to Glaister (Glaister, 
2002), as many franchises realised too late that they could not run the railways on the 
reduced staffing levels they had originally budgeted for in the franchise bids.  
There are many impacts that affect the rail industry, not least those directly related as we 
have seen. The next sections look at external factors that could have an effect on the growth 
of the rail industry including other transport modes and other social and economic impacts. 
4.3.6  Passenger Performance Measure 
The Passenger Performance Measure (PPM) gives an indication of the quality and punctuality 
of the service provision. There are various problems with this data set and changes have been 
made to the collection rules to fill any loopholes that were apparent and exploited. One of 
these is the definition of ‘Late’. The DfT has now clarified that any train that does not call at all 
of its prescribed stations is deemed as late (even if it arrives on time). Prior to this loophole 
being closed there were instances of trains missing out stations in order to arrive on time and 
therefore reach DfT targets, thereby enabling the collection of performance related 
payments. Cancelled trains are also recorded as ‘Late’ and the instances of cancellations has 
therefore dropped since it no longer makes sense to cancel a train in order to ensure it is not 
late (Kassam, 2006)! Trains arriving ‘on time’ are considered to be within 10 minutes either 
side of the time due for Long Distance trains and 5 minutes either side for all other trains (DfT, 
2006). There are gaps in the data set: there is no disaggregated data prior to 1986 and there 
are no disaggregated figures for the two years that privatisation was rolled out, therefore it is 
difficult to use this variable in conjunction with other predictors for growth in PKm. 
Figure 4-15 shows the general trend over the 30yr time period for punctuality. The Hatfield 
Crash of October 2000 had a big impact on the performance of trains for a considerable time 
after due to the speed restrictions that were placed on the industry. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-15 Public Performance Measure (PPM) for All Operators (%) 
 
Since privatisation it has been possible to disaggregate the data by Sector. Figure 4-16 shows 
how each sector was affected by the Hatfield Crash and the length of time it has taken each 
sector to recover.  
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Figure 4-16 Public Performance Measure by Sector (Inc Peak and Off Peak for London & SE) 
 
The most severely affected sector seems to be the Long Distance Operators. It is this sector 
that made the most improvement in PPM prior to privatisation and also the first sector to 
recover after Hatfield. Although PPM is an indicator of performance it is not an easy indicator 
to use for contributing to growth in the industry due to the changes in collection methods and 
gaps in the data set. It would be useful instead, to look at a Hatfield variable that would 
account for the impact of this event on the growth in the PKm. 
4.4   External Factors Affecting the Rail Industry 
External factors that could have an impact on the growth in PKm are all interrelated - socially, 
economically, environmentally and politically. We have seen that the London & SE sector 
appears to be most affected by privatisation in the sense that it has seen the highest growth, 
with season ticket sales almost doubling. The privatisation period has also been a period of 
significant growth in the economy with one of the longest sustained year – on – year increases 
until 2008 and the current global recession. Unemployment has, in relative terms, been 
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consistently low during the privatisation period but prior to this the economy experienced a 
state of flux that is also apparent in the PKm. Political change has meant that policy has 
changed radically since privatisation with the Labour Government pursuing a policy of 
integration as opposed to the Conservative secular business model. The original aim of 
privatisation was very different under the Conservative Government and this issue is 
addressed in the next section. 
4.4.1  Politics 
Whereas the core objectives of the privatisation of water, gas, electricity and 
telecommunications were widely accepted by all the main political parties, those of rail were 
controversial. The Conservatives view of a subsidy free industry was different from Labour’s 
‘integrated transport policy’ with fundamental differences of interest between the SRA and 
ORR.  
The objectives of the Conservative Government were to a) eliminate subsidy, b) use private 
borrowing for financing, and c) improve efficiency. The Conservatives did not have an 
integrated transport plan, but instead wanted to turn British Rail into a ‘normal’ set of 
businesses (Helm, 2000). The on-going fuel crisis of the early 1990s, congestion problems and 
the greater transport debate were peripheral to Conservative ideal. In order to achieve these 
objectives the privatisation plan was fairly well conceived. Competitive bidding would lessen 
the Treasury burden; an un-geared Railtrack balance sheet would provide the finance 
mechanism, and introducing competitive services over time would force attention onto costs 
and customer service, thus improving efficiency. But, due to the Labour threats of 
renationalisation (Haubrich, 2001, Newbery, 2002), the risk to franchise bidders increased and 
private investors into Railtrack were put off. Due to this increased risk, the regulator, after 
persuasion from the Government, moderated competition to ease the burden. Privatisation 
now became the objective rather than a vehicle of achieving the original objectives. 
Performance post-privatisation, since the moderating of policy, was therefore both financially 
and organisationally dreadful. TOC’s tried to reduce costs, usually staff costs, thereby affecting 
the service quality. Railtrack failed to tackle the fundamentals of managing a network and 
played scant regard to asset management and managing large projects. Furthermore, until 
recently challenged by the monopolies commission (2007), the ROSCO’s proved very 
profitable and engineered the first ‘railway millionaires’ (Preston, 1999a). Actual costs were 
fixed to ensure Railtrack’s revenue was secure; therefore the TOC’s had very little room to Dawn Louise Robins         
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manoeuvre. The only way to substantially reduce costs was to drive down operating costs. 
Railtrack had a guaranteed income therefore profit was the difference between costs and 
income. Better service and more customers for the TOC’s would mean increased costs to 
Railtrack; consequently poor service quality was not a problem for Railtrack. All this led to the 
inevitable climax which presented itself in October 2000 when the infrastructure failed at 
Hatfield causing a devastating impact on the industry. 
Arguably, the Conservative model could have been made to work under different 
circumstances.  Criticisms of the original privatisation structure are therefore unjustified when 
consideration is given to how other large industries followed the trend of downsizing and 
reorganisation through both vertical and horizontal disintegration (Flyvbjerg, 2007b). 
Monolithic companies have shown little evidence of improved interest in either customer 
service or efficiency (Hood, 1994). The main problems arguably arose when a change of 
Government meant a change of policy (Helm, 2000). The objectives of the incoming Labour 
Government were radically different from the outgoing Conservative Government (Goodwin, 
1999). Therefore a new answer to the privatisation question was needed.   
Labour had pledged to pull Railtrack back under public control. The White Paper (DfT, 1998), 
was an integrated transport policy that would also tackle pollution and congestion by 
encouraging users to switch from cars to buses and trains. The Conservatives had planned an 
efficient network but had not built into the equation the plans to enlarge the network. The 
Labour ideology would need extra financing to ensure that instead of a decline in services, 
they were increased to accommodate extra routes and increased capacity. The Labour idea 
was to use the Strategic Rail Authority, supported by the Integrated Transport Commission 
and the Rail Regulator, to steer this forward. The Rail Regulator would, in fact, become 
subordinate to the SRA, as reflected in the Transport Bill 2000 (Government, 2000). Politics 
has, therefore, played an enormous role in forming the parameters of what the possible 
outcomes of the privatisation initiative could be; not least the fact that it is politics that 
generated the initiative itself. As we have seen previously, despite the limitations of the initial 
rail privatisation scheme, PKm increased significantly after privatisation. Indeed, it almost 
seems that the growth in PKm is despite the political input rather than a product of it. This 
means that we need to look for other explanatory factors. 
4.4.2  Workforce and Employment 
Employment has both a direct and indirect effect on the rail industry. First in the direct sense, 
British Rail used to be one of the biggest employers in the country. Network Rail currently Dawn Louise Robins         
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employs 35,000 people alone (Network Rail Profile 2009), and estimations by ATOC stand at 
around 130,000 staff employed within the industry at present
12. The current recession and 
enforced efficiency savings of 21% by ORR on Network Rail has meant that recent reports 
outline a planned reduction in NR workforce of 1800 (Thompson, 2009), although Network 
Rail insist these are mainly from the West Coast upgrade that has now finished. Privatisation 
saw large staff reductions and streamlining of operations although reductions had already 
taken place during the previous decade, first in the 1980s 22% of the workforce was cut to try 
and save money (Gourvish, 2002a), and again when OfQ came into operation and 109,000 
jobs were cut between 1990 and 1994 (Gourvish 2002). Staffing within the rail industry is 
clearly much lower now compared to its previous historical levels. 
Secondly, from an indirect external perspective, employment rates impact on the rail industry 
through the number of commuters as well as a passengers’ ability to pay. It is important that 
this indirect employment effect is accounted for when trying to work out the impact of 
different variables on PKm. The number of rail employees will affect the cost of rail whereas 
general employment will impact on PKm. By looking at the correlation between PKm and 
Unemployment it can be ascertained whether there is a significant relationship between the 
two variables and whether there is a case for using unemployment as a predictor for growth 
in PKm. Figure 4-17 shows the correlation between the two variables and highlights the 
negative impact that Unemployment has on PKm growth. 
                                                             
 
12 This was given through written evidence to the Transport Select Committee in November 2009 and 
published on the TSC website. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-17  Correlation between Unemployed and PKm 
 
There is a distinct negative correlation between unemployment and PKm. The Adjusted R
2 
shows that 48.7% of the changes in PKm can be explained by changes to Unemployment. For 
each unit increase in Unemployment the PKm will decrease by 0.007 units. The t-test is highly 
significant giving a probability of less than 0.001 that the observed values of 16.587 
(Dependant PKm) and -5.342 (Predictor Unemployment) will occur if PKm were 0. The outliers 
represent recent growth in the rail industry against one of the worst recessions the country 
has seen for many years (Morris and O'Grady, 2009). Whereas PKm has previously fallen in 
recession years, it seems that passengers are, although reduced, now downgrading from first 
class to standard rather than abandoning rail travel entirely. 
Although inversely related and highly significant, the unemployment of the population only 
indicates peoples’ inability to travel, and therefore would be a better predictor of a decrease 
in PKm, rather than as a predictor of the enormous increase that has been observed. 
Data is readily available for demographic indicators such as population, income, births/deaths, 
ethnicity and migration but using this data to help predict PKm is difficult with aggregate data. 
Localised population changes will impact specific routes: i.e. a main industry in a small town Dawn Louise Robins         
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closing would reduce the ability to spend of those now unemployed and also decrease 
commuter traffic, but the dilution of so many factors into the national network area would 
make it very difficult to analyse. GDP is one indicator that can be used as an indication of the 
spending power of the passenger base. Changes in the GDP affect the economy as a whole 
and can be used to gauge general increases and decreases in spending power. 
We have seen that unemployment affects the PKm and Figure 4-18 shows that conversely, 
employment activity also impacts on PKm. 
Figure 4-18  Employment Activity and PKm 
 
The rise in employment during the late 1980s and early 1990s is also reflected in the PKm. 
Although the PKm follows the employment totals fairly closely, it breaks away and rises at a 
much faster rate after privatisation, suggesting that even though there is a correlation, there 
are other factors that affect PKm far more strongly. By carrying out a regression, using PKm as 
the dependant variable and Employment as the Independent variable, the adjusted R
2 shows 
an 81% likelihood that changes in the employment figures will affect the PKm, with both 
variables having a high significance. Employment would be a good indicator of changes in PKm 
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if the sector data were analysed. London and SE sector has the highest PKm rise and the most 
commuter services. We have seen from the previous section on rail trends that the regional 
sector and Long Distance sector do not have the same impacts.  
4.4.3  Environmental Factors 
Environmental factors affect the PKm but are not easily quantified. Recent research on the 
performance of six carbon footprint models (Kenny and Gray, 2009) highlight the lack of 
standards or codes of practice associated to calculating carbon footprints inevitably leading to 
significant differences and inconsistencies between these models (Kenny and Gray 2009 p2). 
The main problems appear to be the parameters that each model uses and their rationale. 
Technological advances can mean a difference in the materials used in transport 
infrastructure, vehicle manufacture and fuel source. All of these factors impact on the total 
carbon footprint for each mode of transport. The problem then arises that not only can the 
parameters be out of date but it is also difficult to account for transport infrastructure 
construction, vehicle type and average fuel consumption over such a large scale project such 
as attempted in this research. The margin of error for environmental impacts will increase the 
larger the area studied and if the parameters are less rigorous than it would be liked, the 
overall assessment is flawed. 
Research by Federici et.al. (2009) looked at the energy and environmental comparisons on 
different transport modes (Federici et al., 2009). The case studies centred on Italy using the 
parallel road and high speed rail link from Milan to Naples and the main Italian airports in 
Rome (Leonardo da Vinci and Ciampino).  Figure 4-19 and Figure 4-20 highlight the differences 
of material input on PKm and vehicle Km. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-19 Comparison of material input per p-km for air, train and highway passenger transport.
13 
 
Source: (Federici et al., 2009) 
Figure 4-20 Comparison of material input per t-km for air, train and highway freight transport
14 
 
Source: (Federici et al., 2009) 
                                                             
 
13 Air related MI (calculated under the assumption of 50% of maximum payload capacity) declines 
steadily with distance, due to the declining importance of infrastructure in such a transportation 
modality. 
14 Uses the same assumptions as (a). Dawn Louise Robins         
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Airplanes are always competitive with HS train and IC trains, when material intensity 
indicators are taken into account, due to the dominating influence of infrastructure. Aircraft 
only need an origin and destination whereas rail needs complete infrastructure from start to 
finish. Air related MI declines steadily with distance, due to the declining importance of 
infrastructure in such a transportation modality. Under the same assumptions used for (a), air 
transport is never competitive, while highway truck transport is always the less intensive 
option, as far as material intensity is concerned (Federici et al., 2009).  
When energy inputs for each mode are compared the picture is very different. Rail performs 
much better for both vehicle Km and PKm. Air transport becomes competitive with High 
Speed after 1000km at 50% capacity but when capacity is increased to 80% for each mode, air 
transport starts to compete at around 500km. Due to the small freight payload of planes they 
are never able to compete with other modes at domestic level.  
Different transport agencies conclude with differing assumptions as to the impact of transport 
on the environment. According to the Rail Freight Group during a recent Government Inquiry 
rail freight produces 70% less emissions than road freight and Eurostar have predicted that 
the reduction in journey times of HS1 has increased market share for rail and therefore 
reduced the overall CO2 emissions as a result of higher load factors (TSC, 2009a). According to 
Crossrail Ltd. the construction phase of the project will produce approximately 80.660 tonnes 
pa. of CO2 but this will be offset over the first few years due to a modal shift resulting in a net 
decrease in emissions of -1.314 tonnes pa. (Crossrail, 2007). Other, less rail orientated, 
agencies suggest that inadequate consideration is given to less costly and less intrusive 
transport improvements such as road widening, and that rail improvements such as HS2 
encourages travel rather than relieves congestion thereby adding to the carbon output. 
In summary, accounting for each variable specific to each transport mode and comparing over 
such a large area is not without its problems. Environmental impacts will be looked at further 
for the purpose of costs in the rail industry in the next chapter where the chosen impacts will 
be explored and accounted for in greater detail. 
4.5   Other Transport Modes 
There have been significant changes in travel patterns over the last 50yrs. Technological and 
social developments have meant people have tended to travel further for work and leisure 
which has meant an increase in travel and choice of transport mode. Cheaper flights, 
increasing car ownership and a general increase in disposable income have changed the way Dawn Louise Robins         
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that people live their lives. This section looks at the impact that other transport modes have 
had on the rail industry and whether the privatisation of the rail industry has altered any 
trends. 
4.5.1  General transport trends 
Modal choice has changed considerably since 1950. Figure 4-21 highlights the change in the 
1950s and 1960s from public transport to private transport. Car use and ownership has 
increased exponentially and brought with it a whole different set of problems for transport 
policy. Road building, widening, and enhancements coupled with recent fuel increases and 
capacity and congestion measures have shown stagnation in the growth of both ownership 
and use in the last couple of years. 
Figure 4-21  Percentage Share of the Market of each Transport Mode 
 
Source: (DfT, 2009c) 
Although the graph is not representative of total growth in the specific transport modes it 
does give a good indication of how travel behaviour has changed over the years. Figure 4-22 
shows how individual transport modes have changed since 1980. The rise in cheap air fares 
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has seen a large increase in PKm for domestic flights and rail travel shows a considerable rise 
since privatisation. 
Figure 4-22  Overall Percentage Growth of Transport Modes 
 
Car use appears to have peaked and the overall modal share and total PKm has reduced in 
recent years (see below). Table 4-7 highlights the reduction in young drivers since a peak in 
the 1990s. Although the average cost of running a car has reduced in real terms over the 
years, the cost of passing the driving test, high insurance costs (mainly for young men), 
coupled with rising fuel prices have helped to reduce the amount of young drivers (DfT, 
2009b). 
Table 4-7  Percentage of Full Licence Holders by Age and Gender over Selective Years 
Males   17-20  21-29 
1975/1976  36  78 
1985/1986  37  73 
1995/1997  50  80 
2008     38  67 
Females   17-20  21-29 
1975/1976  20  43 
1985/1986  29  54 
1995/1997  36  67 
2008     35  61 
Source: DfT (2009) National Travel Survey 2009 
Trends in car use appear to be changing from the consistently upward trend seen over the last 
few decades. Table 4-8 shows how the average number of trips and time spent travelling has 
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decreased since 2005.  This is for all age groups and therefore highlights a general trend rather 
than one for a specific sector. 
Table 4-8  Average Car Trips and Time Spent Travelling 
  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Average Trips 
Made per Year 
(Car Driver) 
3,682  3,660  3,641  3,494 
Average Hours 
Spent Travelling 
151  149  147  143 
Source: DfT (2009) National Travel Survey 2009 
It is safe to assume that people are either travelling less or using a different mode of transport 
to make their journeys. The additional growth that has been seen in the rail industry since 
2005 could include some of the trips that would have previously been made by car. According 
to the DfT National Travel Survey (DfT, 2009b), we are making less and shorter trips but taking 
longer to get there (Table 4-9).  
Table 4-9 Overall Journey Length, Distance, Frequency and Duration of Trips for all Modes of Transport 
  
Trip 
Duration  
1995/
1997 
1998/
2000 
2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
                          
Commuting  24  25  26  26  27  27  27  28  28 
Business  36  38  37  40  40  38  38  42  41 
Education  18  19  21  21  20  20  21  21  22 
Trip Length                   
Commuting  8.2  8.3  8.5  8.5  8.5  8.7  8.7  8.9  8.6 
Business  19.0  19.9  20.2  21.0  21.1  19.4  19.4  21.0  20.8 
Education  2.9  3.0  3.2  3.1  3.2  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.3 
Ave Yearly 
Distance 
                 
Commuting  1,425  1,444  1,389  1,407  1,428  1,391  1,391  1,435  1,340 
Business  730  718  693  707  726  723  682  700  630 
Education  193  207  211  220  208  211  205  210  207 
Ave Trips 
per Person 
                 
Commuting  174  173  163  166  168  161  160  162  156 
Business  38  36  34  34  34  37  35  33  30 
Education  68  70  65  70  66  66  62  63  62 
Source: DfT (2009) National Travel Survey 2009 
This phenomenon highlights the significant problems with road congestion and capacity 
constraints of an increasingly densely populated nation. Dawn Louise Robins         
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4.5.2  Domestic Flights 
Although Domestic flights have seen a huge increase, in terms of percentage rise since 1980, 
their overall share of the market is minimal. When the Long Distance Rail Sector is compared 
to Domestic Air there are similarities of size and comparisons can be made. The following 
section explores these two mode sectors to find if there is evidence of a correlation between 
increases in patronage. Figure 4-23 highlights the Km that each mode has travelled each year 
since 1996. 
Figure 4-23  Domestic Air and Long Distance TKm 
 
Source: National Statistics 2010 
Rail has stabilised whereas air has started to fall. The domestic flight sector has seen a series 
of casualties in the low-cost companies as the recession has taken hold. Choice of airports has 
increased over the decade and air transport has opened up to many areas of the country yet 
despite falling prices and increased opportunity, it appears that rail has held strong. When you 
consider the percentage increase in vehicle Km across each sector (Figure 4-24), rail once 
again appears to have the highest increase. 
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Figure 4-24  Percentage Increase in Domestic Air and Long Distance TKm 
 
Source: National Statistics 2010 
Passenger Km appear to have fallen in the domestic air market since 2005 (Figure 4-25) 
whereas PKm for the Long Distance Rail sector has continued to increase. As with the overall 
TKm in the previous section, it is necessary to also look at the amount of journeys that are 
taken to understand whether more passengers are travelling or longer journeys (or indeed 
empty transport modes) are occurring. 
Figure 4-25  Trends in PKm for Domestic Air and Long Distance Rail 
 
Source: Based on National Statistics 2010 
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Figure 4-26 shows that the increase in passenger journeys has mainly been in the rail industry 
and domestic flights have seen a relatively small increase until falling off in 2005. 
Figure 4-26  Trends in Passenger Journeys for Domestic Air and Long Distance Rail 
 
Source: Based on National Statistics 2010 
The results of the trend analysis clearly show that Rail has proven to be a consistent 
competitor in the long distance domestic transport market. Airport security and lengthy 
waiting times may also be a factor in choosing rail over air as concern after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and subsequent security scares at airports across the world have caused distrust and 
fear of air travel. Air travel also needs an element of multi modal methodology due to the 
positioning of airports and the need for passengers to travel to and from airports to their final 
destinations. Airports tend to be sited out of town whereas rail stations are usually close to 
town centres. Cost of transport to and from airports can be a prohibitive factor if cheaper 
public transport alternatives are not freely available. Car parking costs are at a premium at 
airports and increases in fuel prices have seen taxi fares soar. Actual flying time may be 
considerably less than rail travel time but the logistics and multi modal necessities can ensure 
the total travelling time compares less favourably than rail. 
4.5.3  Bus Industry 
The Bus industry has seen the largest fall in modal share and it appears that deregulation had 
little impact on reversing this. Operator and Government attempts to encourage bus use have 
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included concessionary travel for the retired age group and increased fuel and rural subsidies 
but these have had little effect and although stabilised, little growth is apparent except in the 
London area. Table 4-10 shows the changes in bus ridership per head of population and 
underlines the dominance of London over all other areas.  
Table 4-10 Bus Ridership Percentage Increase per Head of Population, by Area  
Year  London  PTE’s  English 
Shires 
Scotland  Wales  All Exc 
London 
Great 
Britain 
1995/96 
– 2007 
55%  -17.4%  -11.4%  -5%  -13.2%  -14.8%  4.2% 
2001/02 
– 2007 
33.8%  -7.3%  -2.8%  2.4%  7.9%  -4%  8.7% 
2005/06 - 
2007 
5.2%  -0.5%  4.7%  0.6%  0.4%  1.8%  3.2% 
Source: Bus Monitor 2007 
It is important to note that the PTEs are the only areas to have seen continual reduction in 
ridership. When compared to the rest of the English regions it becomes apparent that the 
actual number of passengers in the North and West (where the main PTE areas are) is more 
than double that of the South and Southeast, and any increases in ridership in the South will 
have a larger overall impact on the percentage increase. Why there has been a decrease in 
ridership in the North is subject to various impacts that have occurred. 
Subsidy, before deregulation in the 1980s, was higher in the North than any other area and 
this has resulted in higher fare increases. The recession of the 1990s hit harder, and recovery 
took longer, than in other English regions and general increases in car ownership have also 
had an impact. PTE budgets have been continually cut and local authority contributions have 
decreased in line with reductions in passenger numbers. Road congestion has also played a 
part in the general decline in bus use. Rail has dedicated infrastructure that, although suffers 
from capacity issues, increases the chance of punctuality. Buses have to share the road 
infrastructure with cars and lorries and increased car ownership and road freight has meant 
congestion on the main roads and town centres has become substantially worse. The bus 
industry’s cycle of decline can be best presented by Figure 4-27. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 4-27 The Bus Industry’s Cycle of Decline 
 
 
Source: Bus Industry Monitor 2007 p26 
One aspect of bus use that has seen improvements has been in the integration with other 
transport modes. Integrated transport was one of the key policies of the Labour Governments 
manifesto in 1996, but the original Rail Privatisation initiative was designed as a set of 
separate commercial concerns, not with integration in mind. Yet, integrating ticketing for 
different modes of transport is now seen as a necessary progression to enhancing customer 
service, passenger growth, environmental action and revenue increases, with franchises 
offering different incentives depending on the location and infrastructure of the area. This 
does not come without difficulty and due to the horizontal separation of the passenger 
services any technology innovations must be commercially viable and collectively agreed for it 
to be viable (Lovell et al., 2011). This has seen increased research into the uptake of 
technology advancements and although improvements have been seen, there is a question 
over full integration being an ‘impossible dream’ (Lovell et al., 2011). 
Arguably the London Travelcard Area has been the main example of integrating bus and rail 
services with other modes of transport. However, such modal integration has spread to the 
extension of this to other smaller scale initiatives which has given passengers more choice and 
Increasing Car 
Ownership 
Increased Traffic 
Congestion 
Fewer 
Passengers 
Poorer Perceived 
Quality 
Fewer 
Passengers 
Reduced 
Reliability 
Higher Fares 
Lower 
Investment 
Poorer Viability Dawn Louise Robins         
 
115 
 
easier route planning. This coupled with enhanced ticket buying options seems to have 
benefited customers on both cost and choice enabling detailed journey plans to be produced 
and downloaded in a variety of formats. There are many examples of current TOC initiatives 
on offer, some of which include: Bus/rail tickets, large car parks at parkway stations, Airport 
links, joint Rail-Ferry tickets and improved cycle carrying and storage facilities. 
With many of the integrated transport initiatives now on offer customers can use one ticket to 
complete their journey. A specific example of modal integration is Stagecoach’s bus and rail 
integration in Sussex. From July 2009, Stagecoach altered the timetable of the 711 bus to Rye 
to coordinate with rail links, thus reducing door to door journey times
15. Buses tend to have 
more flexibility with timetables than rail (which is restricted by franchise specifications and 
infrastructure constraints). Thus operators with overlapping bus and rail services, such as 
Stagecoach in this instance,  have incentives to coordinate them. Through train/bus ticketing 
is now available at all main stations irrespective of train provider or bus provider. Sales of 
PlusBus integrated rail and bus tickets across the First Great Western network more than 
trebled during 2005: in January, around 700 PlusBus tickets were sold compared to 2,200 in 
November
16.  
The integration of transport has also seen more operators owning rail franchises and bus 
operations in the same areas. This may have benefits for passengers using multi-modal 
transport links but has also raised concern over monopoly’s forming. This has been shown in 
the recent sale of Stagecoach’s bus operations in Preston
17 after a ruling from the monopoly 
commission and also the referral to the commission of Stagecoach’s operations in Eastbourne 
in 2009. One of the main reasons for the deregulation of buses and privatisation of the rail 
industry was to incite competition in the industries, yet mergers and acquisitions are frequent, 
and it could be argued that these local monopolies can produce an increase in quality and 
value that competition, by its very nature, hinders. 
It is not clear if bus travel should be directly compared to rail travel due to the differences in 
route length, cost and origin/destination. Buses tend to operate around main towns whereas 
rail is limited to specific stations. Buses tend to be for short journeys of 1-3 miles, whereas rail 
journeys are usually for much longer distances. Where comparisons can be made are where 
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17 Sold for £3.sm 25
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rail alternatives have been instigated. Integration comes in many forms and the rise in Bus 
Rapid Transit (BRT), light rail and trams in many metropolitan areas has had a variety of costs 
and benefits to both the local bus and railway services. BRT is a dedicated bus line that has 
fewer stopping points and a direct route – usually on a dedicated bus lane – to a main 
industrial area or airport. The benefits of BRT are speed, lack of (or reduction in) congestion, 
frequency and reliability, and origin/destination points. Cost of implementation is much 
smaller than light rail or trams and maintenance costs are also minimal. The cost to the rail 
industry can be quite high though as seen in the Manchester area where BRT, light rail and 
trams have all helped to ease the capacity problems on the railways but at the cost of 
improvement works to the rail infrastructure (TSC, 2009a).  
4.6  Conclusion   
The data available for rail is considerable but can also be limited in its usefulness. Taken 
individually the trends in rail can be seen to show a distinct rise in both patronage and quality. 
More passengers are now travelling than at any time in rail history and the reliability and 
quality of service have improved considerably. That said, the cost of providing the service 
appears to have risen exponentially when compared to the amount of service that is provided 
and reduction in employees providing the service. Utilising some of the rail data for the 
analysis of passenger kilometre increases may be difficult due to the collection methodology 
changes that have taken place. The essential data variables of passenger km, train km and 
revenue will be utilised in the next chapters and manipulated using a simple regression model. 
The other trends that have been identified in this chapter have shown some interesting points 
that are worth commenting on. Domestic air is usually only comparable to HST but the rise in 
long distance rail in the UK has run counter to the fall in domestic air travel. The security, cost 
and quality of domestic air travel have all been raised as potential impacts on this decrease in 
patronage and this has been highlighted in the amount of low-cost airlines that have recently 
left the marketplace. The drop in car use and increase in congestion have also helped the long 
distance rail market to flourish. Fuel increases and high insurance costs have helped to keep 
car use to a minimum and the advent of cheaper advance rail tickets and integrated transport 
for total journeys have possibly contributed to the appeal of rail.  
There are distinct correlations between the demography and economic climate and the rail 
patronage that have been identified. What does appear to be slightly different though is that Dawn Louise Robins         
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Rail, contrary to previous recessions, have been able to maintain patronage as passengers 
have moved from 1
st class to ordinary class seating.    
The trends identified here will provide the background and possible explanations for the 
change in passenger kilometres that will be analysed in the next chapter.  
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5  The Impact of Privatisation on the Rail Industry 
5.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the overall growth in the rail industry since privatisation and 
the general transport and economic trends of the time period. Passenger kilometres have 
increased by around 70% (Wardman, 2006, Gourvish, 2002a, Gourvish, 2008), punctuality and 
customer satisfaction has improved (ORR, 2008b), and the amount of available train 
kilometres has increased. This general uplift in service provision begs the question ‘how much 
of this growth is due to privatisation?’ The aim of this chapter is to try and explain the growth 
by looking at the different variables that contribute to explaining the trends in the rail industry 
(as identified in the previous chapter) and then to separate them in order to disaggregate the 
privatisation effect. These research aims are realised by looking at both possible and actual 
scenarios for rail development and measuring the difference in the results. The first scenario 
is the actual: what has happened since privatisation. The second scenario looks at the 
counterfactual: what could have happened if privatisation had not occurred, and the third 
scenario looks at what the industry expected to happen once privatisation was initiated – the 
privatisation forecast. From this point forward the three scenarios will be referred to as: 
1.  Actual (Ac) - i.e. AcPKm, AcRev. Recorded data that actually occurred. 
2.  Counterfactual (Cf) – Estimated variables for a rail industry without privatisation, i.e. 
CfPKm 
3.  Privatisation Forecast (Pf) – The expected effect of privatisation on the industry, i.e. 
PfPKm 
The main reason for utilising a three scenario model is to separate the impacts of privatisation 
from any changes due to other reasons. It would not be fair to assume that all changes in 
demand are a direct result of the policy change and there would have to be some general 
trend that would have occurred regardless of the change in ownership or management. 
Therefore, in order to carry out the aims of this research a model has to be developed that 
can explain the impacts on passenger kilometres and attribute them to the policy initiative.  
The chosen model is based on a simple regression analysis model where independent 
variables are tested against a dependant variable; in this case PKm; to see how much of an 
impact any changes in the independent variables would have on the dependent. The inclusion 
of a privatisation variable allows the impact of privatisation to be measured and separated Dawn Louise Robins         
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from other impacts. Once a model is formulated it can be tested to see what the impact will 
be using the Coefficient B statistic generated by the regression analysis. This statistic can then 
be used to forecast and predict changes in the PKm and can be used to develop both a 
counterfactual and predicted privatised scenario.   
How this model was developed and the choices that were made make up a considerable part 
of this chapter. The first section explains the variables that were used in the analysis and the 
reasons for choosing them. The availability, aggregation and ability to be used as a 
comparison were discussed in the previous chapter where the groundwork was laid for this 
part of the analysis. The development of each scenario is then taken in turn before the final 
section explains the differences in the calculations and finds the consumer surplus in 
Passenger Kilometres that can be attributed to the privatisation of the industry. The second 
analysis chapter adds in the costs and describes the methodology for carrying out a Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA). This allows the cost of the privatisation initiative to be disaggregated 
to specific stakeholders and it can be seen where the benefit and disbenefit has been felt. 
5.2  Explanatory Variables  
The first stage of the process of deciding how much privatisation has impacted on passenger 
kilometres is to choose which variables to use in developing the model for the analysis. The 
aim is to find the privatisation effect: how much of the growth in Passenger Kilometres (PKm) 
can be attributed to privatisation. To achieve this, the PKm must be measured against specific 
variables that impact on the amount of kilometres travelled: cost, availability, and 
need/demand. There are various factors that hinder this process of evaluation including the 
availability of data, continuity of methods of data collection, and similarity of variables. As it 
became apparent in the analysis of trends there is a considerable difference in how data is 
collected across modes and also industries. Compounded by the problems of inconsistent data 
within the rail industry itself this has made the collection of data for the analysis difficult, but 
not impossible. The previous chapter highlighted the variables that were relevant and also 
excluded variables for reasons of irrelevance (lack of impact) or inability to compare (mainly 
incomplete data sets). The variables that were chosen initially were: 
  Passenger Km (PKm) – What this variable, PKm, does show is the amount of Km 
travelled by passengers regardless of length of journey, frequency of journey or 
amount of passengers who travelled. It therefore gives a clear indication of growth 
over the time period. This is the dependent variable that all others are used to Dawn Louise Robins         
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predict. This variable highlights the increase in demand over the period and is the 
variable that needs to be explained. PKm does not include the amount of journeys 
taken or the number of passengers who travelled. Data for passenger journeys are 
based upon each journey or part of journey (a return trip counts as two journeys; a 
return trip with train changes counts as four or more journeys). The data set 
‘Passenger Journeys’ has not been chosen because the data collection method 
changed during the period researched and the amount of journeys taken is not a true 
representation of demand. PKm is the variable of choice for the DfT when explaining 
growth within the rail industry and is widely used in transport research and is also 
consistent with Train Kilometres. 
  Passenger Revenue per Km (RevPKm) – this variable covers the cost of rail to 
passengers each year excluding any subsidies received or payments made from the 
Train Operating Companies (TOC’s) to the Government. This variable is specifically 
covering the cost of rail travel to passengers in the form of tickets sold – therefore 
RevPKm is used as a proxy for price. The variable is calculated against the amount of 
Km travelled and therefore gives an average cost to passengers for each Km they 
travel. The main problem with this variable is the inability to accurately gauge how 
much rail travel has increased in price, as the methodology behind price changes since 
privatisation has altered and the cost of tickets varies depending on length of journey 
(long journeys tend to be cheaper per km than short journeys); the type of ticket 
bought (first class is more expensive than standard tickets); and even the region that 
the journey takes place (the Southeast region is more expensive than most other 
areas). The data were calculated by dividing the total amount of revenue received 
each year by the total amount of Km travelled and dividing this by 1000 to give the 
price in £/Km. The data has also been converted to real prices using 2008 as the base 
year. The benefit of using this variable as a measure of cost to passengers is that it 
gives the measure of yield by illustrating the revenue collected per PKm – therefore 
the average cost to passengers of travelling by train per Km. 
  Train Km (TKm) – this covers the service that is available. This variable could be 
slightly problematic as it covers the amount of Km that trains travelled -  not capacity - 
therefore it does not give an indication of length of train, frequency of service, or 
amount of trains, but it does indicate the total Km available each year to be travelled. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Capacity will have changed over the period but this is not something that can be taken 
into account in the model. 
  GDP
18 – this variable represents the spending power of the passengers over the time 
period and has been standardised to 2008 prices along with Passenger Revenue. GDP 
is a measure of the total economic activity of a country and is a key indicator of the 
economic wealth or otherwise of a nation although it may include a lagged effect as 
changes in the economy can take time to impact on the data.  
  Privatisation Effect (PE) – this is a dummy variable that works as a ‘catch all’ to 
account for any privatisation effects not taken into account in the other variables. 
There is a considered argument that quality and punctuality are important variables that 
should be included in the model. The impact of late and cancelled trains, and the comfort of – 
and facilities provided – on trains will have a bearing on the choice of rail as a mode of 
transport. The problem with the inclusion of these variables is the lack of data covering the 
entire timeline of events. As it has been explained previously there are issues with what 
constitutes a late train in the data and prior to privatisation the collection method was 
sporadic and unreliable. Passenger survey data are, by their very definition, opinions based on 
perceptions of quality around an unknown baseline. Even if a full data set were available, 
comparing this qualitative data with the collected quantitative data could open the model for 
additional criticism. There has been recent research into the inclusion of PPM in long run 
forecasting by Whelan et.al. (2010). They make use of univariate time-series and multivariate 
econometric approaches (Whelan et al., 2010) as well as a new application of unobserved 
component models based on the work of Harvey (Harvey, 2006). Due to the timescales of this 
research it has not been possible to learn from the methodology in order to adapt the model 
but the results of the work can be compared to the results that this research generates and 
this will be looked at in the following chapter. 
Ideally, environmental costs should also be taken into account but this has proven difficult to 
disaggregate to specify all rail costs (or benefits). In addition, emphasis on environmental data 
is relatively new and therefore not available for the complete time period that is under 
consideration here. Instead, environmental costs were considered when the final totals were 
concluded and were looked at as both costs and benefits.   To account for other modes, such 
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as car and bus transport, has also proven difficult but modal transfer from car to rail could be 
included in the environmental costs and will again be explored in the next chapter. Data was 
collected as described in the methodology section and begins in 1979 and continues 
consistently until 2009, providing a timeline of 30 years’ worth of variables to compare. Table 
5-1 shows the data that has been collected and used in the analysis.  
Table 5-1 Data Variables Chosen for Regression Analysis 
  TOT PKm 
(bn) 
RevPKm (£km 
2008) 
TOT TKm  Real GDP 
(£m 2008) 
PE 
1979-80  30.70  0.0996264  315.3  755,044  0 
1980-81  30.30  0.1019149  326.8  748,521  0 
1981-82  29.70  0.0997253  322.5  735,521  0 
1982-83  27.20  0.0908989  286.5  744,714  0 
1983-84  29.50  0.0985414  310.9  777,234  0 
1984-85  29.80  0.097694  309.1  795,090  0 
1985-86  29.70  0.099666  311.5  821,191  0 
1986-87  30.80  0.10307  311.7  856,128  0 
1987-88  32.40  0.1055983  325.1  904,483  0 
1988-89  34.30  0.1056569  339.4  961,805  0 
1989-90  33.30  0.1065171  343.5  977,010  0 
1990-91  33.20  0.1053283  353.5  969,481  0 
1991-92  32.50  0.1048729  353.7  963,849  0 
1992-93  31.70  0.1053095  348.9  964,224  0 
1993-94  30.4  0.1103462  350.2  1,000,920  0 
1994-95  28.7  0.1127105  340.5  1,032,551  1 
1995-96  30  0.114192  353.4  1,055,903  1 
1996-97  32.1  0.1130196  356.7  1,102,234  1 
1997-98  34.7  0.1105637  376.3  1,128,928  1 
1998-99  36.3  0.1123273  405.1  1,160,415  1 
1999-00  38.5  0.1137247  418.4  1,207,349  1 
2000-01  38.2  0.1125754  427.2  1,230,432  1 
2001-02  39.1  0.1125197  435.9  1,267,067  1 
2002-03  39.7  0.1125657  443.3  1,312,188  1 
2003-04  40.9  0.1125472  446.2  1,344,900  1 
2004-05  42.4  0.1127759  458.4  1,380,684  1 
2005-06  43.2  0.1164535  456.81  1,402,806  1 
2006-07  46.2  0.1171149  461.12  1,427,609  0 
2007-08  49.0  0.1178732  455.32  1,456,547  0 
2008-09  50.7  0.1184274  474.48  1,442,921  0 
Source: ORR 2010 
The Passenger Kilometre data was transformed by Natural Log (ln) transformation (ln(Xi)), to 
help reduce positive skew and to correct any assumption of homogeneity of variance. A semi-Dawn Louise Robins         
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log transformation will allow the different data types to interact with the dependant variable. 
From the data it can be seen that PKm fluctuated slightly before privatisation before rising 
consistently after privatisation. It is this rise in passenger Km that this research seeks to 
explain. 
From the data shown in Table 5-1 it is immediately apparent that anomalies are present. The 
amount of Train Km (TKm) available to be travelled reduces in 1982 and does not recover until 
1984. The TKm remains fairly static during the following two years and to account for this 
inconsistency we need to look at the events that were occurring during this time. 1982-84 saw 
significant strike action on the railways that would have prevented rail travel and the 
subsequent two years 1984-86 saw strike action in the coal industry which may have had a 
serious impact on the cost and availability of fuel but would also have been a time where 
sympathy strikes were occurring. The amount of Train Km available then increases steadily 
either due to the introduction of new services or the increase in frequency of existing services. 
It is worth noting that this in itself is problematic as an increase in frequency of service (more 
trains running per hour), will have a different effect on the amount of journeys taken than an 
increase in route length; which will just enable people to travel further rather than more 
frequently. From the previous chapter we know that the route length available did not 
increase as dramatically as the train km would suggest, therefore it is apparent that there are 
more trains (and/or longer routes) that have been provided over the period. For the purpose 
of this research it is assumed that there has been a combination of both frequency and route 
length enhancement over the period, but, as mentioned before, there is nothing to suggest 
that capacity has also changed; it could well be shorter trains operating a more frequent 
service or travelling further.  GDP also fell in 1982, and again in the early years of the 1990s, 
highlighting the difficult economic climate of that time.  
Now the variables have been chosen and collated to cover the entire research time period the 
next step is to see how well the variables can explain the impact on demand. The next section 
looks at the process of determining the ‘best fit’ model to provide the parameters for 
calculating the privatisation effect. 
5.3  Privatisation Effect 
Once the variables had been chosen that were likely to best represent the impact on PKm the 
task of refining the model began. Basic regression analysis was chosen as the best method for 
forecasting demand. Regression analysis is used with naturally-occurring variables, such as Dawn Louise Robins         
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those found in this research, as opposed to experimentally manipulated variables and is the 
most widely used tool for forecasting (Price, 1991, Picard et al., 2010). 
The chosen hypothesis is:  
The increase in Passenger Km (demand) can be predicted from the cost of travel (revenue), 
train service available (Train Km), purchasing power of passengers (GDP), and the effect of 
privatisation.   
Using the basic regression model: 
 ln                                 ) 
Where y = the dependent variable and x1, x2, ... are the independent variables, the following 
model can be used : 
               
                                                 
                                                                  
The dependant variable was the only variable to be included in its natural log formation; all 
other variables were actual data. The model used was, therefore, a semi-log or negative 
exponential demand model. SPSS was the chosen software to carry out the regression analysis 
as it was fairly easy to use and available for the research. The variables were entered using a 
stepwise methodology so each model has one more variable added than in the previous 
model. The variables were entered in the following sequence: 
1)  Revenue per Passenger Km 
2)  Train Km 
3)  GDP 
4)  Privatisation Effect 
The dependent variable was Passenger Km and there were no missing variables. The order of 
entry was altered to determine if the sequence was important to the final outcome but the 
final statistics proved to remain the same regardless of order. As the stepwise method did not 
have any effect on the outcome, and it is a more time consuming exercise, further regression 
models that were tried used the block entering (or hierarchy) methodology, which is Dawn Louise Robins         
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recommended as a preferred method for standard multiple regression modelling (Field, 
2005).  
Privatisation was deemed to have started in 1994/95 rather than the year of privatisation, 
which was 1996, due to the premise that the effect of privatisation started after the decision 
to privatise was made and the preparation of the process of privatisation had begun. 1994/95 
was chosen as a ‘best guess’ regarding the start of the impact of privatisation but it has been 
reported to have impacted earlier (Gourvish, 2002b), and could arguably be said to impacted 
only when the process began in 1996. Pollitt and Smith (2002) take 1996/97 as the first full 
year of privatisation. However, they take the last year of public ownership to be 1992/93, 
since this is the last year unaffected by the restructuring and privatisation programme. They 
include a transition period (1993/94 to 1995/96) which they say saw the restructuring of the 
industry and its transfer to private ownership (Pollitt and Smith, 2002). Although the 
franchises were privatised in little more than a year, Railtrack was established as the rail 
infrastructure company in 1994 but did not float on the Stock Market until 1996.  
The date chosen at this stage of the research did not take into account the White Paper of 
1992 and the Railways Act in 1993 and in further testing of the variables it was proven that 
the date chosen should have been earlier. Table 5-2 gives the results of the regression on the 
variables. 
Table 5-2 Regression Statistics for the Basic Model 
Model  Adjusted 
R Square 
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Coefficients  Durbin-
Watson 
B  t stat  sig 
1  Pass KM 
Rev per Pass Km 
Train Km 
GDP 
Privatisation 
 
.594 
.897 
.898 
.957 
2.653 
-2.085 
.002 
2.567E-7 
-.097 
11.939 
-.860 
4.751 
1.689 
-6.033 
.000 
.398 
.000 
.104 
.000 
0.826 
Source: Data from ORR 2008, regression generated using SPSS  
Both RevPKm and TKm appear to be not significant at either 5% or 10% confidence intervals. 
The Durbin-Watson Test statistic highlights potential problems with autocorrelation; that the 
deviations of observations from their expected values are correlated. The Durbin-Watson Test 
statistic should be around 2 (Kennedy, 2008); anything less than 1 or more than 3 shows a 
potential autocorrelation (Kennedy 2008 p119). As the final step of the model gives a figure of 
0.826, this is significantly less than 1 and shows that further investigation is required. 
Autocorrelation occurs for a number of reasons including: Dawn Louise Robins         
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1.  Prolonged influence of shocks (Kennedy 2008) – when using time-series data the 
effects of events can be prolonged and have a significant effect on the data for 
considerable time period 
2.  Inertia – this is where past actions will have an effect on current actions. 
3.  Spatial autocorrelation – where a shock or event in one region affects the whole data 
4.  Data manipulation – published data (as used in this research) may have undergone 
significant interpolation that averages disturbances over a time period 
5.  Misspecification – omitted relevant independent variables that are autocorrelated. 
There is a possibility that the reasons mentioned above will apply to the variables used in this 
research. The Hatfield Crash did have a prolonged effect on the revenue, train kilometres and 
passenger kilometres. The effect was transferred across the network rather than confined to 
the actual area around the crash site (spatial autocorrelation). The data used in the modelling 
exercise is publically available and known to have been smoothed and rounded to the nearest 
whole number
19. Positive autocorrelation errors can lead to an upward bias on the R
2 and this 
is apparent in the first attempt at modelling the PKm as shown in Table 5-2. There may also be 
a case of omitted variables, although care has been taken to ensure the impacts are all 
represented there may be something missing from the model. There are various ways of 
dealing with autocorrelation, including lagging the variables, and these are looked at closely in 
relation to this research in the next section.  
From the table it is clear that privatisation has a slightly negative correlation with PKm 
travelled. This can either be explained by stating that the outcome is correct and privatisation 
negatively affected the amount of PKm travelled and any increase was due to reasons other 
than privatisation: which may have some truth in it as Wardman explained the up-turn in the 
economy increased the PKm during this time (Wardman, 2005). Alternatively, assumptions 
can be made regarding privatisation being apparent in the other variables used in the model, 
for example,  - TKm already has a privatisation effect contained in the values as privatisation 
impacted the amount of Km trains travelled; RevPKm also has a privatisation effect inbuilt into 
the values due to privatisation and regulation impacting on the cost of tickets. This may 
account for some of the effects of privatisation but there should still be effects that are not 
part of the stated variables.  
                                                             
 
19 The DfT, ORR and NR all ensure their data is reconciled with the data collection software - LENNON Dawn Louise Robins         
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There also needs to be consideration given to multicollinearity of variables as it is apparent 
that the GDP and TKm are closely related. Multicollinearity occurs when an approximate linear 
relationship is observed among the independent variables. It is common for multicollinearity 
in this form to occur. It is also common for data containing dummy variables to include some 
form of multicollinearity and although technically assumptions have not been violated unless 
an exact linear relationship is discovered the presence of approximate linear relationships 
must be considered due to the estimating problems that this uncovers (Kennedy 2008). The 
consequences of multicollinearity are a dampening down of impacts. The R
2 remains 
unchanged and, strictly speaking, the assumptions of Classic Linear Regression (CLR) are still 
met. The main issue that has to be considered – assuming that multicollinearity cannot be 
avoided – is that the parameter estimates are not precise and can lead to specification errors 
(Kennedy 2008). 
5.3.1  Adapting the Model 
The problems with autocorrelation and collinearity were considered significant enough to 
require further investigation and although the model was not rejected, alternatives needed to 
be considered before choosing the correct model. There are various methods that can be used 
to lessen the impact of these classic linear regression (CLR) assumption violators including: 
1.  Combining the Passenger Revenue with GDP could help sort out problems with 
collinearity (they are closely correlated with a coefficient value of 0.75). In order to do 
this the RevPkm was divided by the GDP. This gave one variable that would then first 
smooth out the relationship they had with each other before explaining the impact on 
PKm   
2.  Lagging the GDP by one year: this assumes that the effect of GDP on PKm is not 
immediate, but takes a year to impact, especially true regarding season ticket sales 
that are bought as much as a year in advance. There is also evidence that GDP 
statistics are already a year behind when published as the effect that the economy 
has on GDP is not immediate;  
3.  Testing for multi-collinearity by replacing Train KM with Train Km
-1 changes the 
functional form;  
4.  Introducing other dummy variables to account for the exceptional anomalies that 
appear in the data such as the strikes in 1982, the Hatfield crash in 2000 and also 
introducing a transitionary period to cover the effect of the transition from public to 
private ownership.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Before these alternative scenarios were tried the format for the Privatisation dummy variable 
was considered. In the original model the dummy variable was fixed at 1. This raises the 
question of the privatisation impact being instant and steady rather than gradual and 
fluctuating. Graduating the impact of privatisation through increasing and decreasing the 
variable was tested along with the other variables. It was hoped that the effect would show 
privatisation as having an increasing impact as the policy was initiated and then a gradual 
decrease in impact as the transition settled down. This did not appear to be the case and little 
reportable impacts were seen in the final statistics. One of the reasons for this occurring could 
be that the impact of privatisation is fairly strong in the other variables and the privatisation 
dummy variable is, as it has been explained as, a ‘catch all’ variable that accounts for those 
impacts not apparent or able to be explained elsewhere. As there was little impact from 
trialling this model the results have not been included in the thesis. 
The issues of multicollinearity and autocorrelation were still evident and therefore the need 
for solutions had to be explored. The first three methods had little impact on the model, in 
the respect that they did not help to explain the changes in passenger kilometres, and were 
discarded. It was decided, instead, to explore various dummy variables to account for the 
economic changes over the time period and the industry specific events such as Hatfield. 
Hatfield, as a train accident, was not considered to be the worst accident to befall the rail 
industry in recent years: Ladbrooke Grove took many more lives the previous year (Evans, 
2007, Wolmar, 2005). Yet the cause of the accident at Hatfield was detrimental to the industry 
in the respect that it is the infrastructure that was at fault rather than human error. The rail 
industry suffered huge disruption after the Hatfield crash as trains were forced to slow down 
while thousands of kilometres of rail were inspected for further faults. This is why the Hatfield 
crash, rather than any other accident, is worthy of consideration when calculating the impact 
of different variables on the growth in PKm.  
Altering the model gives us the following regression statistics as outlined in Table 5-3. The 
table is interesting in that it highlights the progression of the process of defining the model. 
Although more than 100 different variations were tried out only a proportion are shown in the 
table.  The years where a dummy variable has been included are outlined for each model 
tried, and the various regression statistics that show the relationship between the dependant 
variable: PKm, and the independent explanatory variables. In each case the R
2 shows the 
relative reduction in the total sum of squares (total error) when a regression line is fitted. 
Therefore the higher the R
2 (closer to 1) that each variable is, the greater the goodness of fit Dawn Louise Robins         
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and therefore better chance that any change in the variables will also enable a prediction of 
the change in the dependant. The adjusted R
2 indicates the amount of variation in the data 
explained by the model and identifies the impact of the variables on the change in the 
dependent variable. The r
2 will not decrease as each new variable is introduced as it cannot 
undo the impact of preceding variables but the adjusted r
2 can reduce thereby indicating that 
the impact of the new variable reduces the overall explanation of impact. The adjusted r
2 can 
be read as a percentage: i.e. 0.685 = 68.5%.  
The Unstandardised Coefficient B is the unit increase of each variable needed to ensure a unit 
increase in the dependant. Therefore, for each model shown, an increase of the Coefficient B 
for each of the independent variables would result in an increase in PKm of the Coefficient B 
for PKm. 
Table 5-3 Adaptations to the Basic Model 
Model  Years for 
Dummy 
Variables 
Variables  R2 
Adjusted 
D-W  Unstandardise
d Coefficients 
B 
Coefficients t  sig 
1     (Constant)     1.479  2.757  13.515  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -3.986  -1.631  .116 
     TKm  .897    .003  5.885  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.09252E-07  1.556  .133 
   92/3-04/5  PE  .957    -.071  -4.985  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .966     -.061  -2.812  .010 
2     (Constant)     1.234  2.690  10.840  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -2.518  -.830  .415 
     TKm  .897    .003  4.554  .000 
     GDP  .898    1.9734E-07  1.264  .218 
   93/4-04/5  PE  .954    -.075  -3.768  .001 
   00/1-04/5  Hatfield  .954     -.030  -1.024  .316 
3     (Constant)     1.574  2.617  11.710  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -.940  -.380  .707 
     TKm  .897    .002  4.616  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.00302E-07  1.319  .199 
   92/3-04/5  PE  .957    -.088  -6.046  .000 
   N/A  Hatfield                
4     (Constant)     1.575  2.552  12.167  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -.584  -.253  .802 
     TKm  .897    .002  5.051  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.16112E-07  1.532  .138 
   93/4-05/6  PE  .963    -.098  -6.803  .000 
   N/A  Hatfield                
5     (Constant)     1.678  2.603  13.616  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -1.627  -.693  .495 
     TKm  .897    .002  5.639  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.32614E-07  1.929  .066 
   92/3-05/6  PE  .973    -.095  -6.051  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .973     -.024  -1.062  .299 
6     (Constant)     1.143  2.675  13.059  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -2.897  -1.168  .255 
     TKm  .897    .003  5.795  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.02501E-07  1.541  .137 
   93/4-04/5  PE  .962    -.083  -5.269  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .966    -.049  -2.203  .038 Dawn Louise Robins         
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Model  Years for 
Dummy 
Variables 
Variables  R2 
Adjusted 
D-W  Unstandardise
d Coefficients 
B 
Coefficients t  sig 
   90/1-91/2  Recession  .968     -.033  -1.463  .157 
7     (Constant)     1.636  2.784  18.442  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -4.524  -2.513  .019 
     TKm  .897    .003  8.325  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.64554E-07  2.852  .009 
   92/3-06/7  PE  .971    -.098  -8.340  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .976    -.053  -3.369  .003 
   81/2-82/3 & 
90/1-91/2 
Recession  .984     -.049  -3.632  .001 
8     (Constant)     2.042  2.877  15.431  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -5.999  -2.729  .012 
     TKm  .897    .003  6.317  .000 
     GDP  .898    3.68484E-07  3.119  .005 
   92/3-07/8  PE  .955    -.097  -5.998  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .966    -.073  -3.938  .001 
   81/2-82/3 & 
90/1-91/2 
Recession  .975     -.050  -2.965  .007 
9     (Constant)     1.812  2.787  18.940  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -4.372  -2.454  .022 
     TKm  .897    .003  8.412  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.48255E-07  2.705  .013 
   92/3-05/6  PE  .973    -.096  -9.317  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .976    -.050  -3.205  .004 
   81/2-82/3 & 
90/1-91/2 
Recession  .984     -.048  -3.646  .001 
10     (Constant)     1.709  2.822  16.959  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -4.898  -2.463  .022 
     TKm  .897    .003  7.860  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.49598E-07  2.465  .022 
   91/2-05/6  PE  .971    -.089  -8.239  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .978    -.055  -3.272  .003 
   81/2-82/3  Recession/Strikes  .981     -.046  -2.273  .033 
11     (Constant)     1.508  3.062  14.508  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -7.332  -3.054  .006 
     TKm  .897    .002  6.478  .000 
     GDP  .898    4.14838E-07  3.458  .002 
   91/2-05/6  PE  .971    -.084  -7.940  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .978    -.058  -3.535  .002 
   82/3  Recession/Strikes  .982     -.086  -2.599  .016 
12     (Constant)     1.275  3.151  14.719  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -8.455  -3.487  .002 
     TKm  .897    .002  6.380  .000 
     GDP  .898    4.34101E-07  3.514  .002 
   90/1-05/6  PE  .966    -.080  -7.596  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .975    -.066  -4.002  .001 
   82/3  Recession/Strikes  .981     -.099  -2.909  .008 
13     (Constant)     1.113  3.254  13.568  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -9.396  -3.467  .002 
     TKm  .897    .002  5.718  .000 
     GDP  .898    4.20653E-07  3.045  .006 
   90/1-04/5  PE  .957    -.065  -5.620  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .969    -.073  -4.059  .000 
   82/3  Recession/Strikes  .976     -.108  -2.841  .009 
14     (Constant)     1.486  2.601  14.454  .000 
     RevPKm  .596    -1.480  -.723  .477 
     TKm  .897    .003  6.049  .000 
     GDP  .898    1.995E-07  1.645  .113 
   91/2-05/6  PE  .971    -.094  -7.177  .000 
   00/1-03/4  Hatfield  .973    -.028  -1.475  .153 
   N/A  Recession/Strikes                Dawn Louise Robins         
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Model  Years for 
Dummy 
Variables 
Variables  R2 
Adjusted 
D-W  Unstandardise
d Coefficients 
B 
Coefficients t  sig 
15     (Constant)     1.414  2.659  14.711  .000 
     RevPKm  0.594    -2.45  -1.142  .265 
     TKm  0.897    0.003  6.309  .000 
     GDP  0.898    2.10E-07  1.785  .087 
   91/2-05/6  PE  0.971    -0.089  -6.564  .000 
   00/1-04/5  Hatfield  0.974    -0.037  -1.887  .071 
   N/A  Recession/Strikes                
16     (Constant)     1.608  2.66  14.371  .000 
     RevPKm  0.594    -2.51  -1.121  .273 
     TKm  0.897    0.003  6.135  .000 
     GDP  0.898    2.19E-07  1.834  .079 
   91/2-05/6  PE  0.971    -0.088  -6.155  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  0.973    -0.035  -1.677  .107 
   N/A  Recession/Strikes                
17     (Constant)     1.734  3.060  12.506  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -6.863  -2.440  .023 
     TKm  .897    .002  5.537  .000 
     GDP  .898    3.95118E-07  2.939  .007 
   91/2-05/6  PE  .971    -.081  -5.925  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .973    -.045  -2.280  .032 
   82/3  Recession/Strikes  .977     -.086  -2.283  .032 
18     (Constant)     1.916  2.817  14.803  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -4.384  -1.906  .069 
     TKm  .897    .003  6.715  .000 
     GDP  .898    2.31378E-07  2.058  .051 
   91/2-05/6  PE  .971    -.085  -6.329  .000 
   00/1-05/6  Hatfield  .973    -.041  -2.057  .051 
   81/2-82/3  Recession/Strikes  .976     -.046  -2.039  .053 
19     (Constant)     1.442  2.966  12.594  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -6.099  -2.259  .034 
     TKm  .897    .002  5.821  .000 
     GDP  .898    3.96382E-07  3.036  .006 
   92/3-05/6  PE  .973    -.088  -7.085  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .976    -.049  -2.671  .014 
   82/3  Recession/Strikes  .979     -.072  -1.976  .060 
20     (Constant)     1.453  2.923  17.106  .000 
     RevPKm  .594    -5.690  -2.817  .010 
     TKm  .897    .0024  7.093  .000 
     GDP  .898    3.68762E-07  3.614  .001 
   92/3-05/6  PE  .973    -.092  -8.575  .000 
   00/1-06/7  Hatfield  .976    -.051  -3.117  .005 
   82/3 & 91/2  Recession/Strikes  .983     -.063  -3.283  .003 
Source: Data from ORR 2008, regression generated using SPSS 
Each model takes us closer to realising the closest representation of the impacts on passenger 
Km and conversely takes away some of the options as they are calibrated. The process shown 
in the table allowed for a deeper understanding of the different variables and the impact that 
each of them has on the prediction of changes to PKm. The Privatisation Effect (PE) was 
originally thought to have been best set at 1994, but Model 11 suggests Privatisation could 
have started as early as 1991, yet the introduction of a recession/strike variable gave other 
explanations to the change in PKm. The elasticity’s for the three variables, RevPKm, TKm and 
GDP are tested for the four models that appear to represent the best explanation of the Dawn Louise Robins         
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change in the Passenger Kilometres (Table 5-4). Elasticity of demand is calculated by 
multiplying the coefficient B statistic by the mean value of the variable in question. 
Table 5-4 Model Elasticity’s 
Elasticities of 
Models    RevPKm  TKm  GDP 
Model 7  Coefficient B  -4.524  .003  2.64554E-07 
 
Mean Value  .108138560  373.9243  1064258.30 
 
Elasticity  -0.48922681  1.035750291  0.281554268 
Model 9  Coefficient B  -4.372  .003  2.48255E-07 
 
Mean Value  .108138560  373.9243  1064258.30 
 
Elasticity  -0.47276611  1.031104257  0.264207691 
Model 11  Coefficient B  -7.332  .002  4.14838E-07 
  Mean Value  .108138560  373.9243  1064258.30 
  Elasticity  -0.79283571  0.894023434  0.441494841 
Model 20  Coefficient B  -5.690  .002  3.68762E-07 
 
Mean Value  .108138560  373.9243  1064258.30 
 
Elasticity  -0.61530941  0.904923386  0.392458503 
The elasticity’s show that in absolute terms, compared to the parameters used in the 
Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH), the fare elasticity (RevPKm) – for the 
preferred model 20 – is a little on the low side (in absolute terms – this should be (and is) 
negative) as is the GDP elasticity, whilst the train km elasticity is a little higher than it would 
be liked. The fare parameter is much lower in models 7 and 9 and slightly higher in model 11. 
Although it appears that model 11 may be fractionally better in explaining the change in the 
dependent, when consideration is given to the variables included, the narrative falls down 
slightly – it is unlikely that privatisation can be determined to have started as early as 1991. In 
this respect, Model 20 appears to have the better ‘fit’, for all three variables.  
The recent work by Whelan et. al. (2010) carried out a similar exercise to that of this research. 
They use a univariate time-series model similar to that used here but utilise additional 
variables to account for PPM and fuel. The calculated elasticities of this work are comparable 
to here except with the GDP and TKm. Whelan et. al. find a GDP elasticity of 0.9 and a TKm 
elasticity of 0.32 which is opposite to this research (Whelan et al., 2010). The research by 
Whelan et. al. included lagged variables which this research had decided against. This issue, 
along with impact of the other variables that were not included here can be assumed to be 
the main cause of this discrepancy. The fare elasticity is within acceptable limits in comparison 
and the only event this research did not include as a dummy variable, that Whelan has 
included, is the rail bombings by the IRA in 1994 but the impact of this event is minimal at -3% Dawn Louise Robins         
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compared to strikes of the 1980s. Had this research been available during the timescales of 
this work there may have been opportunities to have developed the model further. It also 
suggests that Whelan et al. have managed to address the potential issues of multicollinearity 
that this research has been unable to address. 
Model 20 suggests that if fares go up 1%, demand will go down 0.615%, if the amount of train 
kms increases by 1%, demand will go up by 0.905%, and if the economy grows by 1%, demand 
will go up by 0.392%.  There does appear to be a problem with multicollinearity as Train Km 
and GDP do appear closely related. This was a problem with the original model and as 
explained in the previous section, attempts to correct this have not proved viable. Table 5-5 
highlights the close relationship between TKm and GDP. 
Table 5-5 Correlation between TKm and GDP 
  ACTKM  GDP 
ACTKM  Pearson Correlation  1  .972
** 
Sig. (2-tailed)    .000 
N  30  30 
GDP  Pearson Correlation  .972
**  1 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000   
N  30  30 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Model 20 is still considered a better fit than either model 7, 9 or 11 despite their higher 
adjusted R
2 values. The Durbin-Watson stands at 1.453 and shows that even though the test 
statistic is edging closer to 1 than 2, significant problems with autocorrelation regardless of 
the correlation between TKm and GDP are reduced. The adjusted R
2 is 98.3 which mean 98.3% 
of the increase in passenger Km can be explained by the variables in the model.  
Although it is usually expected that the chosen model should be the one with the highest 
adjusted R
2 (Field, 2005), model 20 has a better overall fit with regards to predicting PKm 
change and the narrative surrounding the variables included. The Privatisation Effect dummy 
variable is included from 1992/93 to 2005/06 and the Hatfield dummy variable from 2000/01 
to 2006/07. It is interesting to note that the increase in PKm accelerated after 2005/06 and 
therefore begs the question – ‘was there something that depressed the increase up to this 
point and was it just the effect of Hatfield or could it have been privatisation?’ This is not 
easily answered but the assumptions that have therefore been made are: Dawn Louise Robins         
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1.  The effects of privatisation on the rail industry that are not included in the other 
variables cease to be of any impact after 2006 and could also have depressed the PE 
during this time 
2.  The impacts of privatisation started to take effect as early as 1992 when the White 
Paper on privatising the rail industry was published.  
3.  The Hatfield crash in October 2000 had an immediate and long lasting effect on the 
passenger Km travelled 
4.  The recession/strikes of the early 1980s and 1990s did have an impact on the PKm. 
The statistics that have been generated in this section can be used as a basis for calculating 
the impact of privatisation on the rail industry in comparison to a nationalised industry and 
the predictions for a privatised industry. To be able to use the model to predict the effect of 
privatisation we need to compare the actual events with a counterfactual scenario and also a 
scenario where privatisation is forecast. This will give us our three scenarios and enable the 
privatisation effect in the form of consumer surplus in PKm to be extrapolated.  
5.4   The Counterfactual 
The aim of this section is to examine via ‘post diction’ what would have happened to the 
British rail industry had it not been privatised – or, how does the estimated counterfactual 
scenario compare to predictions based on actual events that are now known. There could 
arguably be many counterfactuals to privatisation – a continuation of a Conservative 
Government, a less environmentally aware public - to name just a couple - but it is my belief 
that these scenarios are open to speculation and their relevance to comparison with the 
actual events is limited. The scenario described in this chapter therefore deserves the heading 
of ‘the counterfactual’ as it uses actual events related to the rail industry to explain the 
predictions and is therefore far more convincing in any comparison to the privatised industry. 
The counterfactual data may be estimated based on what was known at the time, but the 
actual events of the last fifteen years are taken into account when explanations of the 
calculations are given. The first part of this section describes the economic and political 
climate of the era before calculating the counterfactual scenario. 
Although it appears from the literature that privatisation was probable rather than merely just 
possible for the rail industry (Gourvish 2002a), the rail industry itself was not in favour of 
privatisation and continued to implement long term plans for improving the railways. The 
main change within the industry prior to privatisation was the Organising for Quality initiative Dawn Louise Robins         
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that has been explained in a previous chapter. This attempt at commercialisation appeared to 
have a positive effect on rail data just prior to privatisation and it is therefore assumed that, 
had privatisation not happened, the industry would have continued with this strategy within a 
nationalised framework. PKm may not have risen in the early part of the 1990s and there is an 
argument for the OfQ initiative to have been yet another attempt at cost and service 
efficiency that would have under achieved as so many other attempts have done (Gourvish, 
2002b, Riley, 2011). Nonetheless, any attempts at explaining the counterfactual of the non-
privatisation of rail should reflect this policy initiative.  
When calculating the counterfactual there are variables that remain fixed and others that are 
open to interpretation and assumptions. It is important that clarity is maintained when 
claiming specific ‘facts’. The variables can be classified into four main areas with some 
overlap: political, economic, social and industry specific. 
5.4.1  Political implications  
One important consideration that needs to be taken into account is the political impact of 
policy changes. For the purposes of determining the counterfactual we are aware of the policy 
changes that have taken place and the political preferences of each subsequent government. 
The difference from a non-privatised setting will be that these policy responses were reacting 
to a privatised industry whereas the counterfactual places these policy issues within a 
nationalised setting. The Conservative Government, regardless of whether or not they 
privatised the industry, were headed in the direction of maintaining a limited railway with 
little improvement or increase in funds (Preston and Whelan, 1995).  
In contrast, the three Labour Governments of 1997 to 2010 have dominated the majority of 
the counterfactual period and were not, initially, in favour of the privatisation of the industry. 
That said, Engle gives an alternative opinion on the Labour Parties ‘strong opposition’ to the 
privatisation proposals (Ivaldi, 2008). He states that with the rail industry needing continual 
funds and support and no alternative proposals for improving efficiency to be found, they 
actually gave implicit support to the privatisation plans and could, had they wished, forced the 
Conservative Government to change the proposals far more radically than they did (Engles, 
2009).  
It could also be said that the privatisation of the industry actually helped the incoming Labour 
Government to regulate for an integrated transport plan and that the privatised structure and 
competitive nature of the franchise operators to increase efficiency and revenues made it Dawn Louise Robins         
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easier for them to take integration on as a policy and then practice. Engle’s suggestion also 
adds weight to the idea of property rights theory in regards to railway ownership and would 
also have allowed the Labour Government to have distanced themselves from any failures of 
the industry that could have been due to privatisation.  
It is assumed that the integration of transport modes would have continued under a 
nationalised framework and funds would have been made available to increase the network 
coverage and capacity to accommodate these policies. The change of government in 1997 is 
of course an actual event and the privatisation of the rail industry, although it may have been 
a contributing factor to the Conservatives losing the election, cannot be held responsible for 
it. Therefore the change in government was an actual fact; it is only the policy implications of 
the change that are open to interpretation. If privatisation is assumed to have begun when 
the decision to privatise was made in 1992, with the July publication of the White Paper 
(1992), then the Conservatives had only just won the general election three months 
previously and had another five years to run before the change in government. The 
counterfactual would therefore have two different policies over the period to account for. 
5.4.2  Economic implications  
It would be fair to assume that the economic climate of the country would have continued 
along the path that it did, regardless of the privatisation of the rail industry. What would need 
to be taken into account though, are the changes in the rail budget that would have occurred. 
There would not have been the extra funds from the sale of the various separated companies 
but there would also have been the extra billions of pounds that the privatisation initiative 
had cost: £5bn according to a report by the Rail Consultancy (Harris and Godward 1997) 
although this figure has been heavily disputed and will depend on the cost variables that are 
included in the calculation. Organising for Quality, the industry attempt at commercialisation, 
was estimated to cost around £50 - £70 million (Gourvish 2002a), considerably less than the 
privatisation initiative regardless of how the privatisation initiative is costed. The Conservative 
Government believed that the decrease in subsidy payments and income generated from the 
sales would be recouped over the forthcoming years. That this has not happened is not an 
issue for the counterfactual to take into account but for the predictions for privatisation and 
the Conservative assumptions. 
It is fairly safe to assume that the costs of maintenance, renewal, labour and materials would 
have risen in much the same way that they have. Organising for Quality had seen the removal Dawn Louise Robins         
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of management structures that were labour heavy and streamlining of services and 
operations was becoming more commercialised and therefore more economic than it had 
been. It could therefore be argued that coupled with the policy implications of stagnation and 
the apparent value for money service that was developed under OfQ the economic health of 
the railways under a continued nationalised policy may have seen reduced costs if not 
increased service. 
5.4.3  Social implications  
Although it is fair to say that social behaviour of the population would have followed the same 
path that it has, regardless of any privatisation initiatives, there need to be some assumptions 
made regarding the behaviour of passengers during this time. Congestion, the growth in 
cheap air travel, and environmental concerns, would all have to be factored into the 
counterfactual period, but how these would have impacted on the rail industry is open to 
suggestion. Assumptions based on the passenger surveys need to be made regarding the 
degree of patronage that has evolved from the increased comfort and general passenger 
improvements that have occurred over the period. How much of this is due to privatisation 
and how much would have occurred anyway are important considerations.  
It was seen in the previous chapter that the choice of transport mode has changed fairly 
dramatically over the last fifty years. Since privatisation of the rail industry the bus industry 
has remained fairly static but until recently car use has increased steadily – the increase in fuel 
costs and reduction in young drivers has recently impacted on car use – this coupled with 
congestion and lengthening of ‘peak’ times has helped to slow down, and revert in many 
cases, the continued upward trend in car use. Domestic flights are in direct competition with 
Long Distance Rail yet cheaper and more frequent flights have not stopped the Long Distance 
Rail Sector from growing steadily. It is usually the impact of high speed rail that is compared to 
flights (Gonzalez-Savignat, 2004, Vickerman, 1997) but, as the previous section has shown, the 
Long Distance Rail Sector also compares favourably. 
An issue that is rarely covered in rail literature is the branding of British Rail (Lovegrove, 2004). 
The rail industry has always evoked a sense of national pride, both positively and negatively, 
and the privatisation of the industry has taken this brand away, or at the very least diluted it 
into a variety of other brands. Instead of having one brand – British Rail – to love or hate there 
are now at least 18 franchises and NR and the ORR. This has also meant that there is no longer 
one person with a vision for the industry as there was with BR. There is no-one to guide the Dawn Louise Robins         
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industry with the passion and authority that the Chairman of BR used to wield. Although much 
can be attributed to nostalgia there are possible considerations regarding the separate 
branding of the individual franchise companies and the impact this will have had on 
privatisation and conversely what the brand ‘British Rail’ would have continued to have given 
the industry had it not been privatised.    
5.4.4  Rail industry  
Apart from the political, economic and social implications, there are also industry issues that 
need to be accounted for. Wages, working conditions, and general human resource issues 
would all have played a part in the counterfactual. The Hatfield crash in October 2000 was 
specific to the rail industry and also privatisation. For the purposes of the counterfactual it is 
assumed that the Hatfield disaster – an event that has so dominated the first part of the 
current new millennium – would not have happened if privatisation had not gone ahead. This 
assumption is based on the widely held view that the incident resulted from mismanagement 
of the infrastructure by the accountants who were in charge of the infrastructure company, 
Railtrack (Stittle, 2002, Pollitt and Smith, 2002). It is unlikely, given the policies of the 
Conservative Government; the service provided (TKm) would have increased by much.  Fare 
increases are assumed to have continued under a nationalised industry due to the need for 
investment and increased revenue needed to support this. 
The Conservative model of rail development allowed for limited growth and expected 
patronage to level off and stagnate, possibly even decline. The majority of passengers were 
assumed to be commuters and occasional leisure travellers. The forecasts for the industry 
from 1992 onwards would therefore reflect this trend. The reason the trend would start prior 
to 1995/6 is that privatisation was decided in 1992 and, if this had not happened, it would 
have been at this date that the continuation of the conservative policy would have started to 
have had an effect on the actual figures rather than the start of the preparation for 
privatisation. Passenger numbers would remain stable, revenue would increase as prices went 
up, maintenance would have continued on an ‘as needed’ basis and renewals would have 
been minimal. The trend would have possibly changed slightly in 1997 when the Labour 
Government initiated a policy of integration with other modes but prices would have been 
likely to increase in order to fund this. 
Now the scene is set, the data has to be manipulated to mirror a counterfactual scenario. The 
next section looks at the variables used and how they were calculated. Dawn Louise Robins         
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5.5   Providing a Counterfactual Scenario using Moving Averages 
It is not possible to know exactly what the counterfactual would have looked like and there 
are no rail industries that are suitably comparable. The best method of determining the 
counterfactual is to assume; all things considered; that the past is a prediction of the future 
and therefore the average would prevail. The methodology section has considered various 
options and their associated problems with representation and after careful consideration the 
decision was made to use five year moving averages. Using five year moving averages to 
generate a linear trend was not a decision taken lightly, but when compared to other 
solutions it seems the simplest and most adaptable methodology (as shown in the 
methodology chapter).  
Taking into account the nature of the various methods available the research here has used an 
ARIMA (autoregressive integrated moving average) methodology to calculate the predicted 
privatised and non-privatised (counterfactual) trends of the rail industry. The reasons for 
choosing this method lie in the ease of modelling the various different variables for both cost 
and kilometres. As explained previously, it is not necessarily the purpose of this thesis to 
provide a comprehensive econometric guide, but rather to use econometrics as a means to an 
end. When combining time series data with regression modelling it is important to remember 
that time series data can be decomposed to exhibit one or more of the following components: 
1.  Trend component – either a broad rise or fall over time 
2.  Seasonal Component – data within the year shows peaks and troughs but the yearly 
trend shows regularity 
3.  Cyclical component – cycles are over a medium or long term 
4.  Irregular component – an unprecedented and unpredictable event such as the stock 
market crash (Field 2005). 
For the rail industry there have been various irregular events over the years: the BR strikes of 
1982 and the Hatfield crash in October 2000 to name a few: and for forecasting purposes they 
must be removed, or smoothed over, which is where using five year moving averages as a 
base for prediction helps. 
Although privatisation did not actually occur until 1995/96, the White Paper for reform was 
published in 1992 and the preliminary moves towards privatisation such as land sales and 
asset management would have preceded the actual event. On the other hand, the recession 
years of the early 1990s would impact heavily on the forecasts for the future if the economic Dawn Louise Robins         
 
141 
 
recovery is not accounted for when calculating the moving averages. After considerable 
thought it was decided to calculate moving averages using data up to and including 1994/95. 
When calculating five year moving averages the actual data generated initially is up to two 
years prior to the last actual data set; therefore, the data generated took the averaged data 
set up to 1992/93. This provides consistency with the preferred model choice which assumes 
that the effect of privatisation began in 1992/93. The new averaged data was then used to 
predict the future trends in TKm and RevPKm and these variables were then compared.   
GDP is assumed to be unaffected by the privatisation process. Although the data does reflect 
the impact of the social and economic events over the years, it is pushing the boundaries of 
assumptions to estimate the impact of these factors on the data. Therefore, actual GDP 
figures can be used but the Train Km and Revenue per Passenger Km will all need to be 
calculated using five year moving averages.  
Initially the two variables were calculated and centred. Using a five year moving average helps 
eliminate any ‘seasonal’ or cyclical variations such as the strike action in 1982 and the 
recession years during the 1990s (Gardner 1985). Each rolling five year period is totalled and 
then averaged giving a rolling five year average over time. The last column of each variable is 
the mean of two years of five year averages. By averaging a rolling two years of the moving 
averages ensures the data is ‘centred’ and anomalies and irregularities are eliminated as much 
as possible. The results of the moving averages are shown in Table 5-6. 
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Table 5-6 Five year moving averages on Revenue per Km and Train Km 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
The results for each variable show how each trend line (5yr centred average) smoothes out 
the data and disposes of irregularities. (See Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2) 
Year 
RevPKm 
£/Km 
Total 5yr  5yr Ave 
5yr 
Centred 
Ave 
Ac 
Train 
Km (m) 
Total 
5yr 
5yr Ave 
5yr 
Centre
d Ave 
1979-80  0.099626 
     
315.3 
   
  
1980-81  0.101915 
     
326.8 
   
  
1981-82  0.099725  0.490707  0.098141 
 
322.5  1562  312.4    
1982-83  0.090899  0.488774  0.097755  0.097948  286.5  1555.8  311.16  311.78 
1983-84  0.098541  0.486525  0.097305  0.09753  310.9  1540.5  308.1  309.63 
1984-85  0.097694  0.48987  0.097974  0.09764  309.1  1529.7  305.94  307.02 
1985-86  0.099666  0.50457  0.100914  0.099444  311.5  1568.3  313.66  309.8 
1986-87  0.10307  0.511685  0.102337  0.101625  311.7  1596.8  319.36  316.51 
1987-88  0.105598  0.520508  0.104102  0.103219  325.1  1631.2  326.24  322.8 
1988-89  0.105657  0.526171  0.105234  0.104668  339.4  1673.2  334.64  330.44 
1989-90  0.106517  0.527974  0.105595  0.105414  343.5  1715.2  343.04  338.84 
1990-91  0.105328  0.527685  0.105537  0.105566  353.5  1739  347.8  345.42 
1991-92  0.104873  0.532374  0.106475  0.106006  353.7  1749.8  349.96  348.88 
1992-93  0.10531  0.538567  0.107713  0.107094  348.9  1746.8  349.36  349.66 
1993-94  0.110346  0.547431  0.109486  0.1086  350.2  1746.7  349.34  349.35 
1994-95  0.11271 
     
340.5 
   
  
1995-96  0.114192           353.4          Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 5-1  Actual Passenger Revenue and Centred Moving Average 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
 
Figure 5-2 Actual Train Km and Centred Moving Average 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
If quarterly data were to be used the next stage would be to identify the seasonal component 
(S), and calculate the distance from the trend (T) (Burton et al., 2002). The yearly data has no 
seasonal variations and does not appear to have specific cycles; therefore this stage can be 
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omitted. The averages that have been calculated can now be used to forecast the future 
trends. Forecasting for a long time period is not an exact science since it cannot account for 
major changes in regulation, the economy, or variations in personal choice that may prove 
longer term and therefore impact on the data thereafter. Therefore, the further into the 
future the predictions go, the less rugged the analysis may be. Predictions are only reliable if 
past relations between the variables continue and if the line of least squares is a good fit to 
begin with.  
Using simple regression, where the least squares line is combined with the analysis of time 
series data, a regression line can be extrapolated and used to forecast future expectations of 
patronage (passenger Km), revenue and train Km. The table in appendix 2 gives the 
calculations for the three variables. The slight difference with this model compared with 
standard ARIMA is that rather than finding the average parameter increase of the pre 
privatisation era and adding it onto each year forward, the parameter for each year after the 
base year (12 = 1992/3) is calculated and then the total included for the next years forecast. 
This alters the statistic slightly each year and has the effect of smoothing out the trend whilst 
building on the previous forecasts. Table 5-7 gives the estimated growth based on the 
counterfactual scenario using moving averages. 
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Table 5-7 Forecast and Actual Trends 
 
CfPKm 
Ac 
PKm 
CfRevPKm 
Ac 
RevPKm 
CfTKm  Ac TKm  Ac GDP 
1982-83  29.39  27.2  0.097948  0.090899  311.78  286.5  744,714 
1983-84  29.24  29.5  0.09753  0.098541  309.63  310.9  777,234 
1984-85  29.29  29.8  0.09764  0.097694  307.02  309.1  795,090 
1985-86  29.92  29.7  0.099444  0.099666  309.8  311.5  821,191 
1986-87  30.92  30.8  0.101625  0.10307  316.51  311.7  856,128 
1987-88  31.75  32.4  0.103219  0.105598  322.8  325.1  904,483 
1988-89  32.45  34.3  0.104668  0.105657  330.44  339.4  961,805 
1989-90  32.97  33.3  0.105414  0.106517  338.84  343.5  977,010 
1990-91  33.07  33.2  0.105566  0.105328  345.42  353.5  969,481 
1991-92  32.61  32.5  0.106006  0.104873  348.88  353.7  963,849 
1992-93  31.76  31.7  0.107094  0.10531  349.66  348.9  964,224 
1993-94  30.98  30.4  0.1086  0.110346  349.35  350.2  1,000,920 
1994-95  31.28073  28.7  0.109667  0.11271  353.9629  340.5  1,032,551 
1995-96  31.51982  30  0.110729  0.114192  358.4319  353.4  1,055,903 
1996-97  31.72017  32.1  0.111787  0.11302  362.8104  356.7  1,102,234 
1997-98  31.89532  34.7  0.112843  0.110564  367.1302  376.3  1,128,928 
1998-99  32.05363  36.3  0.113898  0.112327  371.4106  405.1  1,160,415 
1999-00  32.20037  38.5  0.114951  0.113725  375.664  418.4  1,207,349 
2000-01  32.33899  38.2  0.116004  0.112575  379.8985  427.2  1,230,432 
2001-02  32.4718  39.1  0.117057  0.11252  384.1194  435.9  1,267,067 
2002-03  32.60038  39.7  0.118109  0.112566  388.3304  443.3  1,312,188 
2003-04  32.72583  40.9  0.11916  0.112547  392.5341  446.2  1,344,900 
2004-05  32.84892  42.4  0.120212  0.112776  396.7323  458.4  1,380,684 
2005-06  32.97023  43.2  0.121263  0.116453  400.9263  456.81  1,402,806 
2006-07  33.09015  46.2  0.122314  0.117115  405.1171  461.12  1,427,609 
2007-08  33.20901  49  0.123365  0.117873  409.3054  455.32  1,456,547 
2008-09  33.32701  50.7  0.124416  0.118427  413.4918  474.48  1,442,921 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2008 
Revenue per Passenger km is predicted to rise to a slightly greater degree than has been seen 
in the actual trends and this can be explained through the increase in price that would have 
occurred. Regulation has kept many prices low – although public perception is very different! 
Train Km is expected to rise at negligible rates compared to what has actually been seen. This 
relates to a counterfactual scenario under a Thatcher Government where the service was not 
expected to increase and fare rises would reduce demand but maintain income. Passenger 
Km, based on the moving averages to predict a counterfactual scenario, shows a slight 
increase in trend and when applied to a counterfactual scenario this would account for 
increases in population and commuting workforce but the policy of fare rises would have 
prevented any additional increase in demand.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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The Counterfactual can be seen to represent a fair assumption of what the industry may have 
looked like if it had not been privatised so it is interesting that considering the revenue has 
remained fairly true to the actual revenue the PKm (demand) has grown exponentially under a 
privatised policy. This cannot be explained by the increase in TKm alone and will need to be 
explained further to understand how much of the increase is due to privatisation and how 
much would have occurred regardless. The following figures highlight the trends of a 
counterfactual and actual scenario.  
Figure 5-3 Actual and Forecast trends in Passenger Km 
 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
The counterfactual in Figure 5-3 shows a slight growth that, based on previous data, would 
have occurred. This can be attributed to a number of factors including the rise in population 
and increase in wealth and surplus income. It highlights the Conservative agenda of a stagnant 
railway. Prior to privatisation there was an increase in Revenue (Figure 5-4). This is picked up 
in the moving averages and is one of the possible causes of the predicted rise in revenue 
above that which has actually been seen.  
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Figure 5-4 Actual and Forecast Trends in Passenger Revenue 
 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
It could be argued that a rail industry without privatisation would have seen the increases in 
RevPKm that have been predicted if the original aim of running the railways at a profit had 
been maintained. Regulation has prevented TOCs from increasing those fares that are 
deemed socially necessary and those routes that are competitive between operators have had 
to maintain competitive rates. The RevPKm is revenue disaggregated by passenger kilometre 
and will therefore reflect the growth in PKm. Had the PKm not risen the RevPKm would have 
been much smaller had the same service and price still been maintained.  
The amount of Km available to travel continues to rise during the counterfactual (Figure 5-5). 
The actual TKm has risen much higher though. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is 
a need to understand that the actual rise may be due to a combination of factors and it may 
not mean extra capacity but shorter and more frequent services. We know that there has 
been additional route length and an increase in the amount of trains but there is also an 
argument that the increases in technology that now allow for trains to run closer together 
without the risk of accident would have occurred regardless of the privatisation initiative. It 
could also be said that much of this technology advancement could have been implemented 
more effectively under a nationalised industry due to the ownership issues and operational 
boundaries that are apparent under a fractured and privately owned industry. Alternatively it 
may have been the case that there would have been little change due to the inability of the 
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Treasury to fund technology advancements on a grand scale and the changes would have 
occurred at similar times, albeit for different reasons, under a nationalised scenario. 
Figure 5-5 Actual and Forecast Train Km 
 
 
Source: Original data from ORR 2009 
Although the counterfactual data that has been generated can be explained by the events 
that have occurred, the counterfactual rise in RevPKm appears to show increases in revenue 
over and above that which would be expected under a counterfactual scenario. Revenue was 
expected to increase – raised fares, reduced costs, slimline and efficient service provision – 
but because the rise is over and above that which has actually occurred it is worth testing the 
reality at this point before the data is used in the cost benefit analysis. This can be achieved 
using the product of the counterfactual PKm and RevPKm as the counterfactual estimate of 
Revenue: 
CfPKm x CfRevPKm  (x 100 to give £mil) = CfRev 
This will give us an understanding of the actual revenue that would have been generated 
rather than the revenue per passenger kilometre. To achieve this, the PKm is calculated to 
provide a counterfactual using the same method of moving averages as before also shown in 
Appendix 1). The final counterfactual data is then multiplied together each year to give the 
counterfactual revenue (Table 5-8) with the equation being: 
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CfPKm(n) x CfRevPKm(n) = CfRev(n) 
Table 5-8 RevPKm and Total Revenue – Actual and Counterfactual 
   CfPKm    x  CfRevPKm    =  CfRev 
Ac Prev (£m 
2008) 
1982-83  29.39  0.097948  287.8695  247.245 
1983-84  29.24  0.09753  285.1777  290.697 
1984-85  29.29  0.09764  285.9863  291.128 
1985-86  29.92  0.099444  297.5364  296.008 
1986-87  30.92  0.101625  314.226  317.4556 
1987-88  31.75  0.103219  327.7214  342.1386 
1988-89  32.45  0.104668  339.6473  362.403 
1989-90  32.97  0.105414  347.5513  354.702 
1990-91  33.07  0.105566  349.1062  349.69 
1991-92  32.61  0.106006  345.6852  340.837 
1992-93  31.76  0.107094  340.131  333.8313 
1993-94  30.98  0.1086  336.4424  335.4525 
1994-95  31.28073  0.109667  343.0468  323.479 
1995-96  31.51982  0.110729  349.0155  342.576 
1996-97  31.72017  0.111787  354.5909  362.793 
1997-98  31.89532  0.112843  359.9174  383.656 
1998-99  32.05363  0.113898  365.0841  407.748 
1999-00  32.20037  0.114951  370.1479  437.84 
2000-01  32.33899  0.116004  375.1462  430.038 
2001-02  32.4718  0.117057  380.104  439.952 
2002-03  32.60038  0.118109  385.0385  446.886 
2003-04  32.72583  0.11916  389.9618  460.318 
2004-05  32.84892  0.120212  394.8826  478.17 
2005-06  32.97023  0.121263  399.807  503.2031 
2006-07  33.09015  0.122314  404.7396  541.287 
2007-08  33.20901  0.123365  409.6839  577.6701 
2008-09  33.32701  0.124416  414.6424  600.4012 
 
Once converted to total revenue the amount of revenue expected under the counterfactual is 
considerably less than what has actually occurred. This highlights that the rising fares under 
the counterfactual scenario would have meant an increase in the revenue per passenger Km 
rather than an increase in total revenue.  This is shown graphically in Figure 5-6. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 5-6 Actual and Counterfactual Revenue 
 
Source: Original Data ORR 2009 
The data still shows an increase but the actual revenue is far above any that would have been 
generated under a counterfactual scenario. The narrative supporting this is that the data is 
consistent with a counterfactual scenario where ticket prices would have risen to pay for the 
general maintenance of keeping the network running rather than to ensure a profit or enlarge 
the network through renewals. The actual variable ‘revenue’ cannot be used in the modelling 
exercise as it is not directly comparable with the variables PKm and TKm therefore this rise in 
revenue can be taken as explanatory and is used to underpin the counterfactual narrative.  
The argument for stopping the data at 1995 is robust in the respect that data included in 
averaging after this period will have some privatisation effect evident and therefore 
transferred. It could also be argued, though, that if privatisation had not gone ahead the 
Conservative Government may still have carried out their plan of stagnation within the 
industry and running OfQ to maximise profit from a streamlined railway. The forecast data 
would therefore have looked similar. In the final section of this chapter the moving averages 
will be used to help predict the PKm for the counterfactual and forecasts for a privatised 
industry, but first, the forecasts for a privatised industry need to be set out so the 
privatisation impacts can be identified. It is here that the ‘growth that would have occurred 
anyway’ is identified. 
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5.5.1  Forecasts for a Privatised Industry 
The forecasts for a privatised industry are not necessarily based on future prediction from 
1995, estimating the GDP, RevPKm and TKm. It is not possible, or necessary, for the purposes 
of this research, to try and work out what was predicted at the time. The essence of this 
research is to explain the growth in PKm that is over and above that which is predicted from 
what has actually happened with the other variables. The GDP variable gives an understanding 
of the spending power of passengers and the revenue tells us how much money is made per 
kilometre travelled by passengers. The TKm gives a good indication of the service that is being 
provided and we can therefore work out from the actual data and the model that was 
developed in the previous section, what the PKm should have been if all things remained the 
same. The forecasts for a predicted privatised industry are therefore not actually about what 
it was thought would happen once privatisation was initiated but rather that which should 
have happened based on what has actually happened! 
The difference between what the forecasts predict and what has actually occurred is the 
growth that needs to be explained. If we take the counterfactual away from the predictions: 
the counterfactual represents the growth that would have occurred anyway: we are left with 
growth that can be attributed to the privatisation effect. The following section looks at how 
this calculation, of what is essentially the consumer surplus (CS), is calculated ready for 
inclusion in the estimation of the overall costs and benefits of the privatisation initiative. 
5.6  Comparison and Explanations of the Three Scenarios 
This section develops a privatisation forecast and looks at the differences between the three 
rail industry scenarios and then measures the growth in PKm for a counterfactual, predicted 
and privatised scenario. The first step is to build the data and, using the preferred model 20, 
run the forecasting model. In each case the model that was used is given, followed by a table 
of the data that was used, and the PKm that was generated by the model. The model is a 
semi-logged regression model where PKm is the logged variable. Once the model has been 
run the PKm is then returned to its exponential for graphic and analytical purposes.  
In order to find the predicted lnPKm for a counterfactual scenario the modelled coefficient B 
parameter for PKm is added to the forecast RevPKm, forecast TKm, and actual GDP multiplied 
by their modelled coefficients for each year after 1992. The dummy variables are omitted for 
the counterfactual scenario.  
   Dawn Louise Robins         
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Where: For the Counterfactual: 
                                                   
As this is a counterfactual model the PE and Hatfield variables are omitted from the model as 
privatisation did not occur and it is assumed that the Hatfield crash is a product of the 
privatisation initiative.  
The model is developed with the coefficient B statistics for each variable which equates to: 
                                                                   
Table 5-9 shows the data for the counterfactual scenario after this calculation has been run 
for each year. 
Table 5-9 Counterfactual Forecasts for PKm 
Date  Cf LnPKm   Cf RevPKm   Cf TKm   Ac GDP  
1992-93  3.508616907  0.107094  349.66  964,224 
1993-94  3.512846241  0.1086  349.35  1,000,920 
1994-95  3.529516256  0.109667  353.9629  1,032,551 
1995-96  3.54281738  0.110729  358.4319  1,055,903 
1996-97  3.564399977  0.111787  362.8104  1,102,234 
1997-98  3.57860836  0.112843  367.1302  1,128,928 
1998-99  3.594499328  0.113898  371.4106  1,160,415 
1999-00  3.616031499  0.114951  375.664  1,207,349 
2000-01  3.628720999  0.116004  379.8985  1,230,432 
2001-02  3.646381784  0.117057  384.1194  1,267,067 
2002-03  3.667152412  0.118109  388.3304  1,312,188 
2003-04  3.683328091  0.11916  392.5341  1,344,900 
2004-05  3.70062526  0.120212  396.7323  1,380,684 
2005-06  3.712871798  0.121263  400.9263  1,402,806 
2006-07  3.726100913  0.122314  405.1171  1,427,609 
2007-08  3.740850387  0.123365  409.3054  1,456,547 
2008-09  3.739889342  0.124416  413.4918  1,442,921 
 
Continued steady growth is apparent but until the data is transformed back to its exponential 
it is difficult to see how much growth would have occurred under a counterfactual scenario. 
Before carrying out the transference the model is run for a privatised industry. This data will 
show what should have occurred under a privatised industry. It is here that we can see how 
much growth has occurred over and above that which can be explained by privatisation.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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For the Privatised Industry:   
                                                             
                        
Where the PE dummy variable begins in 1992/93 and ends in 2005/06 and where the Hatfield 
dummy variable begins in 2000/01 and ends in 2006/07 and the Recession/Strike dummy 
variable is included in 1982/83 and 1991/92. This equates to:  
                                                              
                                                          
Table 5-10 gives the predicted forecasts for PKm using the actual data available for the other 
variables. 
Table 5-10 Actual Privatised Industry Forecasts for PKm 
Date  Fc PKm  Ac RevPKm  Ac TKm  Ac GDP   PEffect  Hatfield  Rec/Str 
1992-93  3.424947  0.10530954  348.9  964,224  1  0  0 
1993-94  3.412949  0.11034622  350.2  1,000,920  1  0  0 
1994-95  3.387889  0.11271045  340.5  1,032,551  1  0  0 
1995-96  3.419036  0.114192  353.4  1,055,903  1  0  0 
1996-97  3.450723  0.11301963  356.7  1,102,234  1  0  0 
1997-98  3.521587  0.11056369  376.3  1,128,928  1  0  0 
1998-99  3.592291  0.11232727  405.1  1,160,415  1  0  0 
1999-00  3.633578  0.11372468  418.4  1,207,349  1  0  0 
2000-01  3.618755  0.11257539  427.2  1,230,432  1  1  0 
2001-02  3.653471  0.11251969  435.9  1,267,067  1  1  0 
2002-03  3.687618  0.11256574  443.3  1,312,188  1  1  0 
2003-04  3.706755  0.11254719  446.2  1,344,900  1  1  0 
2004-05  3.747937  0.11277594  458.4  1,380,684  1  1  0 
2005-06  3.731359  0.11645346  456.81  1,402,806  1  1  0 
2006-07  3.839092  0.11711495  461.12  1,427,609  0  1  0 
2007-08  3.882535  0.11787323  455.32  1,456,547  0  0  0 
2008-09  3.920338  0.11842739  474.48  1,442,921  0  0  0 
Source: Generated by Model 
An increase over and above that seen in the counterfactual scenario is apparent except for the 
early years of privatisation. Figure 5-7 shows the comparison graphically. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 5-7 Actual, Predicted and Counterfactual lnPKm 
 
 
In the counterfactual scenario the predicted PKm (CfPKm) continues to rise steadily, and due 
to the fall in actual PKm after 1992, the CfPKm remains above the actual and then, due to the 
Hatfield crash, it is again slightly above the actual PKm until 2005. The predictions for PKm, 
based on the actual data and using the model, show that FcPKm follows the actual trends that 
have occurred.  
Now the LnPKm for each scenario has been calculated, the variables can be converted back to 
kilometres and the differences between each case can be measured. This is then shown 
pictorially in Figure 5-8. The recession of the early 1990s is clearly shown in the actual PKm 
(Figure 5-8). But if privatisation had not occurred it is calculated that the fall in PKm would 
have been steeper but recovery would have occurred earlier. The gradual rise in Pkm from 
this time onwards in the counterfactual describes an industry where little growth has 
occurred but it does not show an industry in decline.  
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Figure 5-8 The Forecast, Counterfactual and Actual PKm   
 
 
An interesting feature of this graph is the picture that has developed after 2005/06. The 
privatisation effect was removed after this date and passenger kilometres are seen to have 
risen considerably. In contrast, the counterfactual scenario shows an industry that had 
stabilised and the passenger kilometres were showing little growth. This suggests that the 
effect of privatisation is only impacting on the industry in recent years and that the actual 
passenger kilometre rise that has been seen was going to have happened anyway. This slight 
depression could also indicate an anomaly in the data or a missing variable to explain the 
event. That said, the model does closely follow the actual PKm trends and should therefore be 
seen as an effective explanation of events. 
In essence, it can be seen from the model that the dummy variables indicate that privatisation 
suppressed demand between 1992/3 and 2005/6 by around 8.8% (1 – exp θ) whilst the 
Hatfield accident suppressed demand between 2000/1 and 2006/7 by a further 5.0% (1 – exp 
μ). The strikes in the years 1992/3 (ASLEF) and 1991/2 (Signalmen) were estimated to reduce 
demand by around 6.1% (1 – exp ρ). This is broadly in line with the findings by Whelan et al. 
(2010) although this research included a PE variable as well as various other dummy variables 
to account for events.    
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This analysis suggests that rather than a three phase initiative of pre-privatisation, transition, 
and post privatisation, as suggested by Smith (2006), there are at least four periods to the 
‘privatisation’ era. The first, 1992 to 1995, was the preparatory phase. The second from 1995 
to 2000 was the initial privatisation phase, in which OPRAF and Railtrack are key players. The 
third, from 2000 to 2005, is the Hatfield phase in which OPRAF is replaced by SRA and 
Railtrack by Network Rail.  The fourth phase is the post Hatfield phase, commencing in 2005, 
associated with greater control of the railways by DfT. This does not sit with the political 
timeframe as the Conservative Government under John Major ran from 1990 until May 1997 
and then became a Labour Government under Tony Blair (later Gordon Brown) until the end 
of the research period. It does, however, follow the various policy changes and 
reorganisations that took place within the industry and highlights how external impacts can be 
both a driver and suppressor. The difference of opinion compared to Smiths findings could be 
due to the inclusion of the benefits in this research rather than just accounting for trends in 
the costs. 
The modelling of the data has shown some interesting issues around timescales of policy 
issues, impacts of events, strength of internal and external impacts as well as giving a good 
idea of the different scenarios that occurred, should have occurred, and would have occurred 
under a non-privatised industry. It is now the intention to take this data a step further and 
start to account for the different costs and benefits that have been felt by the different 
stakeholders. The next section starts this process by calculating the consumer surplus that has 
arisen since privatisation and allocates this to the stakeholder groups. 
5.7  Calculating the Consumer Surplus 
The consumer surplus will determine how much of the growth in PKm can be attributed to the 
privatisation and how much would have happened anyway. Consumer Surplus is defined as 
the difference between the price a customer is willing to pay for a product and the price that 
he actually ends up paying (Figure 5-9). If more people are prepared to pay a higher amount 
than that which is demanded to cover the cost there will be a consumer surplus.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 5-9 Consumer Surplus 
 
Source: (Parkin and King, 1992) 
For this research the consumer surplus is looking at the change between the counterfactual 
scenario, the predicted scenario and the actual scenario. The model that has been developed 
has given the passenger kilometres that would have been demanded if the industry had not 
been privatised and the predicted demand based on a privatised industry. The difference 
between these figures is the change in demand. The amount of passenger kilometres over and 
above that which is predicted is considered to be the consumer demand surplus and can be 
converted to revenue to calculate the amount of benefit that privatisation has brought to the 
main stakeholders.  
The first step is to measure the increase in percentage terms for each scenario from the base 
line (1994/95). The percentage increases show how much increase each scenario generated 
over and above the base line. It does not yet attribute the increase to anything other than 
what would, and did, happen. Calculating the change in growth can be made using the 
following model: 
Change in PKm = 
     
    
Where A1 = each year from 1994/95 and A0 = the base year 1994/95 Dawn Louise Robins         
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The same is carried out for both the counterfactual years and the forecast years where: 
C1 = each counterfactual year, C0 = the counterfactual base year (1994/95) and 
F1 = each forecast year, F0 = the forecast base year (1994/95) 
It is worth remembering here that we look at the difference in the counterfactual and the 
forecast rather than the counterfactual and the actual. This is because the aim is to find how 
much of the growth is due to privatisation and anything over and above this will be due to 
other factors unconnected to privatisation. Table 5-11 gives the amount of passenger 
kilometres for the actual data, predicted privatised data and counterfactual scenario and the 
growth that has occurred from the base year in percentage terms. 
Table 5-11 Growth in PKm for each scenario 
  AcPKm  FcPKm   CfPKm   Ac%  Fc%  Cf% 
1994-95  28.70  29.60  34.11  0%  0%  0% 
1995-96  30.00  30.54  34.56  4.53%  3.16%  1.34% 
1996-97  32.10  31.52  35.32  11.85%  6.48%  3.55% 
1997-98  34.70  33.84  35.82  20.91%  14.30%  5.03% 
1998-99  36.30  36.32  36.40  26.48%  22.68%  6.71% 
1999-00  38.50  37.85  37.19  34.15%  27.85%  9.04% 
2000-01  38.20  37.29  37.66  33.10%  25.97%  10.43% 
2001-02  39.10  38.61  38.34  36.24%  30.42%  12.40% 
2002-03  39.70  39.95  39.14  38.33%  34.95%  14.76% 
2003-04  40.90  40.72  39.78  42.51%  37.56%  16.63% 
2004-05  42.40  42.43  40.47  47.74%  43.34%  18.66% 
2005-06  43.21  41.74  40.97  50.56%  40.98%  20.12% 
2006-07  46.22  46.48  41.52  61.04%  57.02%  21.72% 
2007-08  49.01  48.55  42.13  70.76%  63.99%  23.53% 
2008-09  50.70  50.42  42.09  76.65%  70.31%  23.41% 
 
The actual growth is slightly more than the growth predicted but considerably more than the 
growth under the counterfactual scenario. The differences between the scenarios can now be 
measured. This will give us the consumer surplus. 
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The complete calculation that has been used to determine the differences between the 
growth that has actually occurred and the growth that would have occurred anyway can now 
be measured, therefore –  
                 
       
  
        
        
               
    
        
    
   
This will give us the change in PKm which can then be divided by the Revenue PKm 
Unstandardised Coefficient B for Model 20 for each year since 1994/95 to calculate the 
change in consumer surplus. Using the model: 
     
      
    
                 
Where: 
∆CS = Change in Consumer Surplus and: 
∆PKM(n) = (A1 – A0) x (1 - Growth that would have occurred anyway) and: 
5.69 = Model 20 RevPKm Unstandardised Coefficient B. 
 
Table 5-12 shows the changes in percentage growth that can be attributed to privatisation. 
The third column gives the actual increase in PKm and then the fourth column shows the fare 
parameters in pence per Km that can be attributed to privatisation in the form of consumer 
surplus. The data set starts at 1995 as this is the actual start of privatisation and any surplus 
prior to this, although may be due to the privatisation initiative, was gained while the rail 
industry was still under nationalised management structure. 
   Dawn Louise Robins         
 
160 
 
Table 5-12  Consumer Surplus 
 
Privatisation 
Effect 
Growth due to 
Privatisation 
Actual Increase 
in PKm (Bil) 
Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
(£bil) 
1995-96  57.68%  0.026125222  0.749793883  0.131773969 
1996-97  45.26%  0.053617272  1.538815702  0.270442127 
1997-98  64.83%  0.135522662  3.889500403  0.683567733 
1998-99  70.40%  0.186412576  5.350040942  0.940253241 
1999-00  67.55%  0.230666086  6.620116659  1.163465142 
2000-01  59.84%  0.198076132  5.684784999  0.99908348 
2001-02  59.25%  0.214690717  6.16162359  1.082886395 
2002-03  57.78%  0.221454664  6.355748843  1.117003312 
2003-04  55.73%  0.236892092  6.79880303  1.194868722 
2004-05  56.94%  0.271805937  7.800830403  1.370971951 
2005-06  50.90%  0.257332016  7.385428861  1.297966408 
2006-07  61.90%  0.377845063  10.8441533  1.905826591 
2007-08  63.23%  0.447377144  12.83972403  2.256542009 
2008-09  66.70%  0.511231709  14.67235006  2.578620396 
Total 
     
16.99327148 
The total change in consumer surplus over the privatisation period stands at £16.993 (bn). 
This has to be discounted to account for net present value. Using the Government 
recommended rate of 3.5% NPV it can be said that the consumer surplus that can be 
attributed to the privatisation initiative stands at £12.3422 (bn) and that the privatisation of 
the rail industry generated a consumer benefit. It can, therefore, be said that there has been a 
significant benefit to consumers – rail users – from the privatisation initiative. This is 
unsurprising when you consider that a counterfactual scenario was looking to increased fares 
and a stagnated service whereas a privatised industry has seen a considerable increase in the 
quantity of service and in many instances quality (PPM has risen over the period). The first 
stage of the cost benefit analysis can therefore suggest that the privatisation initiative has 
generated a benefit of more than £12 bn to the User stakeholder group.  
This is just the first stage of the process though; there are other stakeholders that need to be 
assessed for costs and benefits. The next section looks at the operators of the railways and 
calculates the change in revenue. This is carried out in much the same way as the consumer 
surplus has been and is the subject of the next section. 
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5.7.1  Change in Revenue 
To calculate the change in revenue we substitute in the previous model the following: 
F is based on the forecast PKm times the actual RevPKm,  
C is based on the counterfactual PKm times the counterfactual RevPKm.  
                 
       
  
   
        
               
    
        
    
   
Whereas the consumer surplus looked at how much extra consumers were prepared to pay, 
the change in revenue shows how much extra – or less – the passengers actually pay for the 
service that they receive. This will determine the increase in revenue to the operators and will 
highlight the amount of cost or benefit to the Operator stakeholder group.  
The first stage is to calculate each bracket of the equation shown above to give the change in 
revenue for the three scenarios. The results as shown in Table 5-13 
Table 5-13 Actual, Counterfactual and Forecast Revenue (£bn) 
 
AcRev  PfRev  CfRev 
1992-93  3.338313  3.235217  3.4013104 
1993-94  3.354525  3.34952  3.36442362 
1994-95  3.23479  3.336611  3.43046792 
1995-96  3.42576  3.487418  3.49015525 
1996-97  3.62793  3.562736  3.54590938 
1997-98  3.83656  3.741264  3.599174 
1998-99  4.07748  4.079409  3.65084108 
1999-00  4.3784  4.304253  3.70147946 
2000-01  4.30038  4.198063  3.75146219 
2001-02  4.39952  4.344208  3.80104002 
2002-03  4.46886  4.496955  3.85038521 
2003-04  4.60318  4.583083  3.89961844 
2004-05  4.7817  4.785474  3.9488258 
2005-06  5.032031  4.860277  3.99806967 
2006-07  5.41287  5.443881  4.04739592 
2007-08  5.776701  5.722408  4.09683875 
2008-09  6.004012  5.970811  4.14642393 
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Once this has been completed the actual equation itself is calculated to give the change in 
revenue and subsequent cost or benefit that has been felt by the operators due to the 
privatisation initiative. The change in revenue can is shown in Table 5-14. 
Table 5-14 Change in Revenue 
 
  Actual  Counterfactual  Forecast  Change in Revenue  NPV 3.5% 
1994-95 
       
 
1995-96  0.059036  0.017399181  0.045198  0.036309874   
1996-97  0.121535  0.033651811  0.067771  0.061186417   
1997-98  0.186031  0.049178738  0.121277  0.110593539   
1998-99  0.260508  0.06423997  0.222621  0.185335457   
1999-00  0.353535  0.079001333  0.290007  0.257227667   
2000-01  0.329416  0.093571572  0.258182  0.210026987   
2001-02  0.360064  0.108023778  0.301982  0.231263209   
2002-03  0.381499  0.122408166  0.347761  0.247215686   
2003-04  0.423023  0.13675992  0.373574  0.268160598   
2004-05  0.47821  0.151104133  0.434232  0.311802629   
2005-06  0.555597  0.165458988  0.456651  0.354287019   
2006-07  0.67333  0.179837859  0.63156  0.48159782   
2007-08  0.785804  0.19425071  0.715036  0.572327953   
2008-09  0.856075  0.20870506  0.789484  0.629765912   
Total 
     
£3.957100(bn)  £2.84(bn) 
The total change in revenue is £3.957 (bn) and is a positive increase therefore a benefit rather 
than a cost. The change in revenue should also be converted using the Governments 
recommended NPV 3.5% before comparing in the final cost benefit analysis in the next 
chapter.  
This gives a change in revenue of £2.84bn 
The consumer surplus far outweighs the change in revenue that has been seen. More 
passengers have travelled which has increased the amount of revenue but because the price 
has been kept low the actual revenue received per passenger kilometre has reduced. The 
interesting result here is that the forecast always underestimate the actual total revenue 
increases. This may be because the model doesn’t take into account price discrimination – it 
assumes a standard fare per km is charged. It could be argued that as a result one of the 
benefits of privatisation is missed (private firms are better at maximising revenue yield). In six 
of the years the actual revenue is greater than the counterfactual revenue increase.  Dawn Louise Robins         
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5.8  Conclusion 
The preparation and development of defining the benefits of the privatisation policy initiative 
have been rigorously considered and the arguments for choosing the variables and 
methodology relate to the previous research that has been carried out by others. The 
calculation for the benefits to consumers and operators is sound and suggests that consumers 
have benefited far in excess of the train operating companies. The reasons given to underpin 
this finding are situated within the regulatory framework that has developed during 
privatisation. We will see in the next chapter how the operators have held their own when it 
comes to achieving profits despite the continued tightening of the franchise contracts and 
deliverables demanded by the DfT. 
It is also worth noting at this point that the findings for the consumer surplus and the change 
in revenue are only as good as the counterfactual that has been devised. It is not a definitive 
figure and does not represent the actual monetary benefit that has actually occurred. It does, 
however, represent the total amount of benefit in monetary terms that has been felt, by the 
consumers and operators, if the counterfactual scenario that has been devised is a correct 
assumption of what would have happened if privatisation had not occurred. 
Many consumers will argue that the loss of restaurant cars, manned stations, guards vans and 
other costly and loss making or capacity reducing measures, along with the increased 
opportunity fares and confusion around the multitude of differing fares and ticket structure,  
has not amounted to more than £12 (bn) of savings/benefits. It should therefore be 
highlighted that this perceived increase in benefit is compared to what would have been felt 
under a nationalised railway that was run according to the constraints of a Treasury funded 
industry. 
One of the issues with estimating the benefits was around the fare structure, or revenue per 
passenger kilometre. Profits are made, and conversely benefits are felt, on different routes to 
different degrees. The only way of using revenue as a guide to price and income was through 
the generalised revenue per passenger kilometre data and this does not give a comprehensive 
account of where the benefits have been felt the most. Disaggregating the data by sector or 
ticket type would have helped to identify and allocate more proficiently but not all data is 
collected in this manner and therefore a direct disaggregation of parts was not possible. 
Whelan (2010) also found this when looking at modelling long time series data and also 
pointed out that seasonality is also a feature. Whelan suggests that the volatility can be Dawn Louise Robins         
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reduced through estimation of the underlying trend (Whelan et al. 2010) and this is something 
that can be considered as additional research to the model developed here. 
The benefits to consumers and operators are now ready to be included in the final cost 
benefit table that will quantify the total costs and benefits of the privatisation policy initiative 
to all stakeholders. Before this can occur the actual and counterfactual costs of the 
privatisation policy have to be calculated and this is the topic of the next chapter.  
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6  Costs of the Railway Industry 
6.1  Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the user and operator benefits by way of calculating the 
consumer surplus and change in revenue. This tells us how much user benefit has been 
generated over and above that which would have been expected and would have happened 
anyway. It does not tell us how much of a welfare benefit this is or where the costs have been 
felt the most.  
In order to ascertain the impact of privatisation we must include the costs of the privatisation 
initiative to the industry. The difficulties in collecting cost data has already been discussed and 
will be further investigated in this chapter. To achieve the aims of this research the cost of the 
actual privatisation process should be accounted for and this will also include the income 
generated from the sale of the different companies. The actual operational costs include 
investment and subsidies although the subsidy is a benefit to the operators and Network Rail, 
it is a cost to the Government. Collecting data for the costs – where the data was obtained, 
the format and extrapolation needed, and the assumptions that needed to be made - are 
described first followed by an explanation of the costs and the calculation of welfare benefit.  
6.1.1  Collecting Data for the Costs 
Calculating the cost of running the rail industry both before and after privatisation has been a 
difficult process. The data has been found to be elusive in some areas and, where it is 
available, the format that has been used for collection and reporting has not been consistent 
over the time period of the research. The majority of the cost data for the period after 
privatisation has been kindly given by Andrew Smith (Smith, 2006). Smith has devised a 
specific cost methodology to ascertain the total costs since privatisation and then the 
disaggregated costs for the different stakeholders. Smith uses Total Cash Costs as the basis for 
the data collection and, where relevant, the operating grants (such as level crossing grants) 
and capital grants (such as regional development grants) have been added back into operating 
and capital costs in order to construct measures of gross costs (Smith, 2006). Achieving the 
same methodology as Smith was not without difficulty as Smith’s data does not go beyond the 
Hatfield incident and changes that took place in reorganising the industry structure and 
responsibility for the different activities. Nevertheless, attempts were made to ensure that Dawn Louise Robins         
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the data separation and aggregation was consistent with the methodology based on the 
knowledge that was available. 
The costs prior to privatisation have also been collected and the same methodology used to 
throughout the entire research time frame. The Retail Price Index used for the benefit section 
(RPI from The Office of National Statistics) has also been used for the costs and to ensure 
consistency the data received from Andrew Smith has been taken back to original prices and 
then recalculated using the RPI index from the Office for National Statistics (Figure 6-1).  
Figure 6-1 RPI Calculation 
 
2005 prices = x   original prices = y  RPI = z  
therefore:    y * z = x 
           z = x / y 
           z = RPI increase 
The RPI used for changing the data was 106 = 2005/06 prices 
 
 
This ensures consistency throughout the data series and the whole research. The RPI 2008 
prices mean that all data for the 2008/09 period are real prices that are also current prices 
and therefore do not need adjusting. Although this process was time consuming and open to 
marginal error it does mean that any calculations made using the cost and benefit currency 
data will be directly comparable if compared to any other data compiled elsewhere in this 
research. 
Infrastructure expenditure has been calculated from the Annual Returns for maintenance and 
renewals/enhancements and other operating costs taken from the NR Accounts (minus 
maintenance costs). Data was recalculated where necessary into 2008 prices for each column 
rather than totalling and then recalculating; therefore, all totals are the sum of the 
recalculated 2008 price data.  The current prices for 2008/09 have been taken from the 
National Rail Trends and the Network Rail Annual Accounts. Train operating data is from the 
TOC Annual Accounts and Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR). An example of how the data was 
calculated for the individual years and variable type is shown below: Dawn Louise Robins         
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TOC costs = OPEX+CAPEX for train operations therefore for 2008/09 the total costs for 
TOCs was: OPEX £8182.22m + CAPEX £173.200m = £8355.42. No price change needs to be 
made as this is the price year used (ORR 2009a).  
Total TOC data = OPEX + CAPEX – Access Charges. Access Charges paid during 2008/09 
were £1,976m therefore Total TOC Costs = £6,379.42. (ORR 2009a) 
This total is slightly higher than anticipated and could account for the reduction in access 
charges paid and the rebate received:  
“Franchised track access income was £0.4 billion lower than assumed in the Access Charging 
Regime (ACR) 2003. This is due to the net effect of a £0.6 billion rebate of track access charges 
to train operators offset by £0.2 billion higher income than assumed in the ACR2003 as a result 
of outperformance of the schedule 8 regime and higher income from the usage charge and 
traction electricity charge
20” (ORR 2009a).  
Costs attributed by different stakeholders in one year and offset by others in other years is a 
problem for consistency of comparison with the benefits although should not affect the final 
totals. This also highlights the continually changing policy for rail expenditure and the problem 
of using the Control Periods as indications of where costs are attributed. Changes in 
Government, policy, general economy, and additional events outside of the rail industry, have 
all played a part in altering the allocated fund amounts and specific direction. 
In 1994/95 the first payments of ‘access charges’ were made to Railtrack from the general 
operating budget. The operating expenditure therefore includes access charges from this year 
onwards.  
“At 2008 prices the operating expenditure for 1994/95 was £3,501.9mil and access 
charges were £3,231.214mil” (ORR 2009a).  
The breakdown of costs for the years prior to privatisation has not been easy to find although 
using a cash-based method for the total costs has made the collection simpler. There was a 
change in accounting procedures in 1985 when calculations for the year moved from calendar 
year to financial year. The data for 1985 was therefore given in the Annual Accounts for a 
15month period. Adjustments have been made by BR for this event and the figures used are 
                                                             
 
20 Network Rail’s regulatory accounts, ACR2003 and Network Rail business plan 2007 as shown in the Annual 
Assessment of NR 2008/09 Dawn Louise Robins         
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the adjusted figures that cover a 12 month period. The accounting data for 1984-1986 were 
affected by the national coal strike. As this affected many industries, and also the general 
consumer, the impact is difficult to build into the accounting results. The data for 1986-1989 
were also affected by the sale of many BR businesses. This will have had an impact on the 
number of employees (approximately 13,000 according to Smith 2002) and also the BR cost 
base. The trend for BR business sell offs started in the early 1980’s and gives rise to the 
question of whether it is possible to compare the costs of British Rail against the privatised 
industry (Smith, 2006). To this end, careful consideration has been given to the data that has 
been collected, and the parameters that this data is then used in the analysis, as it is 
important that double accounting does not occur and the transition costs and sale of BR 
companies appear only once in the totals rather than throughout the timeframe.  
The Company Accounts for British Rail were requested from 1979-1995 and these were used 
to underpin the data that was already in the data collection table, to fill in any gaps that were 
proving difficult to fill, and to ensure that the data collection was as rigorous as possible by 
comparing data collected from other sources. The accounts also came with their own set of 
difficulties. The methodology of reporting used in the accounts has also changed over the 
years and the breakdowns of costs and to whom they are attributed seemed to vary. This will 
mean that in order to have a continuous timeline of disaggregated costs certain assumptions 
will have to be made where the data is not available in the format needed. Where this is 
applicable a description of the assumptions and method of calculation will be given. It was 
considered whether in some instances leaving gaps in the data set would be preferable to the 
inclusion of estimated data but the inability of using a completed timeline would render the 
exercise less rigorous than any estimation made based on real events.  
Although the majority of data prior to privatisation has been taken from the BR resource 
accounts and the RPI adjusted to 2008 prices, in some instances, the data for investment has 
been taken from Gourvish (2002). Calculating investment – capital expenditure (CAPEX) – 
from the annual accounts has proven difficult and it has been necessary to compare costs to 
the data collected by Gourvish and, where comparisons are favourable, gaps have been filled 
using this data. For certain years, where the breakdown has not included a specific column but 
where total costs are known and data for either OPEX or CAPEX is known, the total for the 
missing data has been calculated from the totals. The following two tables (Table 6-1 & Table 
6-2) give the rail costs in 2008 prices from 1979 to 2009 and highlights where data has been 
altered or calculated as well as the source of the data. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 6-1 Infrastructure Operating Costs for the Rail Industry 1979-2009 (2008 prices) 
   Maintenance  Renewals and 
Enhancements 
Other 
Operating  
Total Operating 
Costs 
1979/80
21  1918.877  871.7  1309.066  4099.643
22 
1980/81  1909.308  879.54  1292.988  4081.836 
1981/82  1834.217  797.86  1447.054  4079.131 
1982/83  1812.07  651.9  1450.08  3914.05 
1983/84  1759.362  827.31  1424.137  4010.809 
1984/85
23  2468.804  836.27  1914.986  5220.06 
1985/86  1978.078  910.27
24  1039.66  3928.008 
1986/87  1983.96  897.6  950.4  3831.96 
1987/88  1977.282  1084.54  1101.42  4163.242 
1988/89
25  1458.858  984.9  932.64  3376.398 
1989/90  387.438  1052.76  1169.94  2610.138 
1990/91  1687.68  929.9  1128.8
26  3746.38 
1991/92  1309.128  948.29  1304.1  3561.518 
1992/93  1391.068  787.4  1489.55  3668.018 
1993/94  1679.12  664.02  1260.72  3603.86 
1994/95  896.749  725.63  1068.33  2690.709 
1995/96  1142.224
27  1122.996  1039.75  3304.97 
1996/97
28  1023.767  1424.189  923.8777  3371.833 
1997/98  952.5123  1694.977  905.9883  3553.478 
1998/99  918.7511  1912.885  930.6618  3762.298 
1999/00  856.8336  2177.134  934.4613  3968.429 
2000/01  901.968  3079.697  963.4717  4945.137 
2001/02  1180.004  3518.962  1365.199  6064.164 
2002/03  1438.573  3847.941  1461.492  6748.006 
2003/04  1475.794  4710.687  1551.949  7738.431 
2004/05  1460.971  4007.038  1418.441  6886.45 
2005/06  1338.4  3523.52  1384.32  6246.24 
2006/07  1252.215  3656.226  1273.574  6182.015 
                                                             
 
21 Operating Costs for the first five years of the research were taken from BR accounts and recalculated 
into 2008 prices 
22 Rolling stock data from DfT NRT has been subtracted from the BR Annual Accounting data to give 
these totals as the original accounts include this as a CAPEX for the dates 1979-1984 
23 Although adjusted for change in accounting procedures the effect of the coal strike is evident 
24 Renewals from this point until 1997 have been taken from Gourvish 2002 and recalculated into 2008 
prices 
25 Data for 1988-1990 has been reallocated according to cost provision between TOC costs and NR 
costs. Train provision has been identified as rolling stock costs, train maintenance is a TOC cost and 
terminal maintenance adjusted to cover both TOC and NR. 
26 From 1990-1995 ‘other operating costs’ are calculated by taking the maintenance and renewal costs 
from the total costs as no exact data is available 
27 Although the total amount for this year has been calculated from the actual accounts the breakdown 
was not available. Therefore this year’s breakdown has been extrapolated from the total using an 
average of the previous two and future two years 
28 Data from this date forward until 2007 has been given with the kind permission of Andrew Smith Dawn Louise Robins         
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2007/08
29  1191.824  4228.949  1209.896  6630.669 
2008/09  1104  4710  1360  7174 
 
Table 6-2 Passenger Service Costs and Total Industry Costs 1979-2009 (2008 prices) 
   TOC-own operating 
costs 
Rolling 
stock 
CAPEX
30 
Total Passenger 
Service Costs 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 
COSTS 
1979/80   2706.818  352.47  3059.288  7158.931 
1980/81  2739.735  401.25  3140.985  7222.821 
1981/82  2717.029  312.83  3029.859  7108.99 
1982/83  2502.13  270.3  2772.43  6686.48 
1983/84  2669.909  164.45  2834.359  6845.168 
1984/85   3122.878  142.19  3265.068  8485.128 
1985/86  2428.9  181.6  2610.5  6538.508 
1986/87  2282.94  178.2  2461.14  6293.1 
1987/88  2724.198  217.33  2941.528  7104.77 
1988/89   2786.714  418.08  3382.683  6759.081 
1989/90  3531.21  435.24  4092.001  6702.139 
1990/91  2402.286  559.3  2961.586  6707.966 
1991/92  2818.133  729.33  3547.463  7108.981 
1992/93  2908.99  832.35  3741.34  7409.358 
1993/94  2232.561  645.66  2878.221  6482.081 
1994/95  3231.21
31  536.4  3767.6  6458.309 
1995/96  3122.741  288  3410.741  6715.711 
1996/97   4009.256  70.31106  4079.567  7451.4 
1997/98  3856.389  155.0577  4011.447  7564.924 
1998/99  3798.116  231.9187  4030.035  7792.333 
1999/00  3799.118  307.1094  4106.228  8074.657 
2000/01  4243.469  698.2857  4941.755  9886.891 
2001/02  4467.092  1143.528  5610.62  11674.78 
2002/03  4851.89  691.0885  5542.979  12290.98 
2003/04  5047.138  913.0746  5960.213  13698.64 
2004/05  5217.937  1031.277  6249.215  13135.66 
2005/06  5434.768  624.2342  6059.002  12305.24 
2006/07  4994.736  351.9612  5346.697  11528.71 
2007/08   5012.455  416.755  5429.21  12059.88 
2008/09  6379.42  345.627  6725.047  13899.05 
                                                             
 
29 Data from this point has been collected from resource accounts and calculated using Smiths 
methodology 
30 Rolling Stock data obtained from the DfT National Rail Trends (from various year books recalculated 
to 2008 prices) 
31 First year of access charges paid Dawn Louise Robins         
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It is immediately apparent from the tables that the cost structure over the 30 year period has 
altered as the objectives of the railways and the changing policy implications have taken 
effect. Renewal costs have quadrupled but maintenance costs have seen a reduction. Train 
operating costs have remained fairly steady prior to privatisation but increased substantially 
since. Although total industry costs have doubled over the time period it is important to 
remember that the actual service delivered and amount of passengers now using the railways 
has also increased substantially.  
The next section will look at the data collection in greater detail taking in turn each 
stakeholder before the final costs are calculated against a counterfactual to find the final 
welfare cost/benefit of the industry after privatisation. 
6.2   The Actual and Counterfactual Cost of Running the Infrastructure 
Although the costs identify a significant increase in expenditure and suggest an overwhelming 
disbenefit to the privatisation initiative there needs to be some balance set and an argument 
put forward to a counterfactual scenario. The counterfactual is calculated in exactly the same 
way as the counterfactual for the benefits section – forecasting five year centred moving 
averages. The moving averages are again calculated on a yearly basis across the research 
period with the start of the impact of the costs and benefits of privatisation again deemed to 
have started at 1992; therefore, the moving averages only go as far as 1992 and the 
forecasting begins from there on. The following table (Table 6-3) outlines the expected 
(counterfactual) cost increases compared with the actual increases for the infrastructure 
costs. 
   Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 6-3 Total Costs and Counterfactual Costs of the Infrastructure 
 
Maintena
nce Costs 
Counterfa
ctual 
Maintena
nce Costs 
Renewals 
& 
Enhance
ments 
Counterfa
ctual 
Renewals 
& 
Enhance
ments 
Other 
Operating 
Costs  
Counterfa
ctual 
Other 
Operating 
Costs 
Total 
Operating 
Costs 
Counterfa
ctual 
Total 
Operating 
Costs 
1979/80  1918.877 
 
871.7 
 
1309.066 
 
4099.643   
1980/81  1909.308 
 
879.54 
 
1292.988 
 
4081.836   
1981/82  1834.217 
 
797.86 
 
1447.054 
 
4079.131   
1982/83  1812.07  1901.76  651.9  802.119  1450.08  1445.257  3914.05  4149.136 
1983/84  1759.362  1963.629  827.31  801.649  1424.137  1480.516  4010.809  4245.794 
1984/85  2468.804  1985.481  836.27  814.696  1914.986  1405.518  5220.06  4205.695 
1985/86  1978.078  2016.976  910.27  867.934  1039.66  1320.987  3928.008  4205.897 
1986/87  1983.96  2003.447  897.6  926.957  950.4  1236.971  3831.96  4167.375 
1987/88  1977.282  1765.26  1084.54  964.365  1101.42  1113.317  4163.242  3842.941 
1988/89  1458.858  1528.083  984.9  987.977  932.64  1047.726  3376.398  3563.786 
1989/90  387.438  1431.56  1052.76  995.009  1169.94  1092.01  2610.138  3518.579 
1990/91  1687.68  1305.456  929.9  970.364  1128.8  1166.193  3746.38  3442.013 
1991/92  1309.128  1268.861  948.29  908.562  1304.1  1237.814  3561.518  3415.237 
1992/93  1391.068  1341.818  787.4  843.761  1489.55  1260.461  3668.018  3541.463 
1993/94  1679.12  1338.203  664.02  830.3576  1260.72  1265.488  3603.86  3628.038 
1994/95  896.749  1260.154  725.63  837.6534  1068.33  1243.088  2690.709  3545.348 
1995/96  1142.224  1185.838  1122.996  841.5675  1039.75  1225.062  3304.97  3471.087 
1996/97  1023.767  1113.87  1424.189  843.3558  923.8777  1209.784  3371.833  3402.124 
1997/98  952.5123  1043.427  1694.977  843.7623  905.9883  1196.294  3553.478  3336.605 
1998/99  918.7511  974.0047  1912.885  843.2444  930.6618  1184  3762.298  3273.39 
1999/00  856.8336  905.2831  2177.134  842.092  934.4613  1172.526  3968.429  3211.756 
2000/01  901.968  837.0532  3079.697  840.4943  963.4717  1161.628  4945.137  3151.232 
2001/02  1180.004  769.1752  3518.962  838.5779  1365.199  1151.142  6064.164  3091.503 
2002/03  1438.573  701.5536  3847.941  836.4293  1461.492  1140.956  6748.006  3032.352 
2003/04  1475.794  634.1218  4710.687  834.1088  1551.949  1130.993  7738.431  2973.629 
2004/05  1460.971  566.8325  4007.038  831.6593  1418.441  1121.196  6886.45  2915.228 
2005/06  1338.4  499.6516  3523.52  829.1115  1384.32  1111.527  6246.24  2857.072 
2006/07  1252.215  432.5543  3656.226  826.4881  1273.574  1101.955  6182.015  2799.105 
2007/08  1191.824  365.5219  4228.949  823.8058  1209.896  1092.459  6630.669  2741.284 
2008/09  1104  298.5407  4710  821.0772  1360  1083.024  7174  2683.578 
 
Renewals and enhancements are the main area that has seen the largest increase in costs 
compared to the counterfactual. A counterfactual scenario would have seen limited renewal 
or enhancements as the network would have continued to have been run on a stagnated 
basis. There may have been increases after the Labour Government implemented a 
sustainable transport policy but the funds to maintain this would have been from the Treasury 
and would have been limited. There has been a significant increase in renewals since 
privatisation including CrossRail and the West Coast mainline. Flybjerg found that cost over-
runs for rail occur at around 42% compared with road building at 20% (Flyvbjerg, 2007a), and Dawn Louise Robins         
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Chevroulet, in a recent article on transport over-runs, found that one in four projects achieved 
cost over-runs of more than 20% (Chevroulet et al., 2011). It is possible that this explains 
some of the significant cost increases that have been seen since privatisation. 
The actual maintenance costs initially fell after privatisation and then rose considerably after 
the Hatfield Crash. The costs have reduced since Hatfield and coupled with the efficiency gains 
enforced by the ORR on Network Rail have managed to fall below pre-privatisation levels in 
recent years. The counterfactual maintenance costs were expected to reduce after 
privatisation. This is in-line with the decision by the Conservative Government to run the 
network with increased fares and a stagnated service. Maintenance would be minimal, and 
only where necessary, and the efficiency gains from the OfQ initiative would have seen a 
continued reduction in costs. Figure 6-2 shows the reduction in maintenance since 
privatisation and clearly highlights the increase post-Hatfield. 
Figure 6-2 Actual and Counterfactual Maintenance Costs 
 
 
The decrease in maintenance immediately after privatisation is evident from the graph and 
the increase after Hatfield is also apparent, but it is also seen that maintenance costs fell after 
the essential maintenance had been completed. Prior to the OfQ initiative, and changes in 
accounting that this entailed, there was a significant decrease in maintenance costs. The rise 
after the instigation of OfQ will have to take accounting changes into consideration. The final 
cost calculations for Total Operating and Total Industry are correct and will therefore absorb 
any anomalies in the accounting procedure by aggregation. 
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The increase in renewals and enhancements has far exceeded the counterfactual by more 
than five times the amount and this is clearly highlighted in the graph. Accounting changes will 
have impacted on the data and is something that is hard to quantify. Changes to the Rail 
objectives by the Labour Government can be identified through the increase in renewals that 
will include the Crossrail and Thameslink lines as well as the Western Mainline upgrade. 
Renewals and enhancements remained steady during the pre-privatisation period and were 
expected under a Conservative Government to decrease as cost efficiency methods took 
effect (Figure 6-3). The change in Government and therefore change in priority towards an 
integrated transport plan meant the renewals sector increased to accommodate extra lines, 
extra capacity and predicted growth. The anomaly that is apparent is that none of this 
additional infrastructure renewal was planned until the 10 Year Plan for the Transport 2000 
report (DfT 2000); therefore the increase in costs for renewals prior to 2000 must be 
interpreted as being due to the switch to Modern Equivalent Asset Valuations (MEA) which 
change the rate of the historic depreciation values, or as a product of the infrastructure 
privatisation methodology in the form of Railtrack and the cost overruns and inefficiency that 
has been reported (Gourvish, 2008). 
Figure 6-3 Actual and Counterfactual Renewal Costs 
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For renewal costs to have risen so sharply and consistently after privatisation demands 
questions about the accountability of Railtrack to be considered and also asks why this 
increase was not questioned before the Hatfield crash pushed Railtrack firmly into the 
limelight.  
Total operating costs (Figure 6-4) for the privatisation period must therefore reflect the large 
increase in renewal costs and account for the increased maintenance after Hatfield. Total 
operating costs for the year of privatisation are considerably less than average and highlight 
either the inadequacies of the data provision during the transition years or the lack of 
comprehensive explanation on the costs during this time. 
Figure 6-4 Actual and Counterfactual Total Operating Costs 
 
 
Before concluding on the costs of operating the infrastructure, and a counterfactual scenario, 
it is important to compare them to the amount of train Km that were available to be travelled 
over the research period (Figure 6-5) as this will give an indication of whether the costs have 
increased or whether the increase in trains has meant that costs are averaged out and 
absorbed into an increased service. 
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Figure 6-5 Actual and Counterfactual Total Operating Costs per Train Km 
 
 
Overall costs were anticipated to decrease over time as the infrastructure was maintained at 
serviceable levels and renewals were kept to minimum. The counterfactual would have seen a 
stagnation of service, and little change to the train Km as seen in the previous chapter, so if 
the OfQ initiative had succeeded in commercialising the railways and increasing efficiency and 
transparency the costs per train Km would have seen the fall that is predicted in the 
counterfactual. Therefore, the costs per train Km were expected to reduce as the efficiency 
measures instigated as a result of competition took effect (Figure 6-5). The actual total costs 
per train Km have increased substantially and highlights that even though the service has 
increased the costs are still considerable higher than a counterfactual. This is not something 
that would have been predicted and, as it has been demonstrated in the literature review, the 
privatisation initiative was developed to increase cost efficiency through competition. The fact 
that the total costs have increased, and renewals in particular have increased exponentially, 
the impact of privatisation has not had the desired effect.  
There has been a considerable amount of work that has tried to explain this increase. Some of 
the blame is put to Railtrack and the fact that it was accountants that managed the 
infrastructure rather than engineers (Gourvish, 2008, Preston, 2007) and the knowledge of 
actual cost of infrastructure maintenance was lost in the desire to contract out for the 
greatest perceived value. Wheat (2008) suggests that instead of measuring cost against train 
kilometres it is more effective to use tonnage (Wheat and Smith, 2008) as heavier trains cause 
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more damage, whereas Cowie (2010) finds that the increase in operating costs is not always 
as high as it is sensationally reported in the press and he questions whether the increase 
occurred after privatisation and did not start before (Cowie, 2010b). Cowie also suggests that 
rising operational costs could also be due to imperfect competition in sub contractor markets 
that drives up costs (Cowie, 2010) coupled with an increase in managerial costs. The OfQ 
initiative had tried to address this issue and had rid British Rail of the top heavy management 
structure therefore privatisation has gained inefficiencies in this area whilst attempting to 
reduce them in others. 
When considering renewal costs on their own, there is an evident trend of reduction apparent 
prior to privatisation that is reversed at the point of privatisation (Figure 6-6). 
Figure 6-6 Actual and Counterfactual Renewal Costs per Train Km 
 
 
The explanations given above to explain the increase in renewal costs per TKm should also 
include the fact that an element of ‘privatisation effect’ is deemed to have occurred.  
Figure 6-7 graphically highlights the actual and counterfactual maintenance costs and it is 
clearly apparent that had the Hatfield Crash not have occurred the actual costs were broadly 
in line with the counterfactual. That said, it must be remembered that the Hatfield crash was 
caused by defective and poor maintenance during the Railtrack ownership and it could, 
therefore, be a lack of maintenance that was overpriced that occurred or efficiency had been 
achieved in cost but not in quality. 
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Figure 6-7 Actual and Counterfactual Maintenance Costs per Train Km 
 
 
The maintenance costs (Figure 6-7) per TKm post Hatfield do not highlight any reduction in 
trains immediately around the event – this would increase the cost per TKm – but the majority 
of trains were on a ‘go slow’ rather than cancelled although there would have been some 
cancellations. All ‘other’ costs have maintained a similar trend to the counterfactual scenario 
apart from the Hatfield Crash and subsequent increase in costs (Figure 6-8). 
Figure 6-8 Actual and Counterfactual ‘Other’ Operating Costs per Train Km 
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Costs of maintaining the infrastructure and increasing the capacity after the Transport 2000 
Plan have far outstripped the costs that it is believed would have occurred if the infrastructure 
had not been privatised. How the Labour Government would have instigated their Sustainable 
Transport Plan under a nationalised structure is open to suggestion – by the time this came 
about the OfQ would have been running for a decade. Competitive bidding for maintenance 
and renewals were seen as ineffective and control over costs was purely carried out through 
accounting procedure rather than through an understanding of the railway needs. Although 
this may provide an explanation for the increase in costs it does not answer the immediate 
question of why this occurred and why it was not confronted earlier. The costs of maintaining 
the railway, when compared to the counterfactual scenario, clearly show that there will need 
to be a significant benefit from privatisation to outweigh any of these costs that have been 
incurred.  
The next section looks at the Operator costs – the previous chapter looked at the benefits – 
and explores how much of a difference the privatisation initiative has had on the costs of 
running the service.  
6.3  Train Operator Costs 
Train Operator costs are deemed to be those costs directly attributable to operating the 
trains. This will include train leasing post privatisation and the cost of purchase prior to 
privatisation. The responsibility for costs and proportion of total costs has changed over the 
research period and separating out the different parts has been fraught with difficulties due 
to accounting procedure changes and itemisation of the parts. Some costs have been the 
direct responsibility of the TOCs since privatisation but others will have a shared responsibility 
with NR. In some instances the cost is described within the franchise agreement and cannot 
be trimmed or removed by the TOC. An example of one of these costs was catering. Catering 
on the long distance routes was seen as a specification of the franchise. Passenger use of the 
catering service was declining
32 and the cost outweighed the perceived benefit. Until recently, 
as the catering was a requirement it had to be provided, but now the requirement has been 
removed from the franchise agreement the catering service has also been removed.  
Accounting differences over the time period are only one reason that cost the calculation has 
proven difficult to obtain. Changes in franchise ownership and the franchise map, difficulty in 
obtaining cost data from the current franchisees, and changes in the regulatory regime and 
                                                             
 
32 No judgement as to why this was the case is made here Dawn Louise Robins         
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grant or subsidy quotas have all played a significant role in altering the manner in which costs 
can be identified. Some franchises are currently at the stage of the franchise where they pay 
the DfT a premium for operating the service whereas other franchises are still in receipt of an 
operating subsidy. The original franchise map contained 25 different franchises whereas the 
current franchise map has only 18 franchises. In some cases franchises have been absorbed 
into another franchise and in other instances the franchise route has been given to more than 
one franchise. In some cases this will have altered the sector that the franchise was originally 
counted in. Some of the long distance routes will now contain routes previously counted in 
the regional sector or L&SE sector and conversely, routes previously regional or L & SE will 
have changed sector. The changes will also have affected the cost of staffing, frequency and 
cost of running the trains, and may have affected maintenance costs.  
Pre-privatisation costs cannot be disaggregated into individual operators. Some accounting 
has been made in the annual reports for sector costs in some years, but not for all years, and 
where accounting measures have been taken they tend to be for operating costs only and do 
not account for capital costs. Once OfQ was instigated in 1990 the profit centres began 
reporting on their individual remits. This was a completely new management structure and 
meant the data reported differed significantly from previous years. What can be identified 
though is a general overview of operator costs since privatisation and a breakdown of the 
current individual operator costs and costs by sector. These cost calculations will enable an 
overview of the passenger operating sector to be analysed in greater depth and will give a 
fuller understanding of the total costs used in the cost benefit analysis. The next section looks 
at the sectors Long Distance, London & SE and Regional and helps to create an understanding 
of the differences in the cost of operating in each sector. The calculations are made using the 
data taken from the TAS Rail Monitor 2010. 
6.3.1  Sector Analysis  
There has been a marked increase in capital expenditure in the Long Distance and London & 
SE sectors as well as a general increase in operating costs. On their own, the figures look bleak 
yet these costs need to be compared to the income generated and actual costs per train Km 
before any assumptions are made. Capital costs also have a long run time and should 
therefore not be taken as a comparison to future costs. Table 6-4 shows the OPEX and CAPEX 
for the three sectors for the two years 2006/07 and 2007/08. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Table 6-4 OPEX and CAPEX for the Rail Sectors 
Sector Costs                 
  
  Long Distance (InterCity)  London & SE  Regional 
   2006/07  2007/08  2006/07  2007/08  2006/07  2007/08 
Operating Costs 
(OPEX) 
2708.39  2952.72  3400.16  3546.49  1558.22  1683.01 
Capital Expenditure 
(CAPEX) 
4.1  66.2  47.1  69.7  31.9  35.7 
TOTAL  2712.49  3018.92  3447.26  3616.19  1590.12  1718.71 
Source: TAS Rail Monitor 2010 
There has been a significant increase in capital costs in the Long distance sector although this 
is only accounting for a one year increase and may not be representative of the entire 
timeline. Once the operating costs are broken down and compared to costs per train Km 
(Table 6-5), it can be seen that there has been a general fall in costs of 14% on the passenger 
railway since privatisation.  
Table 6-5 Operating Costs per Train Km by Sector 
Real Operating Costs per Train Km by Sector £km (2008 prices) 
   Long Distance (InterCity)  London & SE  Regional  National 
1996/97  27.97  16.25  13.28  17.26 
1997/98  26.72  15.6  12.55  16.45 
1998/99  25.29  14.81  11.83  15.61 
1999/00  24.8  14.73  11.54  15.36 
2000/01  21.68  13.7  10.86  14.22 
2001/02  23.49  13.27  10.39  14.62 
2002/03  24.9  13.95  10.77  15.02 
2003/04  24.01  15.18  11.51  15.83 
2004/05  22.23  14.97  11.59  15.39 
2005/06  21.29  15.65  10.61  15.02 
2006/07  20.48  15.49  12.66  14.85 
2007/08  22.08  17.26  12.62  17.12 
2008/09  20.69  17.38  13.18  17.25 
Source: TAS Rail Monitor 2010 
This is a significant drop in operating costs and this could be seen as a direct response to 
privatisation: streamlining of operations was considered to be an essential requirement that 
privatisation of the industry would produce through competition. Staff costs have been seen 
to have risen above the level of inflation and TOCs have tackled this by reducing staffing in 
many areas from 135,000 jobs in 1993 to 43,000 in 1998: a considerable reduction in light of Dawn Louise Robins         
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the increase in patronage. There is evidence that this has been an outcome of the 
privatisation initiative as it will have impacted on the reduction of train operating costs per 
Train Km. There is also evidence, as seen in previous chapters, that the reduction in staffing 
became a factor in the subsequent failure of some of the TOCs as they quickly came to realise 
that it was not possible to run the railways with the staffing numbers budgeted for in the 
franchise bidding process. All sectors show a reduction in costs per Km up until the Hatfield 
Crash although the steady rise in costs since this event has not reached the initial costs in any 
sector bar London and SE (Table 6-5). 
It is important to remember that there have been changes in the accounting procedures and a 
general reduction in access charges paid by the operators to NR due to the shift in 
Government funding to grants paid directly to NR. Compensation payments to the operators 
from NR have also impacted on the operating costs. The Hatfield incident in 2000 and the 
recent West Coast mainline delays will have had the most profound effect. As previously 
mentioned, there have been changes to the franchise map and this will have an impact on the 
final costs comparisons for each sector. In recent years the inclusion of ‘Open Access’ 
Operators on certain routes will have had an impact on the costs of operating the railways. 
Open Access Operators are not included in the cost structure and they do not pay access 
charges the same way that the franchised operators do. At present, their impact is minimal 
but the burden of choice on some routes and the differing cost structures for maintenance 
will impact on the costs and revenue of those routes affected. Preston (2010) suggests that 
the ‘niche’ open access operators currently running services are providing a ‘socially desirable’ 
service (Preston, 2010), but due to the limited amount of open access competition on the 
passenger sector the majority of the research concerns itself with freight (Drew, 2009, Cowie, 
2010a). 
6.3.2  Individual Franchise Costs 
In general terms the profit margins for the train operators has grown since privatisation quite 
considerably. Apart from the reduction in patronage during and immediately after the Hatfield 
incident in 2000 and the impact on the revenue this will have entailed, the operators have 
seen an increase in their profit margins year on year (Table 6-6). Even accounting for the 
Hatfield incident – which has been shown to have had a profound effect on the costs and 
benefits to all stakeholders so far – the drop in profit was marginal and a profit was still 
returned. There is an argument here that increased subsidies and compensation payments for Dawn Louise Robins         
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the Hatfield crash will have increased the overall profit made by the operators as the national 
‘go slow’ on all lines took its toll on passenger revenues. 
Table 6-6 Average Profit Margins for Operators since Privatisation 
TOC Profit margins    
   Operating margin % 
1995/96      
1996/97  1.2    
1997/98  3.6    
1998/99  3.5    
1999/00  3.2    
2000/01  2.2    
2001/02  3.5    
2002/03  4.3    
2003/04  4.8    
2004/05  4.3    
2005/06  3.5    
2006/07  3.7    
2007/08  4    
2008/09  3.9    
Source: TAS Rail Monitor 2010  
The average profit margins are impressive in the respect that they are sustained and generally 
increasing. This is also surprising when you consider that almost half of the original franchises 
awarded failed within the first few years and instances of Operators returning their franchises, 
although significantly reduced, is still an occurrence from time to time
33. Sustained profit is 
not necessarily true for all operators though; some have seen larger profits than others with a 
minority returning losses. Table 6-7 shows the different profit margins for each operator in 
2007/08, the revenue received and the actual costs and profits that were made for that year. 
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Table 6-7 Operating margins for 2007/08 for each Franchise Operator 
Individual Train Operators - Operating Margins 2007/08 %    
  
Operating 
margin 
Pass Rev £m 
2007/08 
Operator Profit 
£m  Operator Cost £m 
First Transpennine  14.5  106.8  15.486  91.314 
West Coast  12.7  581.66  73.87082  507.78918 
Gatwick Express  9.1  68.99  6.27809  62.71191 
Merseyrail Electrics  6.7  30.05  2.01335  28.03665 
Southern  5.7  371.39  21.16923  350.22077 
Arriva Trains Wales  4.5  75.95  3.41775  72.53225 
First ScotRail  4.4  215.46  9.48024  205.97976 
Northern Rail  4.2  147.76  6.20592  141.55408 
NX East Coast  4.2  566.31  23.78502  542.52498 
London Overground  4.2  1.33  0.05586  1.27414 
Southeastern  3.1  431.98  13.39138  418.58862 
NEX East Anglia  2.3  476.95  10.96985  465.98015 
c2c Rail  2.2  98.3  2.1626  96.1374 
East Midlands Trains  2.1  280.23  5.88483  274.34517 
South Western  2.1  536.88  11.27448  525.60552 
First Capital Connect  1.5  404.4  6.066  398.334 
New Cross Country  1.1  120.87  1.32957  119.54043 
London Midland  0.7  56.54  0.39578  56.14422 
First Great Western  -1.1  613.73  -6.75103  620.48103 
Chiltern  -3.3  92.5  -3.0525  95.5525 
TOTAL     5278.08  203.43324  5074.64676 
Source: TAS Rail Monitor 2010 
There may well be an element of compensation in the total profit margin for the West Coast 
franchise, run by a joint Virgin/Stagecoach venture, due to the severe delays by NR in 
completing the improvement works. The Gatwick Express was a premium service running half 
hourly services to London Victoria from Gatwick Airport but this has now been absorbed into 
the Southern franchise. The ticket price is considerably more than the local services and is 
favoured by commuters and visitors to Gatwick due to its non-stop journey into London. That 
said, the staffing levels are higher, and the train specification is also higher than the average 
traction, which will increase the operators costs of this service. 
Chiltern Railways are the only franchise showing a significant loss for the year 2007/08. This is 
one example of a ‘design, build, finance, transfer’ (DBFT) scheme in the rail sector and Chiltern 
Railways’ Project, Evergreen 2, was committed infrastructure expenditure as part of its 
franchise agreement. However, this franchise is unusual in that it is the only one to date 
where the franchisee has responsibility for infrastructure works. Network Rail may be moving 
towards a situation where train operating companies are allowed to take on small Dawn Louise Robins         
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infrastructure projects, of up to £25 million in value and this could have substantial 
implications for how projects are tendered in the future. 
In the majority of cases it is clear that income exceeded costs but there are a few TOCs that 
have experienced large cost increases compared to income and others that have seen large 
rises in income compared to costs. Subsidies paid by the Government to the TOCs have now 
started to fall as many of the main operators have started to pay premiums for their 
franchises. The average profit margin for 2007/08 stands at 4.05% which is more than the 
averaged aggregated profit margin of all the operators over the 15 years since privatisation 
which stands at 3.5%. In the present economic climate the profits received by the operators 
seem to be faring better than many of the other travel industries such as airlines.  
An area of contention has been, as it has been seen, that of the rolling stock leasing.  A lack of 
available rolling stock pushed up prices and reduced choice resulting in overcharging 
estimates of around £177 million a year (CC 2008). Differences in the rail infrastructure with 
regard to electrification method meant that choice of traction was limited and there were no 
guarantees of available stock at the beginning of a franchise period. Due to the varying 
lengths of the franchises investment into rolling stock became one of the largest costs to the 
TOCs (Preston, 1999a) and rolling stock replacement has not been undertaken at the level 
anticipated by the previous Government
34. This is borne out by the investment levels and age 
of rolling stock reported in the Railway Statistics yearly figures.  
When account for the profit made on average by the TOCs is taken, and compared to the 
costs incurred, it becomes apparent that there have been significant changes in the allocation 
of benefit. If costs have doubled and profits increased then it would be fair to say that 
revenue must also have increased substantially either through more ticket sales, higher ticket 
prices, or a combination of both. Therefore, although the increase in costs incurred by the 
train operators is considered a dis-benefit, the increase in patronage, and therefore increases 
in revenue, has meant that the train operators have seen increased profits since the beginning 
of privatisation. The problem seems to be that some of the benefits to the train operators 
have come at a cost to both the users – through increases in fares and reduction in service 
quality, and the government/tax payer through higher subsidies and increased investment 
and capacity measures, although it is primarily the latter.  
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Econometric Models. Sustain City. EU. Dawn Louise Robins         
 
186 
 
Track access charges, those payments made by train operators for using the track provided by 
the infrastructure owner NR, have seen significant changes over the privatised period that will 
have impacted on the profits shown by the operators. Originally, the charging regime was set 
by the Rail Regulator and much of the cost was borne by the Government in the respect of 
subsidies to the operators for running the service. The revised access charging regime came 
into force in 2001 at the start of the second control period (CP2). The subsequent changes 
after the Hatfield crash and acquisition of Railtrack by Network Rail in 2002 meant the 
charging regime was adjusted in 2004 – nearly 2 years earlier than planned. One of the main 
changes made during CP2 was the allocation of funds direct from the SRA rather than the 
TOCs. Increases in access charges were also postponed in 2004 and the money that should 
have been paid by the TOCs was now received by NR in the form of additional borrowing. The 
amounts were eventually claimed back from the TOCs in CP3 and would therefore have an 
impact on the amount of access charges paid over the period and meant significant changes in 
the reported operating costs of the operators over this time period. Investment is still 
emphasised through direct funding rather than access charges and the TOCs have therefore 
enjoyed reduced access charges in recent years.  
Recent work has looked at the impact of access charges on covering actual costs (Calvo and 
De Oña, 2012). Calvo found that the cost recovery was higher on regional railways and those 
countries that operated a full-cost recovery system achieved a higher ratio of maintenance 
and renewal costs than those who employed a marginal cost system – of which the UK is one. 
This does not have implications for this research but does underpin the difference between 
operator and government costs and would be a recommendation for policy to consider. 
Now a greater understanding of how operator costs have evolved of the time period has been 
achieved, and the changes in accounting procedures and regulation have impacted on these 
costs, a counterfactual argument can be developed to look at what would have occurred if the 
industry had not had a privatisation policy implemented. This is the topic of the next section.   
6.4  Operator Costs and the Counterfactual 
Developing a counterfactual that takes into account all the stakeholders and the changing cost 
regime was necessary in order to understand how the privatisation initiative had impacted on 
costs. Regarding total operating costs applicable to the operator, for the purpose of the cost 
benefit analysis, the costs have been disaggregated into TOC operating costs – those costs 
specific to running the trains and including access charges – and the actual cost of the trains Dawn Louise Robins         
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themselves. In the original cost methodology, by Smith (2006), the freight costs were included 
as part of the overall cost structure. For the purposes of this research they have been 
removed as the focus is on passenger rail and not total rail. Accounting for regulatory costs 
has proven difficult for the period prior to privatisation as this was not necessarily applicable 
and any comparable costs were not included in any of the final accounts. 
For the years prior to privatisation some assumptions have been made when calculating the 
total operating costs for the TOCs due to the lack of disaggregation in the annual accounts. In 
many instances costs have been disaggregated into specific services such as catering and 
station maintenance and where this has occurred they have been assigned to the appropriate 
cost column. Where costs have not been able to be assigned the total costs for the specific 
service have been split in proportion to where the responsibility for the cost lies (as 
highlighted in the original cost breakdown at the beginning of the chapter). The following 
tables (Table 6-8 and Table 6-9) show the total costs and counterfactual costs for the train 
operating (passenger service) costs. 
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Table 6-8 Actual and Counterfactual Train Operating Costs (2008 Prices) 
  TOC-own 
operating costs 
CF TOC-own 
Operating Costs 
Rolling stock 
capital 
expenditure 
CF Rolling Stock 
Capital 
Expenditure 
1979/80  2706.818    352.47   
1980/81  2739.735    401.25   
1981/82  2717.029    312.83   
1982/83  2502.13  2708.73  270.3  279.232 
1983/84  2669.909  2719.253  164.45  236.239 
1984/85  3122.878  2644.76  142.19  200.811 
1985/86  2428.9  2623.558  181.6  182.051 
1986/87  2282.94  2657.446  178.2  202.117 
1987/88  2724.198  2709.959  217.33  256.785 
1988/89  2786.714  2748.131  418.08  323.86 
1989/90  3531.21  2798.989  435.24  416.743 
1990/91  2402.286  2870.987  559.3  533.358 
1991/92  2818.133  2834.051  729.33  617.618 
1992/93  2908.99  2684.564  832.35  650.492 
1993/94  2232.561  2621.86  645.66  633.478 
1994/95  3231.2  2628.005  536.4  678.9679 
1995/96  3122.741  2629.848  288  724.6409 
1996/97  4009.256  2628.988  70.31106  770.4289 
1997/98  3856.389  2626.371  155.0577  816.2916 
1998/99  3798.116  2622.578  231.9187  862.2044 
1999/00  3799.118  2617.978  307.1094  908.1515 
2000/01  4243.469  2612.812  698.2857  954.1227 
2001/02  4467.092  2607.241  1143.528  1000.111 
2002/03  4851.89  2601.374  691.0885  1046.112 
2003/04  5047.138  2595.289  913.0746  1092.123 
2004/05  5217.937  2589.04  1031.277  1138.14 
2005/06  5434.768  2582.665  624.2342  1184.163 
2006/07  4994.736  2576.195  351.9612  1230.189 
2007/08  5012.455  2569.65  416.755  1276.219 
2008/09  6379.42  2563.045  345.627  1322.252 
It is clear that operator costs have increased under a privatisation policy. The counterfactual 
would have seen a stagnated service and a streamlining of operations under the OfQ 
initiative. The fact that costs have risen so dramatically yet Operators have continued to see a 
profit suggests the cost is being covered elsewhere – namely the Government through 
subsidy. Rolling stock increases have not risen above that of the counterfactual scenario. 
Much of this is accounted for by the problems encountered with the leasing structure and the 
difficulty of obtaining new trains. 
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Table 6-9 Total Passenger Service Actual and Counterfactual Costs and Total Industry Costs (2008 prices) 
  Total Passenger 
Service Costs 
CF Total 
Passenger Service 
Costs 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 
COSTS 
CF Total Industry 
Costs 
1979/80  3059.288    7158.931   
1980/81  3140.985    7222.821   
1981/82  3029.859    7108.99   
1982/83  2772.43  2987.962  6686.48  7137.098 
1983/84  2834.359  2955.492  6845.168  7201.286 
1984/85  3265.068  2845.571  8485.128  7051.266 
1985/86  2610.5  2805.609  6538.508  7011.506 
1986/87  2461.14  2877.351  6293.1  7044.726 
1987/88  2941.528  3014.877  7104.77  6857.818 
1988/89  3382.683  3132.679  6759.081  6696.465 
1989/90  4092.001  3276.42  6702.139  6794.999 
1990/91  2961.586  3465.033  6707.966  6907.046 
1991/92  3547.463  3494.568  7108.981  6909.805 
1992/93  3741.34  3363.137  7409.358  6857.722 
1993/94  2878.221  3335.58  6482.081  6834.114 
1994/95  3767.6  3393.789  6458.309  6803.177 
1995/96  3410.741  3448.237  6715.711  6774.293 
1996/97  4079.567  3500.32  7451.4  6746.7 
1997/98  4011.447  3550.867  7564.924  6719.945 
1998/99  4030.035  3600.385  7792.333  6693.752 
1999/00  4106.228  3649.198  8074.657  6667.944 
2000/01  4941.755  3697.515  9886.891  6642.407 
2001/02  5610.62  3745.478  11674.78  6617.063 
2002/03  5542.979  3793.183  12290.98  6591.86 
2003/04  5960.213  3840.696  13698.64  6566.761 
2004/05  6249.215  3888.066  13135.66  6541.741 
2005/06  6059.002  3935.327  12305.24  6516.78 
2006/07  5346.697  3982.504  11528.71  6491.865 
2007/08  5429.21  4029.615  12059.88  6466.986 
2008/09  6725.047  4076.675  13899.05  6438.139 
Operating the railways has also seen sustained increases in costs. Rolling stock capital costs 
are capital outlay and not operating costs such as leasing and fuel which are accounted for in 
the TOC operating costs and this is why, although important to the cost benefit analysis, the 
capital costs are not necessarily a good guide to the overall changes in rolling stock costs 
(Figure 6-9). Dawn Louise Robins         
 
190 
 
 Figure 6-9 Actual and Counterfactual Rolling Stock Capital Expenditure 
 
 
Rolling stock capital expenditure has a cyclical nature in the sense that rolling stock has an 
approximate lifetime of 30 years. It therefore stands to reason that if a high percentage of 
stock is replaced on a given year it will be a considerable time before such outlay is seen 
again. It may be that the leasing of the trains makes up a large portion of the train operators 
expenditure – an expense that cannot be escaped from. 
According to Harris and Godward (1997) the leasing regime was based on an ‘indifference 
pricing’ principle where costs were distributed depending on the type and age of the train 
with the end result being that the total cost to the TOC was the same regardless of the 
traction used. Although this standardised the cost and attempted to stop Operators from 
choosing cheaper but possibly unsuitable rolling stock it did not give the incentive to renew 
stock at the speed the industry needed. It also had the negative effect of taking yet another 
controllable cost away from the Operators giving them little opportunity to make efficiency 
choices and reducing the rolling stock market to a virtual monopoly. Figure 6-10 highlights the 
significant overall cost increases experienced after privatisation which Harris and Godward 
estimate to be doubled from £400,000 in 1990 to approximately £800,000 per vehicle in 1995 
(Harris and Godward, 1997). It also takes into account the change from historic cost 
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Figure 6-10 Diagrammatic Comparisons of Train Ownership Costs before and after Privatisation 
 
Source: Modern Railways Dec 1993 cited in Harris & Godward 1997 p72 
This increase in cost will have impacted considerably on the Operators and highlights the lack 
of incentive to replace trains when there is limited cost reduction through increased leasing 
costs being outweighed by the reduction in maintenance.  
TOC operating costs have also seen large increases considering the stability that was seen 
prior to privatisation (Figure 6-11) over and above the increase in rolling stock. The coal strike 
and fuel increases are clearly apparent prior to privatisation and there is evidence of cost 
reduction for the three years before the Hatfield Crash – yet it was during this time of cost 
reduction that many of the franchisees failed (Gourvish, 2008). The costs of operating the 
railways for the TOCs is now twice that which is calculated as the counterfactual, but it must 
also be remembered that there has been a substantial rise in PKm that may offset some of the 
increases. The increase in costs cannot be absorbed by the TOCs who have budgeted for 
specific cost margins in the original franchise bids and due to the lack of manoeuvrability 
within the specification are limited in their ability to adapt to cost increases. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Figure 6-11 Actual and Counterfactual Train Operating Costs 
 
 
The increase in costs apparent during the last few years forced many TOCs to look for cost 
efficiency and increased revenue in the most inventive and apparently news worthy ways - 
charging for seat reservations and adding large premiums to the first class upgrade at 
weekends are just two of the minor, but publicly unacceptable revenue streams that have 
been utilised by TOCs (TSC, 2009b). Any increases to the degree seen recently would need 
either subsidy cover or extra revenue streams else the franchise could fail; therefore, many of 
the costs must be absorbed by the rise in subsidy that has also been apparent since 
privatisation. In order to ascertain how much of an increase the costs have been in real terms 
the total costs must be compared to the amount of TKm over the period in just the same way 
that has been done for the other costs and benefits (Figure 6-12).  
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Figure 6-12 Actual and Counterfactual Train Operating Costs per TKm 
 
 
An expected reduction in subsidy and increases in efficiency mean the actual costs would be 
expected to decline rather than increase so the increases that have been seen are a clear dis-
benefit to the train operators and the government and therefore the tax payer and non-users. 
It would be expected that the actual costs would plateau for the period immediately after 
privatisation to enable TOCs to adjust to the change in regime and differences in allocating 
costs on a balance sheet compared to reality, but after a few years of adjustment, the costs 
should have started to decrease as the expenditure settled into a pattern and efficiency gains 
were targeted and achieved. That this has not been the case is argument towards the initial 
bidding structure being flawed and subsequent outside influences, such as the Hatfield crash, 
ultimately having a larger impact. It has also been seen that there is new evidence to suggest 
that the operator access charges are not covering the actual cost of the maintenance (Calvo 
and De Oña, 2012) therefore if the access charges were increased to cover maintenance there 
would be little profit for the Operators and a less attractive franchise proposition. 
Using the costs to complete the cost benefit analysis is the remit of the next section. The 
process is similar to that carried out in the previous chapter on the benefits: consumer 
surplus. 
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6.5  Calculating the Welfare Benefit 
Now all the costs have been collected, manipulated and justified, the final stages of the cost 
benefit analysis can be completed. The aim of this section is to find out the welfare benefit. 
The welfare benefit is the total cost (or benefit) to all stakeholders and represents the total 
cost of the policy initiative. It has already been shown that the Users and Operators have seen 
a benefit from the policy change therefore the final total will indicate whether the 
Government – and therefore non-users – will also have benefited. 
The welfare benefit can be calculated using the formula: 
  Change in welfare = change in revenue – change in total costs + consumer surplus 
We already know the change in consumer surplus from the previous chapter: 
Consumer Surplus = £12.3422 (bn) (at 3.5% NPV) 
And the change in revenue has already been calculated: 
Change in Revenue = £2.84 (bn) (at 3.5% NPV) 
For the calculation of change in costs there is no forecast model to use. The calculation is 
broadly the same as it was in the previous chapter for benefits but the forecast is replaced 
with the actual therefore the change in total costs will be the Actual Costs minus the 
Counterfactual Costs. Although the formula only takes into account the total passenger 
industry operating costs it is possible to see where the costs and benefits occur in the 
breakdown of the individual cost sections and where there are changes during the 30 year 
period of the research.  
The counterfactual is calculated in exactly the same way as before, using 5 year moving 
averages, and will therefore not reflect the first two years of the research. The counterfactual 
data is also only included prior to privatisation as a guide to what the rolling averages were 
compared to the actual data. The forecasts for the counterfactual are only calculated from 
1995 as this is the year privatisation occurred. The total change in costs for each data set is 
also only calculated from 1995 as this is the first year that all costs can be attributed to the 
privatisation initiative. There have been arguments put forward both in this research and 
other research (Smith, 2006) that argues the date to be 1992 – the year the decision to 
privatise was published – should be seen as transitional and dealt with separately. The Dawn Louise Robins         
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following tables (Table 6-10 and Table 6-11) show the Actual and Counterfactual costs and the 
change in costs over the period. The data prior to privatisation that gives the moving averages 
only is highlighted in italics and not used in the final totals. 
Table 6-10 Change in the Costs for the Operating of the Rail Industry (£mil 2008 prices) 
  Maintenan
ce 
CF 
Maintenan
ce 
AC-CF 
Maintenan
ce 
Renewals  CF 
Renewal 
AC-CF 
Renewal 
1979/80  1918.877      871.7     
1980/81  1909.308      879.54     
1981/82  1834.217      797.86     
1982/83  1812.07  1901.76  -89.6895  651.9  802.119  -150.219 
1983/84  1759.362  1963.629  -204.267  827.31  801.649  25.661 
1984/85  2468.804  1985.481  483.3235  836.27  814.696  21.574 
1985/86  1978.078  2016.976  -38.898  910.27  867.934  42.336 
1986/87  1983.96  2003.447  -19.4867  897.6  926.957  -29.357 
1987/88  1977.282  1765.26  212.022  1084.54  964.365  120.175 
1988/89  1458.858  1528.083  -69.2253  984.9  987.977  -3.077 
1989/90  387.438  1431.56  -1044.12  1052.76  995.009  57.751 
1990/91  1687.68  1305.456  382.2242  929.9  970.364  -40.464 
1991/92  1309.128  1268.861  40.2674  948.29  908.562  39.728 
1992/93  1391.068  1341.818  49.2501  787.4  843.761  -56.361 
1993/94  1679.12  1338.203  340.9166  664.02  830.3576  -166.338 
1994/95  896.749  1260.154  -363.405  725.63  837.6534  -112.023 
1995/96  1142.224  1185.838  -43.6142  1122.996  841.5675  281.4285 
1996/97  1023.767  1113.87  -90.1031  1424.189  843.3558  580.8327 
1997/98  952.5123  1043.427  -90.9145  1694.977  843.7623  851.2148 
1998/99  918.7511  974.0047  -55.2536  1912.885  843.2444  1069.641 
1999/00  856.8336  905.2831  -48.4495  2177.134  842.092  1335.042 
2000/01  901.968  837.0532  64.91477  3079.697  840.4943  2239.203 
2001/02  1180.004  769.1752  410.8285  3518.962  838.5779  2680.384 
2002/03  1438.573  701.5536  737.0197  3847.941  836.4293  3011.511 
2003/04  1475.794  634.1218  841.6724  4710.687  834.1088  3876.579 
2004/05  1460.971  566.8325  894.1386  4007.038  831.6593  3175.379 
2005/06  1338.4  499.6516  838.7484  3523.52  829.1115  2694.409 
2006/07  1252.215  432.5543  819.6604  3656.226  826.4881  2829.738 
2007/08  1191.824  365.5219  826.302  4228.949  823.8058  3405.144 
2008/09  1104  298.5407  805.4593  4710  821.0772  3888.923 
Totals      £5589.319      £31668.81 
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Table 6-11 Change in Other Operating Costs 
  Other Operating  
CF Other Operating 
Costs 
AC-CF Other Operating 
Costs 
1979/80  1309.066 
   
1980/81  1292.988 
   
1981/82  1447.054 
   
1982/83  1450.08  1445.257  4.823 
1983/84  1424.137  1480.516  -56.3792 
1984/85  1914.986  1405.518  509.468 
1985/86  1039.66  1320.987  -281.327 
1986/87  950.4  1236.971  -286.571 
1987/88  1101.42  1113.317  -11.8966 
1988/89  932.64  1047.726  -115.086 
1989/90  1169.94  1092.01  77.93 
1990/91  1128.8  1166.193  -37.393 
1991/92  1304.1  1237.814  66.286 
1992/93  1489.55  1260.461  229.089 
1993/94  1260.72  1265.488  -4.7675 
1994/95  1068.33  1243.088  -174.758 
1995/96  1039.75  1225.062  -185.312 
1996/97  923.8777  1209.784  -285.907 
1997/98  905.9883  1196.294  -290.306 
1998/99  930.6618  1184  -253.338 
1999/00  934.4613  1172.526  -238.064 
2000/01  963.4717  1161.628  -198.156 
2001/02  1365.199  1151.142  214.0574 
2002/03  1461.492  1140.956  320.5358 
2003/04  1551.949  1130.993  420.9568 
2004/05  1418.441  1121.196  297.2448 
2005/06  1384.32  1111.527  272.7934 
2006/07  1273.574  1101.955  171.6194 
2007/08  1209.896  1092.459  117.4362 
2008/09  1360  1083.024  276.9761 
Totals 
   
£559.9557m 
 
Both maintenance and other operating costs show a clear reduction in costs since 
privatisation but the large increases in renewals out-weigh any benefit that this has so far 
achieved. The maintenance can be seen to have risen after the Hatfield Crash and although a 
reduction is still evident it is still higher than a counterfactual scenario. The total figure for the 
change in operating costs is therefore deemed to be: 
Actual Total Operating Costs – Counterfactual Total Operating Costs = £37818.0847(mil) Dawn Louise Robins         
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Privatisation has clearly been a costly initiative for the Government and an excess of £37 
billion has been paid compared to what may have occurred under a counterfactual scenario.  
Table 6-12 and Table 6-13 highlight the changes in costs from the passenger operations 
perspective. 
Table 6-12 Cost of Train Operations 
  TOC-own 
operating 
costs 
CF TOC-
own 
Operatin
g Costs 
AC-CF 
TOC 
Operatin
g Costs 
Rolling 
stock 
capital 
expendit
ure 
CF Rolling 
Stock 
Capital 
Expenditur
e 
AC-CF 
Rolling 
Stock 
Capital 
Costs 
1979/80  2706.818 
   
352.47 
    1980/81  2739.735 
   
401.25 
    1981/82  2717.029 
   
312.83 
    1982/83  2502.13  2708.73  -206.6  270.3  279.232  -8.932 
1983/84  2669.909  2719.253  -49.3437  164.45  236.239  -71.789 
1984/85  3122.878  2644.76  478.1177  142.19  200.811  -58.621 
1985/86  2428.9  2623.558  -194.658  181.6  182.051  -0.451 
1986/87  2282.94  2657.446  -374.506  178.2  202.117  -23.917 
1987/88  2724.198  2709.959  14.23904  217.33  256.785  -39.455 
1988/89  2786.714  2748.131  38.58299  418.08  323.86  94.22 
1989/90  3531.21  2798.989  732.2211  435.24  416.743  18.497 
1990/91  2402.286  2870.987  -468.702  559.3  533.358  25.942 
1991/92  2818.133  2834.051  -15.9181  729.33  617.618  111.712 
1992/93  2908.99  2684.564  224.4258  832.35  650.492  181.858 
1993/94  2232.561  2621.86  -389.299  645.66  633.478  12.182 
1994/95  3231.2  2628.005  603.1955  536.4  678.9679  -142.568 
1995/96  3122.741  2629.848  492.8936  288  724.6409  -436.641 
1996/97  4009.256  2628.988  1380.268  70.31106  770.4289  -700.118 
1997/98  3856.389  2626.371  1230.018  155.0577  816.2916  -661.234 
1998/99  3798.116  2622.578  1175.538  231.9187  862.2044  -630.286 
1999/00  3799.118  2617.978  1181.14  307.1094  908.1515  -601.042 
2000/01  4243.469  2612.812  1630.657  698.2857  954.1227  -255.837 
2001/02  4467.092  2607.241  1859.851  1143.528  1000.111  143.4168 
2002/03  4851.89  2601.374  2250.516  691.0885  1046.112  -355.024 
2003/04  5047.138  2595.289  2451.849  913.0746  1092.123  -179.048 
2004/05  5217.937  2589.04  2628.898  1031.277  1138.14  -106.862 
2005/06  5434.768  2582.665  2852.102  624.2342  1184.163  -559.928 
2006/07  4994.736  2576.195  2418.541  351.9612  1230.189  -878.228 
2007/08  5012.455  2569.65  2442.806  416.755  1276.219  -859.464 
2008/09  6379.42  2563.045  3816.375  345.627  1322.252  -976.625 
Totals 
   
28203.21 
   
-6958.24 
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Table 6-13 Change in Total Passenger Service Costs 
  Total Passenger 
Service Costs 
CF Total 
Passenger Service 
Costs 
AC-CF Total Train 
Operating Costs 
1979/80  3059.288 
    1980/81  3140.985 
    1981/82  3029.859 
    1982/83  2772.43  2987.962  -215.532 
1983/84  2834.359  2955.492  -121.133 
1984/85  3265.068  2845.571  419.4967 
1985/86  2610.5  2805.609  -195.109 
1986/87  2461.14  2877.351  -416.211 
1987/88  2941.528  3014.877  -73.3488 
1988/89  3382.683  3132.679  250.0038 
1989/90  4092.001  3276.42  815.581 
1990/91  2961.586  3465.033  -503.448 
1991/92  3547.463  3494.568  52.89485 
1992/93  3741.34  3363.137  378.2027 
1993/94  2878.221  3335.58  -457.359 
1994/95  3767.6  3393.789  373.8108 
1995/96  3410.741  3448.237  -37.4953 
1996/97  4079.567  3500.32  579.2467 
1997/98  4011.447  3550.867  460.5801 
1998/99  4030.035  3600.385  429.6501 
1999/00  4106.228  3649.198  457.0302 
2000/01  4941.755  3697.515  1244.24 
2001/02  5610.62  3745.478  1865.142 
2002/03  5542.979  3793.183  1749.796 
2003/04  5960.213  3840.696  2119.516 
2004/05  6249.215  3888.066  2361.148 
2005/06  6059.002  3935.327  2123.675 
2006/07  5346.697  3982.504  1364.193 
2007/08  5429.21  4029.615  1399.595 
2008/09  6725.047  4076.675  2648.372 
Totals 
   
19072.54 
 
The TOC costs clearly show a large increase in costs that outweighs any reduction in rolling 
stock capital costs. The change in total passenger operating costs can therefore be seen as 
being increased from that expected under a counterfactual scenario and stands at £19.072 
(bn). The final total industry costs are the sum of the operating and passenger costs. The total 
cost of running the railways from both an infrastructure and operating perspective are:  
£37.818 (bn) + £19.072 (bn) (using NPV 3.5%) = £39.84 (bn). Dawn Louise Robins         
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All calculations are now completed and initial findings suggest that there has been a large 
increase in costs for the Government in the form of infrastructure maintenance and renewal 
and an increase in operating costs for the Operators that cover the increased access charges 
and regulatory costs.  
The Welfare Benefit can now be calculated and will highlight the total cost of the privatisation 
policy impact to the industry stakeholders. The welfare benefit is calculated using the 
following formula: 
Change in Revenue – Change in Costs + Consumer Surplus = Welfare Benefit. 
This is shown in the following table of welfare cost/benefit (Table 6-14). 
Table 6-14 Welfare Benefit from the Privatisation Initiative 
 
Tot Rev-Cf Rev 
= Change in 
Revenue 
Ac Costs-Cf Costs 
= Change in 
Total Industry 
Costs (£bn) 
Change in Consumer 
Surplus (£bn) 
Welfare Benefit 
1995/96  0.036309874  -58.5816  0.131773969  0.226665 
1996/97  0.061186417  704.6998  0.270442127  -0.37307 
1997/98  0.110593539  844.979  0.683567733  -0.05082 
1998/99  0.185335457  1098.581  0.940253241  0.027008 
1999/00  0.257227667  1406.713  1.163465142  0.01398 
2000/01  0.210026987  3244.485  0.99908348  -2.03537 
2001/02  0.231263209  5057.721  1.082886395  -3.74357 
2002/03  0.247215686  5699.124  1.117003312  -4.33491 
2003/04  0.268160598  7131.883  1.194868722  -5.66885 
2004/05  0.311802629  6593.924  1.370971951  -4.91115 
2005/06  0.354287019  5788.462  1.297966408  -4.13621 
2006/07  0.48159782  5036.847  1.905826591  -2.64942 
2007/08  0.572327953  5592.893  2.256542009  -2.76402 
2008/09  0.629765912  7460.908  2.578620396  -4.25252 
Totals  £3.957100(bn)  55076.68  16.99327148  -34.6523 
Totals 
using 3.5% 
NPV 
£2.84  £39.84  £12.34  -£24.65 
Overall, Table 6-14 shows that users are net gainers by around £12 billion over the 15 years 
since privatisation was instigated. This not an inconsiderable sum and the main reasons for 
this were discussed in the previous chapter – more train kilometres to be travelled, cheaper 
ticket prices, and in some respects an element of competition on some services. The industry 
loses by around £40 billion which is far in excess of any benefits that have been felt. However, 
within the industry there are some gainers. It has been shown that the private Train Operating Dawn Louise Robins         
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Companies have been profitable over the period (with average returns varying between 1.2 
and 4.8% - TAS (2010)), with total profits around £1.62 billion (in Present Value terms). The 
main loser from the privatisation policy initiative then has been Government, with an 
increased exposure over the period of nearly £40 billion.  
There are considerable losses in welfare of nearly £25 billion. These losses might be offset by 
the one off benefits of the sale of assets. However, Gourvish believes these may only amount 
to around £1.22 billion (2008 prices, Present Value) (based on Gourvish, 2002a) and, in any 
event, they should be considered as pecuniary transfers. It is also worth noting that 
transitional costs are still to be taken into account as these do not appear in the cost figures. 
These will be looked at in greater detail in the next section but tentative findings that the 
transitional costs of setting up the new organisational structure (including ORR, OPRAF and 
Railtrack) are estimated, on a comparable basis, at £0.65 billion (based on Harris and 
Godward, 1997). If these calculations are correct then the net balance to Government is thus 
only £0.57 billion. 
If we consider the three post-privatisation periods outlined in the literature review, in the first 
stage (transition between 1995 and 2000) there was virtually no welfare change – by contrast 
Pollitt and Smith (2002) found a modest welfare improvement over a corresponding period. 
However, between 2000 and 2005 (post Hatfield period), there was a large welfare loss of 
almost £16 billion. The losses have started to decrease and the third post privatisation period 
(2005 – 2009) has also seen losses but these are falling year on year to with this reducing to a 
loss of almost £9 billion. 
All totals are subject to a NPV calculation in line with the government recommended rate of 
3.5%. At this stage of the calculations it is clear that the huge costs incurred since the 
privatisation initiative began have impacted on the benefits that may have resulted. Before 
the final calculations can be made the issue of income from sales of BR and the cost of the 
actual process must first be accounted for.  
6.6  Transition Costs and Income from Sales 
It was shown in the methodology chapter that the issue of transition costs is considered 
complex and problematic. Transition costs and the income or loss from sales must be included 
in the total cost structure but there are also on-going transaction costs that are incurred by 
both Operators and the Government that require fees for contractual agreements, 
consultancy and legal issues that may not be apparent in the data as individual costs. Dawn Louise Robins         
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Accounting for these costs in a longitudinal study such as this research has received attention 
but has been inconclusive (Preston 2002). Recent work by Merkert has attempted to apply 
specific costs across a time frame with interesting results – transaction costs change over time 
and events such as Hatfield increase transaction costs and for a significant time period 
(Merkert, 2010).  
Disaggregating the costs included in this research even further to account for transaction 
costs was deemed unworkable within the time frame of the project. Transaction costs are 
already a feature of the different stakeholders and therefore the impact of these costs will be 
felt as a whole rather than seen as a separate cost. Transitional costs have been taken from 
the cost data and are dealt with in this section. 
Transitional costs are those costs that are incurred as a direct result of the privatisation 
process and would not have been incurred if the railways had remained in public ownership. 
These costs are a loss to the government that cannot be recouped. Sale of items can be a 
benefit to the government – or Treasury – and are one-off items that cannot be gained (or 
lost) again. Calculating these costs has proven to be difficult. Accounting procedure and 
changes in ownership have resulted in slightly different results from each author that has 
been studied. The sale of many items started in the early 1980s and cannot therefore be taken 
as a cost/income due to privatisation since privatisation was not actually decided until 1992. 
The sale of items accounted for in the cost benefit will be those costs that occurred during the 
transition period and impact specifically on the railway operation and management. Gourvish 
(2002a) provides the most complete breakdown of sales and acquisitions for the privatisation 
initiative but it must be noted that some costs may also be included as transition costs and 
double counting must be prevented.  
Table 6-15 gives a summary of the sale items during the privatisation initiative. All of the items 
in this table involved the exchange of currency and were either a profit to the Treasury or a 
loss. There were other minor sales during this period but the majority were small support 
industries specific to a local area with minimal impact on the balance sheet. 
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Table 6-15 Railway Sales during the Privatisation Initiative 
   
Gross 
Sale 
Price 
£m 
Net Profit 
£m 
Gross 
Sale 
Price 
2008 £m 
Net Profit 
2008 £m 
Net Profit 
2008 £m 
NPV 3.5% 
BRIS Infrastructure 
Maintenance    122.2  110.2  175.968  158.688  153.32 
BRIS Track Renewals 
 
43.4  30.6  62.496  44.064  42.57 
BRIS Infrastructure Design 
 
2.8  -9.8  4.032  -14.112  -13.63 
Freight and Parcels 
 
247.7  -134.2  356.688  -193.248  -186.71 
Passenger 
 
39.1  37.2  56.304  53.568  51.76 
Rolling Stock Maintenance 
 
32.6  -29.6  46.944  -42.624  -41.18 
TESCOs 
 
2.4  -0.1  3.456  -0.144  -0.14 
S&T 
 
208.5  190.5  300.24  274.32  265.04 
Central Services 
 
177.2  63.6  255.168  91.584  88.49 
Totals    875.9  258.4  1261.296  372.096  359.51 
Source: Sale prices taken from Gourvish (2002a) 
The summary of sales outlines the actual sale price and benefit received but it should also be 
noted that there were certain sectors within BR that were transferred for nil consideration. 
Although these items may not have incurred a direct income or cost, they were worth a 
considerable amount of money and their worth must be accounted for as a cost. The most 
substantial of these industries was Railtrack. Railtrack became a government owned company 
on the 1
st April 1994 in preparation for its floatation as a competitive company. Railtrack 
issued contracts for maintenance over 7 year terms with ever-decreasing cost levels which 
would provide the profit for the shareholders. Railtrack was first valued at £6.5 billion in 1994, 
although its directors argued that £3 billion was more realistic (Preston, 1996, p. 5). Railtrack 
was ultimately sold far more cheaply in 1996, however, at a share price of £3.90 which 
brought proceeds of only £1.9 billion (Crompton and Jupe, 2003). The company was 
considered to be worth far more by the market and only thirty months later the stock was 
valued at £16.05 a share (Gourvish 2002a).  
Railtrack seems an example of an industry reorganised for political reasons and ease of sale 
rather than for organisational and operational benefit and this failure to address the 
important issues of sustainability meant all stakeholders eventually lost out at the point 
Railtrack was taken into administration. The total impact of the Railtrack saga is difficult to 
quantify due to the many stages the reorganisation and eventual sale took and it is also 
important to remember that just because money did not always change hands, there was a 
level of accounting balancing necessary. To this end the final gain from the floatation of Dawn Louise Robins         
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Railtrack is a combination of debt absorption, re-financing and sale income as shown in Table 
6-16. 
Table 6-16 Companies Transferred for Nil Consideration and Eventual Cost/Income Upon Sale 
Business 
Effect on 
Balance 
Sheet 
Sale 
Net 
Profit/Loss 
Net 
Profit/Loss 
£m 2008  
Net 
Profit/Loss 
£m 2008 
NPV 3.5% 
Railtrack  142.7  1900  1442.7
35  2149.623
36  2,076.93 
Channel Tunnel 
       
 
EPS  -798 
 
-798  -1189.02
37  -1,148.81 
Union Railways  -42.6 
 
-42.6 
 
 
St Pancras Station  -25 
 
-25  -36
38  -34.78 
ROSCOS 
       
 
Angel Trains  -619.4  528.3  -91.1  -131.184  -126.75 
Eversholt  -681  696.3  15.3  22.032  21.29 
Porterbrook  -444.6  518.3  73.7  106.128  102.54 
Sparesco  -14.8 
 
-14.8  -21.312  -20.59 
Total  -£2482.7  £3642.9  £560.2  £900.267  £869.82 
Source: Sale prices from Gourvish 2002  
Absorbing the debt by transferring the ROSCOs at ‘no cost’ to the government balance sheet, 
and then selling on at less than the debt, was seen by many as a mistake (Jupe, 2005). Within 
a couple of years of the sale of the ROSCOs the first railway millionaires were created as the 
share price rose and the companies were sold on at huge profits. This ultimately meant that 
the profit made from the sale of Railtrack was greatly reduced in the overall total profit and, 
when consideration is given to the opinion that Railtrack was sold at less than it was worth, 
the total profit made from the sale of goods was far less than what it may have been. It seems 
that the objective of providing income to the Treasury would not be achieved once the actual 
cost of the privatisation initiative was taken into account. 
Accounting for transition costs – costs specifically related to the privatisation process – take 
into account the year from which privatisation was determined (1992) until all privatisation 
initiatives had been accounted for (Table 6-17). These costs included consultancy costs for the 
DTp, ORR, OPRAF, BR and Railtrack. Other costs, including redundancy costs and franchise 
bidding costs bring the total to double this (Harris and Godward, 1997). Estimations are based 
                                                             
 
35 Includes £600m equity debt absorption 
36 Calculated from 1994 
37 As above 
38 All other prices from this point calculated from 1995 Dawn Louise Robins         
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on the cost of setting up nearly 100 separate companies, staff relocation or redundancy costs, 
new infrastructure costs for both buildings and computer systems and general set-up costs. 
Transition costs can also be seen to include general staff time that is taken away from the 
everyday running of the business. Harris & Godward (1997), estimate that this alone would 
have cost in the region of £2bn. For the purpose of the cost benefit, costs need to be 
accounted for, but should also represent the final estimate based on grounded empirical 
evidence. The actual figure that has been attained as known costs, backed up by the National 
Audit Office (1997), as shown in the table below will be used. 
Table 6-17 Transition Costs 
 
RPI 
Total 
Transitional 
Costs of 
Privatisation 
Total 
Transition 
Costs 
2008 
prices 
Transitional 
Costs at 
3.5% NPV 
1992/93  155  5.5  8.525 
  1993/94  153  104.4  159.732 
  1994/95  149  158.3  235.867 
  1995/96  144  184.7  265.968 
  Totals 
   
670.092  647.43 
Source: Original costs from Harris & Godward 1997 
Taking all these items into account the total income generated from privatising the railways is: 
Total Income (or loss) minus total transition costs = (£359.51+£869.82) - £647.43 = £581.91m 
This does not seem to be a huge sum of money when consideration is given to the cost 
estimation by other authors such as Preston (2000), Pollitt (2002), Crompton (2003) and Harris 
& Godward (1997) but as explained above, the figures are based on known transition costs 
and not estimated additional costs. The costs are also separate from the costs included in the 
accounts for British Rail that are included in the earlier calculations for cost benefit and it is 
assumed that some transition costs will be included in these totals.  
Although not associated with transition costs or asset sales there is a desire to recognise the 
impact of other modes of transport and the impact of the demand for rail on the 
environment. The next section looks at these issues and draws conclusions as to how much of 
a cost or benefit there may be from these issues. Dawn Louise Robins         
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6.7  Environmental Costs of Privatisation 
In order to calculate the environmental impact of the change in demand a consideration of a 
variety of different factors is needed. Ascertaining how many of the journeys were ‘new’ 
journeys and how many involved modal switch will determine whether there is an increase in 
emissions (new journeys) or reduction (modal switch). Accounting for the environmental cost 
of infrastructure and maintenance over its average life and accounting for any reduction in 
road building due to modal switch cannot be made easily. In general, the economy has been 
booming since privatisation and this will mean new jobs and therefore new journeys but it will 
also mean more disposable income and therefore more leisure journeys.  
The reduction in car ownership of young people and general reduction in overall car journeys 
suggest that the rise in modal switch is fairly high. Trends towards downgrading to standard 
rail class from 1
st class during the recent recession also suggest stability in rail rather than an 
exodus to road and the apparent fall in domestic air journeys and stability in rail figures seem 
to suggest that although there may be a reduction in journeys by rail by those passengers that 
came to rail during the boom years there may be an increase in passengers from domestic air 
that will maintain the consistency of the numbers.  
As seen in the trends chapter of this research, the environmental cost models are fraught with 
anomalies and assumptions and therefore considered by many to be unreliable when deciding 
the total environmental impact over such a long time period. Environmental costs are 
considered important though, even more so than they were 30 years ago at the beginning of 
the research period. The environmental impact of infrastructure and mobility commands an 
important place in transport policy decision making and each new infrastructure project that 
is now considered includes an estimation of the environmental impact compared to either a 
‘do nothing’ scenario, or a counter proposal (Flyvbjerg, 2007b, Bos and Vleugel, 2005, Pearce 
et al., 2006).  
When looking at demand rather than infrastructure the inclusion of environmental factors is 
less secure. Whelan et al. (2010) do not include environmental factors into their model for 
estimating change in demand on the railways but use instead a fuel cost as a parameter by 
which modal switch can be seen. Aggregating environmental costs through a modal switch 
appears to be the better route forward for determining any impacts and it is therefore 
suggested that the estimation of modal switch and new journeys is taken from the generally Dawn Louise Robins         
 
206 
 
accepted demand elasticity calculations in the Demand for Public Transport: A Practical Guide 
(Balcombe et al., 2004).  
The variables are split between an urban and inter-urban sector with the diversion rates for 
urban rail schemes being 33% of passengers switching from the car, and for inter-urban the 
figure is 60%. Considering the change in Long Distance travel has seen the highest increase the 
assumption is made that the percentage change to rail from car is higher than 33% and is 
estimated to be 46%. Rail is considered to be an environmentally friendly mode of transport 
compared to road and air therefore modal switch may well carry a benefit in terms of 
environmental impact, but there is also the cost to the environment from new journeys – 
especially leisure journeys or unnecessary journeys.  
To calculate the environmental costs of train kilometre increases an average of the high and 
low marginal cost estimates were used. Bearing in mind that the costs and benefits are 
calculated over a considerable time period it was felt that this would smooth over anomalies 
and give the better average. Calculating the costs required the use of train kms as it is here 
that the actual impact to the environment is made whereas for the environmental benefits, 
passenger km is used. This determines the impact on the environment due to an increase in 
passengers lowering the impact of the train use thereby accounting for both costs and 
benefits.  
Table 6-18 gives the parameters of environmental impact of transport. 
Table 6-18 UK Average Values of Environmental Factors (£s 2008 prices and values) 
Impact Type   Coach   Car   Passenger  
Rail  
Freight  
Rail  
Noise   0.02478  0.003186  0.14396  0.2006 
LAQ   0.10974  0.006254  0.32922  0.19588 
Greenhouse Gases   0.01652  0.00354  0.07906  0.15458 
Safety   0.06136  0.01298 
Source: (Balcombe, Mackett et al. 2004) 
Using the 46% parameter to determine the passenger kms abstracted from car, the figure is 
then divided by a car mean load factor to get vehicle km. The marginal costs per vehicle km 
are then used to calculate the environmental costs avoided on the road (i.e. the benefits). 
Load factors are the amount of passengers that transfer from one mode to another. In this 
case the National Travel Survey suggests that the load factor should be 1.6 for general car use 
but only 1.2 for business and commuting. Considering the capacity of trains has increased Dawn Louise Robins         
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considerably on the commuter routes and peak times it was decided to average the load 
factors in favour of commuting and a load factor of 1.3 was used. 
The parameters for TKm and PKm were calculated as the difference between the actual Km 
and the counterfactual Km:  
Ac(T/P)km – Cf(T/P)Km = change in (T/P)Km 
For calculating the costs to the environment the difference in TKm is used. Including the 
average marginal cost of vehicle Kms and multiplying this by the increase in TKm will give the 
increased cost and the environmental impact of the extra traffic. The parameters shown are 
from the Demand for Public Transport (Balcombe 2004) 
The average marginal costs = (high value + low value)/2 = (6.41+7.43)/2 
The results, and total cost and benefit, of the increase in passengers to the railways are shown 
to be of minimal impact:  a benefit of £49 (mil) from modal switch but an overall benefit over 
the privatisation period of only £4.89 (mil). This is due to the counterfactual passenger 
kilometres being, for the first ten years (bar 1999), estimated to have been over and above 
that of the actual PKm. This underpins the impact of Hatfield on reducing PKm and the 
depression of the privatisation effect during the transitional period. It can be seen that the 
environmental benefits of passengers switching from road to rail are only recently having any 
impact – and the impact over the entire privatisation period is minimal. 
 
Due to the minimal impact of the environment and modal switch it was deemed unnecessary 
to continue further into the research and the totals have not been included in the final cost 
benefit analysis. The final findings for the cost benefit analysis include the change in revenue, 
change in total costs, the consumer surplus and the addition of the transition costs and sale of 
assets. Table 6-19 shows the final totals that have been adjusted using a NPV at 3.5%.  
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Table 6-19 Total Welfare Benefit 
   Change in 
Revenue 
Change in Total 
Industry Costs 
(£bn) 
Change in 
Consumer 
Surplus 
(£bn) 
Welfare Benefit 
£b 
1995/96  0.0363099  -0.0585816  0.131774  0.226665 
1996/97  0.0611864  0.7046998  0.270442  -0.37307 
1997/98  0.1105935  0.844979  0.683568  -0.05082 
1998/99  0.1853355  1.098581  0.940253  0.027008 
1999/00  0.2572277  1.406713  1.163465  0.01398 
2000/01  0.210027  3.244485  0.999083  -2.03537 
2001/02  0.2312632  5.057721  1.082886  -3.74357 
2002/03  0.2472157  5.699124  1.117003  -4.33491 
2003/04  0.2681606  7.131883  1.194869  -5.66885 
2004/05  0.3118026  6.593924  1.370972  -4.91115 
2005/06  0.354287  5.788462  1.297966  -4.13621 
2006/07  0.4815978  5.036847  1.905827  -2.64942 
2007/08  0.572328  5.592893  2.256542  -2.76402 
2008/09  0.6297659  7.460908  2.57862  -4.25252 
Totals  £3.957100(bn)  55.07668  16.99327  -34.6523 
Totals using 
3.5% NPV 
£2.84  £39.84  £12.34  -£24.65 
Income from 
Sales 
0.35951          
Sale of Transfers  0.86982          
Transition Costs 
 
0.64743       
Totals  £4.07  £40.49  £12.34  -£24.08 
The final totals are not dissimilar to the costs and benefits that were already suggested in the 
original change in welfare. This underpins the assumption that income from sales may have 
been an original incentive when privatising the rail industry, but, due to the political wrangling 
and apparent need to privatise regardless, the impact of sales, after the reduction from 
transition costs, has had very limited impact on the balance sheet (Gourvish 2002).   
The welfare benefit is calculated using the formula: 
Change in welfare = change in revenue – change in total costs + consumer surplus 
The actual welfare benefit from privatising the railways can therefore be seen as: 
Welfare = £4.07 (bn) - £40.49 (bn) + £12.34 (bn) 
The Total Welfare Benefit = £-24.08 (bn) 
It can be seen that earlier predictions of some of the losses being offset by the sale of assets 
has not occurred. The previous tentative findings of losses and gains still stand – the Users are Dawn Louise Robins         
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the main beneficiary and the Government the main loser. It we assume there is a deadweight 
loss of this additional public burden and that the shadow price of public funds is around 1.20 
(after Dodgson and Topham, 1987), then there is an additional welfare loss of £7.6 billion to 
take into account (Dodgson and Topham, 1987).  
6.7.1  Conclusion 
There has been significant disbenefit from the privatisation initiative and the areas and 
stakeholders that have been affected by this cost have been briefly explained during the 
analysis. The conclusions that this chapter draws are neither definitive nor all consuming – 
there are many explanations and scenarios that could have impacted that may not have been 
accounted for. The counterfactual scenario that has been developed as part of this research 
has provided results that may appear contentious. The estimated rise in both TKms and PKms 
over and above that which has actually occurred means that some of the impacts derived 
from the data are less than it may have been thought – the environmental costs and benefits 
are an example of this. 
There is an overall disbenefit from privatising the passenger rail, but this will hardly come as a 
surprise as the costs have long been an issue for the government. The benefit to consumers is 
considerable at £12 (bn) but had the Hatfield crash not occurred this could have been even 
higher. Whether Hatfield is the main cause of the large increase in costs is less certain as the 
costs have increased both before and after the impact of the crash was affecting the trends. 
What this exercise has shown is that there are specific trends within the data that help 
towards an understanding of the results and many lessons that can be taken from the 
initiative. The following chapter takes forward the analysis and examine it in relationship to 
the work carried out by others and suggests areas for additional work.  
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7  Conclusion and Further Work 
7.1  Introduction 
The rail industry has been seen to be a large and complex industry that has undergone 
continual organisational change as well as changes in focus and business direction. The 
industry has also been subject to impacts from changes in policy, the economy, and consumer 
behaviour, and estimating these impacts on the amount of passenger kilometres travelled 
each year has been a difficult task to achieve. The results that have been found are subject to 
the data variables that were included and these were also conditional for their availability and 
ability to represent that for which they were chosen. Due to the strength of feeling and varied 
opinions on the privatisation issue the results may be seen as fairly contentious and will – as 
they have already – be questioned for their relevance to the impacts on the rail industry.  
The research process for this particular thesis has been a journey of discovery that has 
continually formed and reformed the depth and breadth that the thesis has been able to take. 
Opportunities have been available to question the path that has been followed with various 
industry experts and some of their opinions will be used to either uphold the findings or to 
offer suggestions for further work. As it was pointed out in the beginning of the thesis, this 
was not intended to be an exercise in econometrics but rather to use econometrics as a tool 
to aid the understanding of the effect of privatisation on the industry. The narrative 
surrounding the rail industry has been important and the research results are only considered 
definitive when related to this account.   
To conclude this thesis the final chapter will look first at drawing together the findings of the 
analysis. This will include comparisons to other research that has been carried out and the 
compliance to the theories and ideologies of privatisation. The main contentious issue in this 
thesis is the counterfactual scenario that has been developed. It is important to remember 
that the findings are only as good as the counterfactual they are compared to, therefore there 
will be a dedicated discussion on the justification of the method and findings of the 
counterfactual. The final section to this chapter will consider the policy implications of this 
research and recommendations for additional work from both a personal and industry 
perspective. Dawn Louise Robins         
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7.2  Discussion of the Main Findings 
The main objective of this research was to analyse the literature surrounding the rail industry 
over the last 30 years and to calculate, with the aid of a simple regression model using cost 
benefit analysis, the impact of privatisation on the passenger rail industry. The main objective 
has essentially been met – the data variables were chosen, the model developed, calculations 
made, and a narrative designed to explain the findings was given. Whereas many cost 
analyses of the privatisation impacts have tended to focus on short term findings and the 
impact of events such as the Hatfield Crash (Smith 2006), this research has been able to look 
beyond this and to see the privatisation process from a broader perspective. Through the 
development of the model it has been found that the Hatfield crash had a long lasting effect 
on the passenger rail industry that extended further afield than just the Hatfield area. The 
impact was also diverse in that it affected not just the infrastructure and associated impacts 
such as passenger and train kilometres and resulting costs and revenues, but it also signalled a 
change in the industry structure and focus for rail travel. The recovery from the incident 
occurred during a time of increasing fuel costs and road congestion as well as a greater 
awareness of the environmental damage that transport modes can have and it is evident that 
this may have contributed to a switch to an alternative transport mode such as rail. 
The model that was developed suggests that privatisation depressed the demand for rail 
travel between 1992/93 and 2005/06 by around 8%, whilst Hatfield further depressed 
demand between 2000/01 and 2006/07 by an additional 5%. The strikes in the early 1990s 
reduced demand before the privatisation initiative was brought in by 6.1%. These findings are 
similar to those developed by Whelan et al. (2010) although there it appears that the TKm and 
GDP may be affected by multicollinearity.   These findings suggest that the transition phase of 
the initiative was fairly far reaching in its impact on the network. This coupled with the impact 
of Hatfield has led to a suppressing of the amount of passenger kilometres as shown in the 
actual, predicted and counterfactual passenger kilometres graph (Figure 5-8). Recovery, and 
an increased in PKm over and above that determined by the modelled counterfactual, started 
to occur after 2000 but only rose considerably further after 2006/07. Since this time, 
passenger kilometres have increased beyond the expected counterfactual which has been 
identified as reaching a plateau and stabilising.   
The main findings of the research can be identified by the totals in the final cost benefit table 
(Table 6-19). In general terms:  Dawn Louise Robins         
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1.  Rail passengers have benefited by £12bn.  
2.  Train operators have benefited in terms of revenue by £4bn 
3.  Train operations are more expensive than the pre-privatised era by £40bn. 
The big loser has been Government (and ultimately the taxpayer) as costs have increased 
dramatically. In 2008 prices, the analysis indicates that total industry costs increased from 
around £6.5 billion in 1994/5 to £13.9 billion in 2008/9. This is an increase of 114% and cannot 
be explained away through over pricing, bad accounting, or increased labour and material 
costs. Traffic has increased over this period as well – train kilometres increased by 39%  
indicating a unit cost increase of around 54%. The reasons for this increase are something of a 
puzzle as they are roughly in line with the finding s of Smith (2006), but there does not seem 
to be a simple explanation provided in the literature. The 1992 White Paper did not set targets 
but it was the intention that industry costs should reduce as private sector disciplines were 
brought to bear. Although this did seem to happen initially, at least for train operations 
(Cowie, 2001, 2009), these have reflected the winner’s curse and subsequent cost increases 
were therefore inevitable (Preston, 2008b). This depicts a plausible conclusion to the impact 
of privatisation on the rail industry and can be attributed to various events and challenges 
that have occurred. The next sections will look at each stakeholder in turn. 
7.2.1  User Benefits 
The increase in user benefits is only partly due to the lower fares that have occurred as a 
result of privatisation. The benefits that have manifested over the last 15 years have included 
better carriages, increased punctuality, security, and ease of modal integration. It is 
interesting that in many respects, lower fares are something that many rail users would 
dispute. It needs to be clarified, therefore, that lower fares are based on the expected rise in 
fares that would have occurred if the industry had remained in public ownership and, 
although may appear higher if compared to other rail industries, had the industry remained in 
public ownership the fare increases would have been over and above that which has been 
seen under privatisation. This is substantiated by the Conservative Governments original 
proposal to privatise the industry in order to turn a profit – but not, necessarily, to increase 
the service provided.  
The increase in the quality of service was difficult to integrate into the methodology due to a 
lack of usable data. Punctuality was badly affected by the Hatfied crash and the punctuality 
prior to this event (but post privatisation) was also down on the pre privatisation levels. It has 
been explained that the regulatory controls put in place to encourage punctuality were also Dawn Louise Robins         
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problematic as they encouraged the cancelling of late trains and led to an increase in trains 
cutting out stations. Once these issues had been addressed, through the refining of the 
regulatory contracts, the quality of the service was seen to improve. Reductions in staff – 
especially in the beginning of the privatised industry – had a detrimental effect on service and 
many stations were left unmanned. These issues have also been addressed in recent years 
and coupled with the security improvements the general user experience has been seen to 
improve.  
The ease of modal integration has been achieved through policy initiatives by local and 
metropolitan contractual agreements and could be seen as something that could have 
occurred regardless of the privatisation policy; as prior to privatisation the local councils had a 
greater control over the buses. It is a feature of both the privatisation of the rail industry 
coupled with the deregulation of the bus services that have provided the incentive for private 
operators to link services – especially where the private operator holds a rail franchise as well 
as a bus contract. This is as much about increasing patronage on buses as it is about improving 
rail service, and the inter-modal ticketing initiatives can be seen as a win-win for both bus and 
rail when they succeed. The problem with the privatisation and deregulation of the transport 
industry is that the policy of integration will only occur if it makes commercial sense (Potter, 
2010). 
 There is an argument that technology has increased the opportunities for improving service 
quality and that many of these technological improvements would have been carried out 
under a nationalised industry. It must also be pointed out that the fragmentation of the 
service has meant that some technology could have been slower to arrive due to the inability 
to roll out wide spread changes across the different franchises. This has been found to be true 
of operators and ROSCOs where the collective methodology for creating innovation can only 
be instigated across specific projects and not network wide (Lovell et al., 2011). This raises the 
issue of franchise agreements’ and the bidding process in general. Any improvements 
identified in franchise bids are tightly controlled for cost and the time frame for delivery does 
not allow flexibility for a change in direction unless the changes identified outside of the bid 
agreements bring increased revenue to counteract any costs. User benefits can therefore be 
seen to have been achieved despite the problems associated with horizontal separation. 
An aspect of passenger rail travel that remains controversial that is also a direct result of the 
privatisation initiative is fare structure. TOCs can charge for fares outside the regulated fare 
structure for many routes and discounted travel on advanced tickets is a common incentive Dawn Louise Robins         
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used by franchises – especially in areas where there is on-track competition. The recent 
inquiry into fares by the House of Commons Transport Select Committee (2009) identified 
issues of access to cheaper fares and a lack of commonality surrounding ticket sales between 
operators (TSC 2009). Although this can be seen as a disbenefit to those consumers unable to 
access the promotions it is a benefit to those that can. 
There have been obvious improvements in the user experience due to privatisation that are a 
product of competition and the regulation that is in force to maintain fairness and social 
responsibility. Whether this is political in the respect that it is more common for the socialist 
Labour Party to engender a higher social service than the Conservatives, and it has been a 
Labour Government for more than two thirds of the post privatisation era, it is difficult to 
quantify. The Conservatives were clear in their objective of commercialising the railways, in 
order to increase efficiency and reduce costs without increasing the service provided, and it 
can therefore be argued that it is the Operators themselves who have increased demand, 
through increased service, in their attempts to increase profits in the face of strict regulation. 
Service quality, in the form of PPM, may not have increased or become standard across the 
network to the degree that passengers might have hoped, but the theory of property rights 
and the principal agent problems that underpin the theory of privatisation have become and 
additional threat to the profitability of the industry. This will be considered in greater detail in 
the next section when the relationship between the Operators and the Government is 
considered. Not all of the user benefits have been due to the privatisation initiative and 
distinguishing between the effects of outside impacts – such as congestion and fuel costs – is 
an area that will require additional research.  
Users have clearly benefitted overall, in part due to regulated fares that are lower than they 
otherwise would have been, but perhaps also due to innovations introduced by the private 
sector, such as new services and tickets and changes to retail distribution (in particular 
telesales and web-based sales). Further analysis breaking down the benefits to users by 
service group would be a suggested route for additional research as it is clear that some 
services have performed better than others, but it seems likely that London and South East 
commuters will have been the big winners from fares regulation. 
7.2.2  Train Operators   
The franchised train operators have seen an increase in benefit since the privatisation 
initiative – approximately £4bn of profit when compared to the counterfactual. This is Dawn Louise Robins         
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particularly surprising when you consider that operating the trains under a privatised 
structure has seen increased costs that have not been counteracted by the increased demand. 
Foster (1994) believed the move from a monolithic state system of command and control to a 
market driven contractual system would lead to cost reductions whereas Preston (1996) 
raised concerns over the likely increase in transaction costs. Merkert (2010) estimates that for 
Train Operating Companies transaction costs increased as a percentage of operating costs 
from 2.9% in 1996/7 to 4.3% in 2007/8 (Merkert, 2010). The profit to the Operators has 
therefore been achieved despite the fares being kept lower than a counterfactual and the 
increases in costs for operating the railway being above anything that was anticipated. This 
additional cost has had to have come from somewhere, and it is here. In the politics and 
economics of running a social transport system under a commercially viable umbrella, that the 
theories around property rights and principal agents have been sorely tested.  
During the first transition phase of the railway privatisation initiative (1995/56 – 2000) almost 
half of the franchises failed to control the contracts they were granted and subsequently 
failed. Evidence has suggested that the Principal (Government), with little knowledge of how 
to deal with this phenomenon, either renegotiated, or agreed to break the contract with the 
Agent (franchisee) without penalty (TSC, 2009b). This led to the perception by Operators that 
failure was an option and, if not attractive was without cost, therefore Operators could 
attempt to turn a profit in a manner that they may have not considered if the result meant 
larger costs (Jupe and Crompton, 2006). The theory of principal agent problems is based on a 
‘tug of war’, or desire to achieve a balance, and the rail industry has seen a continual attempt 
by Operators to push for more control and a reaction by the Government to increase 
regulation in order to retain a balance. In effect, the balance has been more in favour of the 
Government, with regards to controlling the railways, even if it has come at the cost of 
increased subsidy, as the DfT has regained power over the franchise contracts with a balance 
on cost of the infrastructure sought through a three way control between the ORR, NR and 
the DfT.    
The Operators of the trains may well feel they are being cornered regarding the lack of control 
they have over many aspects of the train operations (although the franchising process has 
now started to address this) and the initial problems have had a distinct impact on their 
activities. Operators do not own the track they use, the trains they operate or (in many cases) 
the stations they stop at. This led to a lack of choice and therefore control over costs 
regardless of the agreed bid specification (Preston, 2000). The problems that have been Dawn Louise Robins         
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identified with rolling stock availability and the increase in the cost of leasing has meant that 
the replacement of rolling stock has taken a lot longer to happen than was originally desired 
by the government. This seemingly continual tightening of regulation and depth of 
specification could have led to an increase in creativity as the Operators sought innovative 
and sometimes detrimental ways of securing a profit, but, it can also be seen as a product of 
the principal agent problem as the further the Operators pull away, the more the Government 
has pulled back. This also underpins the theory of who the actors and principals are – 
shareholders, suppliers, consumers etc. have all been seen to play a part in the seemingly lack 
of control over costs. 
The operators appear to have overcome many of the obstacles that have been a product of 
the privatisation and subsequent regulatory initiative and, although many of the original 
franchises failed, they are continuing to turn a profit. The research into TOC costs and profit 
margins has suggested that an aggregated profit has been returned each year – even though 
some operators have recorded a loss. One of the biggest costs for the TOCs is the access 
charges that they pay for operating on the infrastructure.  
Finance for infrastructure investment in UK rail networks is currently sourced through 
Network Rail (through a mixture of track access charges paid by the train operating companies 
and the Network Grant, paid directly by government to Network Rail), through the PTE’s and 
through the Northern Ireland Integrated Transport Operator, both of which are dependent on 
levels of funding determined in the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). For Network Rail, 
the network grant accounts for approximately 82% of their revenue in 2009/10, this is 
scheduled to decrease to 72% over Control Period 4 (CP4, the regulatory period running from 
April 2009 to March 2014) due to compulsory cost reductions and control of overspending 
(ORR, 2009a). Research by the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) suggests that 
by the end of CP4 many train operating companies will be covering their operating and full 
infrastructure investment costs independently, regardless of the Network Grant paid to 
Network Rail (ATOC, 2009). This is not necessarily backed up by the literature (Wheat and 
Smith, 2008, Smith and Wheat, 2007), but may be due to an inability to assess the true costs 
compared to the expected costs (Calvo and De Oña, 2012)  
Operators have also found other ways of generating revenue streams and it has been seen 
that fines payable by Network Rail for over-runs on maintenance and renewal coupled with 
charging for additional extras such as car parking and upgrades have helped to increase the 
profit margins. The issue of competition within the industry rather than with other transport Dawn Louise Robins         
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modes is an area that would benefit from further investigation for the impact on profit as well 
as customer service that this change of vision would generate. This is tied in with the franchise 
agreement system and the short term vision that operators have had in the past. Security of 
tenure and motivation to invest has not been a significant feature of rail franchises – 
especially as so many franchises failed to renew their contracts after the first round. Now this 
trend has been seen to reverse – Southern franchise was renewed by the incumbent recently 
– it would be interesting to see if this impacts on the focus and service provision and if a 
change in the direction of competitive vision towards increasing overall transport modal 
choice is becoming evident (Smith et al., 2010). 
Although these may provide many explanations as to how the Operators have managed to 
retain a profit in the face of increasing operating costs it does not go far in explaining why 
these costs for operating the railway have increased to the extent that has been seen. There 
could be the possibility of double marginalisation – where monopolies are created both up 
and down stream leading to excessive rents – but due to the regulation of track access 
charges this should not be the case (Preston, 2008b). Another explanation could be found in 
the losses generated through horizontal and vertical economies of scope (Alexandersson et 
al., 2008). Ivaldi and McCullough (2008) – although looking at US freight railways which are 
unlikely to be transferable to British passenger railways – found that there could be a 20% to 
40% loss of technical efficiency if operations were separated from infrastructure and a 70% 
reduction if on-rail operations were separated (Ivaldi, 2008). Moreover, other studies have 
mixed findings with respect to the impacts of horizontal and vertical separation (Mizutani and 
Uranishi, 2011). 
This goes some way to explaining the possible reasons for the Operators being able to turn a 
profit even though their costs have risen considerably, and further underpins the large 
increases that have been applicable to the Government.  
7.2.3  Train Operations 
One of the reasons for privatising the railways was to remove the interference of MPs in the 
everyday running of the industry and for this, privatisation was successful. The main drawback 
from a government perspective has been the loss of control over the budget in the sense that 
the Treasury was previously able to cancel or reduce the amount of investment into rail 
projects under the nationalised regime – if and when the economic need arose - but due to 
privatisation and the contracted agreements now in place the choices for doing this have 
become limited. The railways do not consist of just one company now and any radical changes Dawn Louise Robins         
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affect many privately owned companies who have specific contractual agreements with the 
Government, therefore, changing the parameters of these agreements could cost more in 
compensation than the savings that would be made. This could be seen as a negative impact 
imposed by the theory of property rights. Divesting of the right of ownership in order to 
secure increased efficiency leads to an inability to control the financial implications of 
contractual rights.  
There is also an element of political stance having changed. The Governments of recent years 
have taken a policy stance of major long term infrastructure projects being a benefit to the 
economy in the long run and are no longer prepared to use them as a means of withdrawing 
from the commitment in order to save money in times of crisis (Whelan, 2008). Even taking 
these policy changes into account, there can be no denying the calamity of cost increases in 
the rail industry, and no discretion for changes in accounting procedure can justify the 
exponential increases in maintenance and infrastructure renewal that have been evident over 
the last 15 years.   
This research has found cost increases of £40 (bn) over and above that which should have 
occurred under a counterfactual nationalised industry. It appears that the costs during the 
franchising transition were inordinately high, and this can possibly be attributed to no-one 
having the incentive to keep costs down (Gourvish 2008). The act of franchising and taking on 
the management was more than enough to deal with and therefore cost efficiency may not 
have been the main priority in the beginning. A counterfactual scenario would therefore have 
seen the OfQ initiative keeping a tighter rein on the costs and, coupled with the expense of 
privatising, the increases in costs due to the transition would possibly have been avoided.  
Sales of assets were also below market price, in many instances, and this reduced the amount 
of income from the transfer of ownership and increased the overall cost of the privatisation 
process. 
This is an example of pushing through a policy against severe opposition from other 
stakeholders. It seemed that, in the end, privatisation would be achieved at any cost (Gourvish 
2008). That said, there is evidence that the opposition was not as conclusive as it appeared 
(Engle 2011); laying argument to the Labour Party allowing privatisation through because they 
could see no other way of reducing the liability in order to regulate according to their own 
policy plans. What was not anticipated was the Hatfield Crash and subsequent infrastructure 
inadequacies that negated any chance of achieving efficiency and reduced costs. It is also 
interesting that the Thatcherite policies lived on for many years after Margaret Thatcher had Dawn Louise Robins         
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resigned as Leader and John Major took over as Prime Minister. It is this testament to the 
strength of the New Right and the radicalism of policy change that ensured the privatisation of 
rail would go ahead in one form or another (Glaister, 2004).  
It has been explained that the lack of comparable industry transfers meant that all 
stakeholders went through a steep learning curve where understandable, if sometimes 
unacceptable, mistakes were made. Many of these were part of the franchise bidding process 
and the apparent lack of sustainability that the original agreements formed. Increasing 
subsidies have been a major part of the privatisation initiative and an area that requires 
further investigation. Bail-outs of struggling franchises and increased support were common 
in the beginning of the process, and this increased the pressure on the subsidy requirements 
and also meant operators could view failure as an option (Preston 2000). The Government did 
not want the privatisation process to fail, and allowing franchises to ‘go-to-the-wall’ was not 
conducive to a successful privatisation process. This can be underpinned by Principal Agent 
Theory and shows a costly settling down period where control appears to be both desired and 
scorned in equal measure by both principal and agent. The recent change in trend and 
promise by the DfT that franchises will not be bailed out has signalled a greater control over 
the rail investment by the Government (TSC 2009). 
The recent report by McNulty (2011) has indicated that cost savings of 30% are feasible for 
the British rail system (McNulty, 2011). Based on the calculations made in this thesis, this 
would amount to savings of some £4.2 billion in 2008/9 and would be almost exactly the same 
as the welfare loss for that year. Even if these are achieved, there is a considerable way to go 
before costs can be brought down to the pre-privatisation levels and the evidence suggests 
that a 30% decrease would not be sufficient to maintain the railway at no cost to the 
taxpayer. 
There is little disagreement regarding the causes of the increases in maintenance and renewal 
that has been seen since the privatisation initiative; what is puzzling is the amount of increase 
that has been seen. The cost of contracting out the activities has come with little increase in 
benefits and costs are far higher for very little extra (Gourvish 2008, Flyvbjerg 2007a). There 
has also been a recent debate in the European Parliament on unbundling (Shaw, 2000), which 
increasingly seems to conclude that separation of infrastructure from operations is expensive 
and ineffective at generating competition. The actual costs per train kilometre have fallen but 
when compared to a counterfactual scenario this is not effective enough to account for the 
added expenditure that has been seen in the renewals and enhancements. Maintenance costs Dawn Louise Robins         
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have fallen though and, apart from the increase after Hatfield, the steps taken by the ORR to 
further reduce maintenance costs appears to be having an effect on the costs per TKm. It was 
pointed out by Smith (2006) that for costs to reduce to a level comparable with the pre-
privatisation era significant future reductions would have to be made that is not apparent in 
the plans for future funding and support. 
The large cost increases can therefore been seen as a product of both political and economic 
failure and a lack of insight into how adaptable the policy initiative that was chosen would be 
for future Governments and social needs. The calculations that underpin this argument are 
only as good as the model that was developed therefore the next section will look at justifying 
the claims that were made during the research process. 
7.3  Justifying the Counterfactual 
The counterfactual argument is probably one of the most contentious issues to come from 
this research. Developing a counterfactual argument is, as it has been shown in the literature 
review and methodology chapters, an attempt at attaining a balance between plausibility and 
justification. The counterfactual should be a plausible scenario but also developed 
methodically using accepted methodology. Justifying the resulting scenario is equally 
important for the counterfactual to be accepted. There has not been a rail industry anywhere 
else in the world that has instigated such wholesale vertical and horizontal separation in such 
a short space of time, therefore ‘like to like’ comparisons has not been a possibility. 
Comparing the rail privatisation initiative with a different privatised industry has previously 
been found to achieve comparisons of productivity trends and not levels of productivity 
(Smith 2006). Developing a counterfactual scenario is therefore the most desirable option for 
comparison but also the most suggestive and possibly controversial. 
Providing a descriptive analysis of the resulting scenario can be difficult if the change in focus 
and direction a counterfactual may have taken also changes – the change to an integrated 
transport policy and change in government is an example of this. The choice of using moving 
averages to determine the future based on the past was a methodology that was known to be 
fraught with difficulties (Harvey, 2006, Collopy, 1992). This is especially true over a long time 
period when subsequent events that impact both directly and indirectly on the industry may 
have altered the path a counterfactual would have taken. Using moving averages is also a 
justifiable methodology when consideration is given to the fact that the counterfactual is 
essentially a ‘do nothing’ scenario which, ultimately, is exactly what keeping the industry Dawn Louise Robins         
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nationalised would have meant. The counterfactual that has been depicted here is based on 
the actual GDP and estimated TKm and RevPKm giving a predicted counterfactual PKm. The 
actual GDP has been strong throughout the privatised era and this, along with a rising TKm 
and RevPKm has shown that the amount of passenger kilometres travelled under a continued 
nationalised industry would have risen. This is not necessarily what would have been planned 
for the industry but considering the events over the last 15 years it is plausible.  
Congestion and fuel price increases would have occurred under a nationalised industry – and 
if the rail industry had not improved its service quality there could have been increased 
congestion due to a less attractive and costly rail industry discouraging new patronage. 
Environmental awareness would also have become an issue for both the government and the 
general public and more sustainable transport would have remained an issue (Balcombe et al., 
2006).  The economy would have continued to have grown as it has been seen to do and 
commuting would have increased. The problems of air travel – increased security and fuel 
prices – would still have impacted, and the train may still have become an attractive modal 
choice when consideration is given to all of these factors.   
The argument for not including the Hatfield crash as an impact in the counterfactual has been 
argued and justified in this thesis, and it is a generally accepted that Hatfield was a product of 
privatisation (Knowles, 2004, Smith and Wheat, 2007). That said there are arguments for 
Hatfield being a product of the industries nationalised past and that the problems with 
infrastructure maintenance were inherent to the large infrastructure and lack of investment 
over a long period. Another narrative would therefore be to focus on the possibility that the 
counterfactual failed to take into account the role of historic underinvestment. The 
counterfactual assumed that infrastructure renewal costs would remain broadly constant – a 
product of moving averages – but the reality is that they increased strongly after privatisation 
and accelerated after Hatfield and are continuing at relatively high levels. This could be seen 
as the market correcting decades of underinvestment by the inefficient nationalised railway 
and a substantive explanation for the so-called cost explosion. Counter arguments here might 
include the nature of the initial infrastructure contractual regime that encouraged renewals 
over routine maintenance, the large increases in the unit costs of renewals under Railtrack 
and accusations of gold plating by Network Rail (Preston, 2002, Preston, 2008a). 
The main findings have been interesting and controversial for a number of reasons. The 
argument for where British Rail would now be if it had not been privatised is subjective and, it 
has been found that for those who worked in the industry at the time, the opinions appear to Dawn Louise Robins         
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vary.  British Rail had different business models for each of the sectors that took into account 
the individuality of the organisational and operational structure of each sector. This scenario 
could not be adapted for this research as it looks at the industry as a whole and uses long 
term data to forecast into the future rather than looking at a smaller region and a shorter 
perspective 
A recurring theme in this research has been that of the Organising for Quality (OfQ) initiative 
that was instigated prior to privatisation and appeared to have made a positive impact during 
the short time it was in operation. There was a desire to try and ascertain the impact of the 
OfQ initiative as part of a counterfactual scenario within this thesis. In many ways this has 
been achieved through the counterfactual and the inclusion of the small but possibly 
significant changes that took place over the short space of time that OfQ was operational. OfQ 
was the first attempt at putting business into the focus for the management structure and for 
the first time money and decision making were in the same place. Customers become the 
main focus and commercialisation saw staff reductions and what was seen as the deskilling of 
the workforce as automated processes and technology advances took over from the 
previously labour intensive roles of train driving, station management and guardsman. OfQ 
also provided the vehicle for the franchise routes in the subsequent privatised industry as 
most of the franchise routes were devised from the OfQ routes – with the main exceptions 
being the east and west coast routes. 
The impact of OfQ has not been easy to estimate due to the lack of research on the initiative 
and the very small time frame that it had to make an impact before privatisation was initiated. 
Although privatisation did not occur until 1995 – and OfQ had been effective for nearly five 
years by this time – the fact that privatisation was decided in 1992, and the impacts have been 
seen to have been felt from this point forward, has meant the OfQ initiative has been pushed 
into the shadows. When opinions have been sought on what the industry made of the 
initiative and potential continued impacts if nationalisation had continued there were 
differences of opinion. To some, the OfQ initiative was just another attempt at 
commercialisation that would have produced similar results to all other initiatives – in other 
words, the impacts would have fallen short of the expected and a reorganisation would have 
occurred again in a few years (Engle, 2011, Riley, 2011). To others there seemed to be a 
feeling that this was a major attempt at tightening the organisational and operational 
structure and the impacts would have been significant and long lasting (Whelan, 2008). Dawn Louise Robins         
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Developing these opinions further and exploring the impact of OfQ would be an interesting 
topic for future investigation. 
One area for consideration with the counterfactual scenario and OfQ may be in the transition 
costs. It has been found that the costs during the franchising transition were inordinately high 
possibly due to no-one having the incentive to keep costs down. The act of franchising and 
taking on the management was more than enough to deal with and therefore cost efficiency 
was not the main priority in the beginning. A counterfactual scenario would therefore have 
seen the OfQ initiative keeping a tighter rein on the costs and the savings made, coupled with 
the expense of privatising, would possibly have been avoided. 
The OfQ initiative and its impact on the counterfactual and were considered to be important 
but investigation has found that the impact was not as influential as previously thought. 
7.4  Recommendations  
Pawson (2002) suggests that caution should be maintained when carrying out statistical 
analyses of data and ‘ruthless arithmetic extraction of net success’ (Pawson 2002 p356). It is 
recommended, therefore, that the findings of this research are taken for what they are: an 
account of the costs and benefits of the rail privatisation initiative as compared to a modelled 
and justified counterfactual scenario. Sensitivity tests should now be carried out to determine 
the robustness of the model, paying particular attention to the base year that was chosen and 
the recent work by Whelan et al. (2010).  
Sector analysis would further explain the anomalies that have been found in the different 
variables included in the research. Disaggregating the data into sectors and even ticket type 
may provide further insight into where the costs and benefits have been felt the most. It may 
be that future research could focus on this issue of a counterfactual scenario and look to 
develop different scenarios based on the different sectors. The main reason that this path was 
not taken during this research was due to the lack of data consistent with sector analysis – the 
costs could not be easily broken down into sectors due to the method of collection therefore 
the only method that could have been used in this research would be to look at the benefits 
and to discover which sectors had benefited the most. 
It was also apparent during the research how important the legacy of the Hatfield crash has 
been on the whole of the industry. Although it was decided, based on rigorously researched 
findings, that Hatfield was a product of the privatisation initiative, it would be interesting to Dawn Louise Robins         
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test out the impact if it was assumed, as it is by some that Hatfield is routed in the 
nationalised era and would have occurred in some form or another eventually.   
The increases that have been seen in subsidy over the research period are considerable and 
worthy of additional research. It has been explained here that the ‘tug of war’ that ensued 
between the Operators and the Government is a product of the principal agent problem and 
the difficulties with the initial franchising process has meant that additional funds have been 
used to increase the stability of the privatised structure. Although the work of Cowie (2009) 
looked at the initial round of franchising, to what extent these subsidies have been necessary 
and whether savings could have been achieved through the utilisation of other regulatory 
methods would be an interesting topic to consider (Cowie, 2009).  
Another interesting area of research that could be a developed as a progression from this 
thesis is the development of a qualitative counterfactual. Although this idea was explored in 
the latter stages of the research analysis it was quickly discovered that developing a 
qualitative analysis based on the actual events that have occurred would be even more 
subjective than the counterfactual that has been offered and, unless significant time and 
resources could be available to ensure the depth that was necessary to clarify and 
substantiate the evidence could be found, the argument would not be convincing. The 
benefits of undertaking such a task would have ensured specific events and impacts, that may 
not have been included in the variables, were accounted for, but, the determination of the 
amount of impact would have been subject to increased scrutiny. Developing a storyline to 
narrate the data may give the analysis of the privatisation impacts greater depth but whether 
this would achieve a greater understanding of the costs and benefits that have been felt is less 
certain. This is certainly an area of research that could be followed on from this thesis and 
developed for comparison. 
Due to the additional research that would be needed to underpin the results of this research 
further the policy recommendations are limited to observations of current changes. 
Competition was an aim of the privatised rail system and this has not proven to have been 
successful. Some of this may be due to the Conservative Government backing down on open 
access in the original franchises but this could have been remedied in later years. The political 
nature of the sector means that compromise is continually sought and any idealist remedies 
to increase profitability and competition end up diluted, and therefore less successful. There 
does seem to be a sense that competition for the market has been substituted for 
competition within the market (Shaw 2000). Dawn Louise Robins         
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Operators have shown the ability to ensure profits in the face of rising costs and could be 
influential in determining a reduction in costs for the infrastructure. It has been seen that the 
one franchise that does have infrastructure responsibility (Chiltern) has performed well in the 
time it has had. A move to longer franchises would give Franchisees the opportunity to invest 
in their franchise rather than act like the tenant they currently are.  
The research in this thesis has raised many more questions than it has answered, and 
although it provides a significant insight into how the privatisation initiative has impacted on 
the increase in passenger demand, it has also raised issues around the relationships between 
politics, economics and the public will.  The final section of this research will conclude on the 
thesis as a whole. 
7.5  Conclusion  
The modern control and perception of the railways is heavily embedded in its history.  The 
current regulation of the railways still stems from the 1845 Railways Act (Jordana and Levi-
Faur, 2004). The railways have always been politically controlled and although the structural 
changes to the railways management may seem to have been a natural economic and 
businesses decision any changes have always been routed in politics (Glaister, 2004). 
Franchising was fairly radical and untried in the format that was chosen and therefore 
mistakes had to be made for lessons to be learnt – unfortunately this came at the cost to the 
franchisee, but, ultimately the Government and therefore taxpayer. The privatisation of the 
British rail industry has seen benefits occurring to the consumers in lower prices, increased 
service quality and in some cases choice of operator. The operators have seen a reduction in 
their potential profits when compared to a counterfactual scenario but profits have always 
remained consistent. That this is mainly due to the increases in subsidy and support from the 
Government has shown that the real losers in the initiative have been the Government and 
therefore the non-users who have contributed through taxes to the increasingly costly service 
provision.  
The overall conclusion is thus that the privatisation package has been welfare negative. The 
most important cause has been the complexity and fragmented nature of the supply-side 
arrangements. Further reforms of these arrangements are probably warranted in order to 
address the cost deficiencies over and above those suggested could be delivered through the 
McNulty Review (2011). There are, however, other narratives that can be offered to support 
the findings. Supporters of the policy reforms would point out that privatisation was showing Dawn Louise Robins         
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some modest welfare gains up to 2000 or was, at worst, welfare neutral. The Hatfield crash 
changed that, and although the causes of the accident could be related to the changes in 
infrastructure maintenance procedures instigated by privatisation, the response was to take 
both infrastructure and train operations more firmly under public control (Glaister, 2004). This 
viewpoint would see the welfare losses from 2000 onwards as reflecting the failure of 
Governmental intervention, not privatisation (Hood, 1994). The counter argument is that any 
welfare gains achieved up to 2000 were as a result of both Train Operating Companies and 
Railtrack adopting business practices that were unsustainable – the subsequent business 
failures were a direct consequence of the privatisation initiative (Wolmar, 2005). 
This thesis has contributed to the current research by providing a plausible account of the 
impact of privatisation on the rail industry. The time scales covered and the breadth of topics 
included has led to a conclusive argument for the privatisation initiative costing far in excess 
of the benefits that have been felt. Further and additional work has been identified as 
possible routes to achieving a greater understanding of the impacts of which developing 
additional methodologies for ascertaining a counterfactual is one. Although the cost of 
privatising may be controversial there are few who believe the benefits to consumers would 
have arisen under the counterfactual. There may have been considerable cost savings but 
these were unlikely to have been transferred into consumer benefits. From this stance alone it 
can be seen that privatisation has had a positive impact, albeit a costly one.   Dawn Louise Robins         
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Appendix 1 Franchised Passenger Services 1996-97 
BR Train Operating Unit  Effective From  Franchisee 
South West Trains  4 Feb 1996  Stagecoach Holdings 
Great Western  4 Feb 1996  Great Western Holdings 
(MBO/First Bus/3i) 
East Coast  28 Apr 1996  Great North Eastern Railway 
(Sea Containers) 
Gatwick Express  28 Apr 1996  National Express Group 
Midland Mainline  28 Apr 1996  National Express Group 
South Central  26 May 1996  Connex Rail (CGEA) 
LTS Rail  26 May 1996  Prism Rail 
Chiltern Railways  21 July 1996  M40 Trains (MBO/Laing) 
South Eastern  13 Oct 1996  Connex Rail (CGEA) 
South Wales & West  13 Oct 1996  Prism Rail 
Cardiff Railway  13 Oct 1996  Prism Rail 
Thames Trains  13 Oct 1996  Victory Railway Holdings 
(MBO/Go-Ahead Group) 
Island Line  13 Oct 1996  Stagecoach 
Anglia Railways  5 Jan 1997  GB Railways 
CrossCountry  5 Jan 1997  Virgin Railways 
Great Eastern  5 Jan 1997  First Bus 
West Anglia Great Northern  5 Jan 1997  Prism Rail 
Merseyrail Electrics  19 Jan 1997  MTL Trust Holdings 
North West  2 Mar 1997  GW Holdings 
North London  2 Mar 1997  National Express Group 
North East  2 Mar 1997  MTL Trust Holdings 
Thameslink  2 Mar 1997  GOVIA (Go-Ahead/VIA GTI) 
Central  2 Mar 1997  National Express Group 
West Coast  9 Mar 1997  Virgin Railways 
ScotRail  31 Mar 1997  National Express Group 
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Appendix 2 Moving Average Calculations 
 
 
   PKm 
         x  y  XY  X₂  Y₂ 
1982-83  1  29.39  29.39  1  863.7721 
1983-84  2  29.24  58.48  4  854.9776 
1984-85  3  29.29  87.87  9  857.9041 
1985-86  4  29.92  119.68  16  895.2064 
1986-87  5  30.92  154.6  25  956.0464 
1987-88  6  31.75  190.5  36  1008.063 
1988-89  7  32.45  227.15  49  1053.003 
1989-90  8  32.97  263.76  64  1087.021 
1990-91  9  33.07  297.63  81  1093.625 
1991-92  10  32.61  326.1  100  1063.412 
1992-93  11  31.76  349.36  121  1008.698 
1993-94  12  30.98  371.76  144  959.7604 
 
78  374.35  2476.28  650  11701.49 
1994-95  13  31.28073  406.6495  169  978.4843 
 
91  405.6307  2882.93  819  12679.97 
1995-96  14  31.51982  441.2775  196  993.4993 
 
105  437.1506  3324.207  1015  13673.47 
1996-97  15  31.72017  475.8025  225  1006.169 
 
120  468.8707  3800.01  1240  14679.64 
1997-98  16  31.89532  510.3252  256  1017.312 
 
136  500.766  4310.335  1496  15696.95 
1998-99  17  32.05363  544.9117  289  1027.435 
 
153  532.8197  4855.246  1785  16724.39 
1999-00  18  32.20037  579.6066  324  1036.864 
 
171  565.02  5434.853  2109  17761.25 
2000-01  19  32.33899  614.4408  361  1045.81 
 
190  597.359  6049.294  2470  18807.06 
2001-02  20  32.4718  649.436  400  1054.418 
 
210  629.8308  6698.73  2870  19861.48 
2002-03  21  32.60038  684.608  441  1062.785 
 
231  662.4312  7383.338  3311  20924.26 
2003-04  22  32.72583  719.9682  484  1070.98 
 
253  695.157  8103.306  3795  21995.24 
2004-05  23  32.84892  755.5252  529  1079.052 
 
276  728.006  8858.831  4324  23074.3 
2005-06  24  32.97023  791.2855  576  1087.036 
 
300  760.9762  9650.117  4900  24161.33 
2006-07  25  33.09015  827.2538  625  1094.958 
 
325  794.0663  10477.37  5525  25256.29 
2007-08  26  33.20901  863.4341  676  1102.838 
 
351  827.2754  11340.8  6201  26359.13 
2008-09  27  33.32701  899.8294  729  1110.69 
 
378  860.6024  12240.63  6930  27469.82 
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RevPKm 
       x  y  XY  X₂  Y₂ 
1982-83  1  0.097948  0.097948  1  0.009594 
1982-83  2  0.09753  0.19506  4  0.009512 
1983-84  3  0.09764  0.292919  9  0.009533 
1984-85  4  0.099444  0.397776  16  0.009889 
1985-86  5  0.101625  0.508127  25  0.010328 
1986-87  6  0.103219  0.619316  36  0.010654 
1987-88  7  0.104668  0.732675  49  0.010955 
1988-89  8  0.105414  0.843315  64  0.011112 
1989-90  9  0.105566  0.950092  81  0.011144 
1990-91  10  0.106006  1.060059  100  0.011237 
1991-92  11  0.107094  1.178036  121  0.011469 
1992-93  12  0.1086  1.303198  144  0.011794 
1993-94  78  1.234754  8.178522  650  0.127223 
 
13  0.109667  1.425673  169  0.012027 
1994-95  91  1.344422  9.604195  819  0.139249 
 
14  0.110729  1.550204  196  0.012261 
1995-96  105  1.455151  11.1544  1015  0.15151 
 
15  0.111787  1.676808  225  0.012496 
1996-97  120  1.566938  12.83121  1240  0.164007 
 
16  0.112843  1.805493  256  0.012734 
1997-98  136  1.679781  14.6367  1496  0.17674 
 
17  0.113898  1.936264  289  0.012973 
1998-99  153  1.793679  16.57296  1785  0.189713 
 
18  0.114951  2.069127  324  0.013214 
1999-00  171  1.90863  18.64209  2109  0.202927 
 
19  0.116004  2.204082  361  0.013457 
2000-01  190  2.024635  20.84617  2470  0.216384 
 
20  0.117057  2.341133  400  0.013702 
2001-02  210  2.141691  23.18731  2870  0.230086 
 
21  0.118109  2.48028  441  0.01395 
2002-03  231  2.2598  25.66759  3311  0.244036 
 
22  0.11916  2.621526  484  0.014199 
2003-04  253  2.37896  28.28911  3795  0.258235 
 
23  0.120212  2.76487  529  0.014451 
2004-05  276  2.499172  31.05398  4324  0.272686 
 
24  0.121263  2.910313  576  0.014705 
2005-06  300  2.620435  33.96429  4900  0.287391 
 
25  0.122314  3.057855  625  0.014961 
2006-07  325  2.742749  37.02215  5525  0.302351 
 
26  0.123365  3.207498  676  0.015219 
2007-08  351  2.866114  40.22965  6201  0.31757 
 
27  0.124416  3.35924  729  0.015479 
2008-09  378  2.990531  43.58889  6930  0.33305 
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TKm 
         x  y  XY  X₂  Y₂ 
1982-83  1  311.78  311.78  1  97206.77 
1982-83  2  309.63  619.26  4  95870.74 
1983-84  3  307.02  921.06  9  94261.28 
1984-85  4  309.8  1239.2  16  95976.04 
1985-86  5  316.51  1582.55  25  100178.6 
1986-87  6  322.8  1936.8  36  104199.8 
1987-88  7  330.44  2313.08  49  109190.6 
1988-89  8  338.84  2710.72  64  114812.5 
1989-90  9  345.42  3108.78  81  119315 
1990-91  10  348.88  3488.8  100  121717.3 
1991-92  11  349.66  3846.26  121  122262.1 
1992-93  12  349.35  4192.2  144  122045.4 
1993-94  78  3940.13  26270.49  650  1297036 
 
13  353.9629  4601.518  169  125289.7 
1994-95  91  4294.093  30872.01  819  1422326 
 
14  358.4319  5018.047  196  128473.4 
1995-96  105  4652.525  35890.05  1015  1550799 
 
15  362.8104  5442.157  225  131631.4 
1996-97  120  5015.335  41332.21  1240  1682431 
 
16  367.1302  5874.083  256  134784.6 
1997-98  136  5382.465  47206.29  1496  1817215 
 
17  371.4106  6313.98  289  137945.8 
1998-99  153  5753.876  53520.27  1785  1955161 
 
18  375.664  6761.952  324  141123.4 
1999-00  171  6129.54  60282.23  2109  2096285 
 
19  379.8985  7218.071  361  144322.8 
2000-01  190  6509.438  67500.3  2470  2240607 
 
20  384.1194  7682.387  400  147547.7 
2001-02  210  6893.558  75182.68  2870  2388155 
 
21  388.3304  8154.938  441  150800.5 
2002-03  231  7281.888  83337.62  3311  2538956 
 
22  392.5341  8635.75  484  154083 
2003-04  253  7674.422  91973.37  3795  2693039 
 
23  396.7323  9124.843  529  157396.5 
2004-05  276  8071.155  101098.2  4324  2850435 
 
24  400.9263  9622.232  576  160741.9 
2005-06  300  8472.081  110720.4  4900  3011177 
 
25  405.1171  10127.93  625  164119.9 
2006-07  325  8877.198  120848.4  5525  3175297 
 
26  409.3054  10641.94  676  167530.9 
2007-08  351  9286.503  131490.3  6201  3342828 
 
27  413.4918  11164.28  729  170975.4 
2008-09  378  9699.995  142654.6  6930  3513803 
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